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INTRODUCTION
This is the thirteenth in a series of annual comments designed
to summarize and analyze significant developments in labor law.
Cases decided during the Survey year—April 1, 1973 to March 31,
1974—are reviewed in a format intended to be helpful to labor law
practitioners as well as to the general readership of this review.
Significant National Labor Relations Act decisions were ren-
dered by the Supreme Court in the areas of solicitation/distribution
activity,' election interference, 2 arbitration of plant safety disputes, 3
and union discipline of rank-and-file strikebreakers. 4
Furthermore, during the Survey year, the Supreme Court has
been unusually active in resolving issues which have arisen in em-
ployment discrimination cases under Title VII, as well as under the
Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the Fourteenth Amendment. While
these decisions have settled several controversial issues regarding
employment practices, additional questions, raising issues appro-
priate for Supreme Court review in the future, have contemporane-
ously divided the lower federal courts. The issues resolved by the
Supreme Court during the Survey year include: the effect of a prior
adverse arbitration award in a Title VII case; 5 the burden of proof
requirements under Title VII; 6 the permissibility of mandatory
maternity leave regulations in public school systems;' and the scope
of the prohibition against discrimination on the basis of alienage by
privates and state government 9 employers.
See pp. 1138-43 infra.
2 See pp. 1114-17 infra.
3 See pp. 1182-87 infra.
4 See pp. 1122-30 infra.
See pp. 1187-98 infra.
See pp. 1211-18 infra.
7 See pp. 1222-27 infra.
/I See pp. 1234-42 infra.
9 See pp. 1234-42 infra.
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I. REPRESENTATIONAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL ACTIVITY
A. Employer's Role in Representation Affairs
1. "Midwest Piping" Doctrine—Duty of Neutrality: Play-
skool; Western Commercial
The Survey year saw significant judicial review of the policy of
the Board in regard to the duty of an employer confronted with
recognitional demands by two or more unions. Section 8(a)(2) of the
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA or Act) forbids an em-
ployer "to dominate or interfere with the formation or administra-
tion of any labor organization or contribute financial or other sup-
port to it . .. ." 1 When an employer recognizes as his employees'
bargaining representative a union which is not supported by a
majority of the employees, he violates section 8(a)(2) by bestowing
"support" upon the minority union. 2 Thus, until the majority of
employees have evidenced their choice of a bargaining representa-
tive, the employer is held to a duty of neutrality among the unions
rivaling for the choice of the majority. In Playskool, Inc. v. NLRB, 3
a Survey year decision by the Seventh Circuit, the Board's view of
the scope of this duty of neutrality, popularly termed the Midwest
Piping doctrine, was decisively rejected. However, the Fifth Cir-
cuit, speaking during the Survey year in NLRB v. Western Com-
mercial Transport, Inc., 4 accepted the Board's Midwest Piping doc-
trine, and thus adopted a position contrary to that taken by the
Seventh Circuit and the other circuit courts.`
First announced by the Board in Midwest Piping & Supply
Co. 6 in 1945, the Midwest Piping doctrine defined the employer's
duty of neutrality under section 8(a)(2) as an obligation to refrain
from recognition of one of two or more rival unions at a time when
"there existed a real question concerning the representation of the
employees."7 The Board, since Midwest Piping, has not formulated
I 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (19W).
2
 ILGWU v. NLRB (Bernard-Altmann), 366 U.S. 731, 738 (1961).
3
 477 F.2d 66, 73, 82 L.R.R.M. 2916, 2921 (7th Cir. 1973).
• 487 F.2d 332, 334, 84 L.R.R.M. 2814, 2815 (5th Cir. 1973).
5
 The Seventh Circuit, in Playskool, noted that the courts of appeals have generally
refused to adhere to the Board's Midwest Piping doctrine. 477 F.2d at 69-70, 82 L.R.R.M. at
218. Among these courts are the Ninth Circuit, NLRB v. Peter Paul, Inc., 467 F.2d 700, 80
L.R.R.M. 3431 (9th Cir. 1972); the Eighth Circuit, Modine Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 453 F.2d
292, 79 L.R.R.M. 2109 (8th Cir. 1971); and the Sixth Circuit, American Bread Co. v. NLRB,
411 F.2d 147, 71 L.R.R.M. 2243 (6th Cir. 1969). The Playskool decision includes the Seventh
Circuit among these courts, but the Western Commercial decision, adopting the Midwest
Piping doctrine, aligns the Fifth Circuit with the Board.
• 63 N.L.R.B, 1060, 17 L.R.R.M. 40 (1945).
7
 63 N.L.R.B, at 1070, 17 L.R.R.M. at 55.
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any specific rules governing the required amount of support and the
proper means of proof of the support that would be sufficient to
create a real question concerning representation.° Instead, it has
traditionally required a union to show that. its claim to majority
status is "not clearly unsupportable and lacking in substance" if it
seeks to prevent the employer from recognizing its rival. As applied
by the Board, this test meant that although a union had provided
clear evidence of majority status, it was not entitled to recognition
by the employer if the union's rival had provided the employer with
evidence of majority support so that its claim to majority status is
"not clearly unsupportable and lacking in substance." In the Board's
Playskool decision,")
 the evidence indicated that the employer rec-
ognized the union as the representative of his employees, although
he knew that the union's rival had demonstrated almost thirty
percent support in a prior election and had since continued organi-
zational and solicitational campaigning. The rival had not
petitioned for an election; nevertheless the employer was aware that
it was seeking recognition. The Board conceded that the union
which was recognized by the employer held a majority of valid
authorization cards at the time of recognition, a fact verified by the
state labor conciliation service." Nevertheless, the Board held the
employer violated section 8(a)(2) by granting the union recognition
on the basis of the card majority, since the rival had demonstrated
substantial support sufficient to create what it termed a real issue
concerning representation. 12
The Seventh Circuit Playskool decision, reversing the Board,
held that the employer was permitted to recognize the union despite
the lack of an election, since the union had demonstrated majority
support." The court reasoned that there is no issue concerning
representation where the union had demonstrated majority support,
but its rival had not. Recognizing" that giving its imprimatur to
such employer conduct foreclosed the use of the Board's election
machinery" as a means of settling conflicting claims to majority
status, the court nevertheless concluded that its decision promoted
proper labor policies by enabling the employer to give more im-
477 F.2d at 69, 82 L.R.R.M. at 2918.
Playskool, Inc., 195 N.L.R.B. 560, 79 L.R.R.M. 1507 (1972).
io Ed .
11 Id. at 560, 79 L.R.R.M. at 1510.
la
 Id.
la
 477 F.2d at 70, 82 L.R.R.M. at 2919.
14 Id.
15
 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1)(B) (1970) authorizes the Board to conduct elections to determine
the bargaining representative of the employees if there is a question of representation of the
employees.
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mediate effect to the employees' majority will and thereby to pro-
mote industrial peace. 16 By sanctioning the employer's recognition,
the Playskool court implies that the employer's statutory right to
petition for an election" was not an equally adequate method of
achieving these labor policies. Where there is sufficient evidence of
its majority status despite the evidence of substantial support of the
rival, the Seventh Circuit felt the employer bestows no unlawful
support by recognizing the union.
However, the Fifth Circuit in NLRB v. Western Commercial
Transport, Inc.," upon a fact situation substantially similar to that
in Playskool, agreed with the Board that a real question concerning
representation encompasses the situation where there are two rival
unions, one of which presents evidence of a card majority and one
which presents evidence of substantial employee support falling
somewhat short of a majority. The court there indicated that it is
not improper for the Board, in this situation, to require the em-
ployer to postpone recognition until valid election results are
available. 19
 In the light of the broad discretion usually afforded the
Board in matters concerning methods of demonstrating majority
support, 2° and since neither the statute itself nor any strong statu-
tory policy dictates otherwise, the courts of appeals might better
defer to Board judgment and thus promote a uniform national
policy.
The rival union situation presents special problems which jus-
tify the Board's judgment. First, unlike the case where only one
union is soliciting employee support, the situation involving compe-
tition among rival unions, each of which exhibits substantial em-
ployee support, presents greater possibilities of unlawful employer
support of either union. The employer, faced with the certainty that
one of the two unions will "get in," has an inducement to interfere
with the employees' free choice by favoring that union considered by
him to be less aggressive. The inclination to favor a union is not as
great where only one union seeks to represent the employees. Sec-
ondly, in the situation where two unions are competing, there exists
the possibility that employees have signed authorization cards of
both unions, thus placing in doubt the validity of an apparent card
majority on the part of either union. 21
'n See 477 F.2d at 73, 82 L.R.R.M. at 2920.
17
 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1)(B) (1970) gives an employer the right to petition the Board for an
election to determine the collective bargaining representative of his employees where there
exists a question of representation.
'n 487 F.2d 332, 84 L.R.R.M. 2814 (5th Cir. 1973).
19 Id. at 334, 84 L.R.R.M. at 2815.
	 I
20
 See NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 fU.S. 575, 610-16 (1969).
21
 See 477 F.2d at 72, 82 L.R.R.M. at 2920.
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It is reasonable that the Board curtail the discretion of an
employer confronted with the substantial claims of rival unions,
since the employer's perception that one has majority support may
often be in error. Proscribing such recognition as unlawful employer
support violative of section 8(a)(2) is a reasonable means of prevent-
ing the danger that an employer will recognize a minority union.
The Board's Midwest Piping doctrine, which concededly favors the
election machinery over employer judgment 22 as a means of ascer-
taining the employees' will, continues to be applied by the Board in
its Survey year decisions. 23 Thus, a continued conflict between the
Board and the courts of appeals is likely, and a resolution of the
dispute by the Supreme Court would be welcome.
2. Pre-Hire Contracts and Representation in the Construction In-
dustry: R. J. Smith
Both an employer24
 and a union25 are ordinarily prohibited
from executing a collective bargaining agreement at a time when the
union does not represent a majority of employees. 26 Nevertheless,
section 8(0 27
 of the Act permits a collective bargaining agreement,
22
 Employer judgment of the merits of the conflicting claims of majority support made
by each of two rivals exists even where, as in Playskool, the employer submitted the issue to
an impartial third party. In Playskool, the employer failed to notify the third party of the
organizational and recognitional effort of a union, other than the one whose cards were to be
checked. Thus, the third party judge was not appraised of circumstances that would necessi-
tate an investigation into the possibility that authorization cards of both unions were signed
by the same employees, in which case an apparent union card majority could become an
invalid index of employee sentiment. 477 F.2d at 742, 82 L.R.R.M. at 2920. The court of
appeals justified the failure by the employer to notify the impartial third party. It reasoned
that the rival had not recently claimed to have increased the 29.9 percent support it garnered
in the prior election, and thus the employer was not aware that its claim to recognition was
substantial. 477 F.2d at 742, 82 L.R.R.M. at 2920-21. However, it was the employer's
judgment, in determining that the rival had not increased support since the last election,
which tainted the validity of the card check performed by the independent third party.
23 E.g., Robert Hall Gentilly Rd. Corp , 207 N.L.R.B. No. 113, 84 L.R.R.M. 1538
(1973); Traub's Market, 205 N.L.R.B. No. 124, 84 L.R.R.M. 1078 (1973). See California
Gen'l Linen Supply Co., 206 N.L.R.B. No. 37, 84 L.R.R.M. 1613 (1973); Playskool, Inc.,
205 N.L.R.B. No. 165, 84 L.R.R.M. 1129 (1973).
24
 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1970) proscribes employer interference with the statutory rights
of employees, among which is the right to bargain collectively through representatives of their
own choosing. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970). 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1970) defines "representatives" as
those "designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining by the majority of
employees ." See also ILGWU v. NLRB (Bernhard-Altmann), 366 U.S. 731, 738 (1961).
25
 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(A) forbids a union to "restrain or coerce employees in the
exercise of their rights." This section is interpreted as prohibiting a union to accept the
employer's recognition while it is a minority union. 366 U.S. at 738.
2b See Bernhard-Altmann, 366 U.S. 731 (1961).
27
 29 U.S.C. § 158(f) provides in pertinent part:
It shall not be an unfair labor practice	 . for an employer engaged primarily in
the building and construction industry to make an agreement covering employees
engaged (or who, upon their employment, will be engaged) in the building and
construction industry with a labor organization of which building and construction
1110
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which necessarily contains a recognition of the union as the em-
ployees' bargaining representative, to be executed by an employer in
the construction industry and a union not representing a majority of
his employees. In a significant Survey year decision by the District
of Columbia Circuit, Operating Engineers, Local 150 v. NLRB (R.J.
Srnith), 28 it was held that an employer is not entitled to breach the
section 8(f)-validated contract with the minority union simply be-
cause the contracting union had not yet achieved majority status
among the employees of the construction industry employer. Con-
fronted with a section 8(1) issue of first impression, the court in R.J.
Smith rendered a decision which, if followed by the Board and
other courts, would be likely to lend stability to labor relations in
the construction industry.
In this case, the employer and the union executed a contract
regulating the terms and conditions of employment of employees yet
to be hired by the employer. The collective bargaining agreement
included a union security provision which was never enforced dur-
ing the term of the contract. At the time of the making of the
contract, the union was necessarily not a majority union since, as
contemplated by the draftsmen of section 8(f), 29 the employer had
not yet hired the employees to be employed on upcoming construc-
tion projects. Thus, the employer had no employees by whom a
bargaining representative could have been selected. Nevertheless, in
order to allow the employer to ascertain his costs of labor before
bidding on construction contracts, this collective bargaining agree-
ment, popularly termed a "pre-hire contract," was lawfully executed
under section 8(f) protection. During the term of this pre-hire con-
tract, the employer unilaterally altered wages and other employment
conditions specified by the contract. 3° The employer refused to
bargain over the alterations on the ground that the union was still a
minority union, and thus had no right to represent the employees for
bargaining purposes. 3 ' The union filed a refusal to bargain charge
against the employer, which alleged a violation of section 8(a)(5). 32
employees are members . . . because (1) the majority status of such labor organiza-
tion has not been established under the provisions of section 159 of this title prior to
the making of such agreement . . . Provided further, That any agreement which
would be invalid, but for clause (1) of this subsection, shall not be a bar to a petition
filed pursuant to section 159(c) or 159(e) of this title.
28
 480 F.2d 1186, 83 L.R.R.M. 2706 (D.C. Cir, 1973). For a comprehensive analysis of
this case, sec Note, 15 B.C. Incl. & Corn. L. Rev. 862 (1974)
an See H.R. Rep. No, 741, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1959), reprinted in 1 Legislative
History of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 759, 777 (1959).
3°
 480 F.2d at 1187-88, 83 L.R.R.M. at 2707.
31
 R.J. Smith Constr. Co., 191 N.L.R.B. 693, 695, 77 L.R.R.M. 1493, 1496 (1972).
32 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer to refuse to
bargain with the bargaining representative of his employees.
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The union conceded that the union security provision of the contract
had gone unenforced and that it did not yet qualify as the statutory,
majority-supported bargaining representative of the employees cur-
rently working for the employer. 33
The Board, reasoning that the union was not the employees'
bargaining representative, refused to hold that the employer vio-
lated his duty to bargain. Noting that under a section 8(1) pre-hire
contract the union was not entitled to the presumption of majority
status otherwise given to a union during the term of the collective
bargaining agreement, the Board stated that the union had no right
to assert a right to bargain with the employer since it was not the
employees' majority representative. 34 Allowing the proof of the
union's minority status as an affirmative defense to the section
8(a)(5) complaint, the Board held that section 8(f) validated only the
execution of the pre-hire contract, and did not obligate the employer
to adhere to it unless the union achieved majority status, either
through enforcement of a union security provision or otherwise.
According to the Board, the exception to the requirement of major-
ity union bargaining created by section 8(f) did not continue after
the execution of the pre-hire contract. This discontinuation of em-
ployer bargaining obligations to the minority union after the date of
execution of the pre-hire contract was supported, according to the
Board's opinion, 35 by section 8(1) itself. The Board reasoned that
since section 8(0 gave the employer the right to petition for an
election among his employees in order to challenge the majority
status of the union at any time, 36 the employer was not required to
presume the union was currently the majority representative and
thus deserving of bargaining recognition. Members Fanning and
Brown argued in dissent that since Congress validated the pre-hire
contract, it would be unreasonable to hold that it nevertheless
permitted the employer to alter or repudiate the contract upon his
own judgment as to the union's current status, since such a result
would interfere with the aim of validating the execution of the
contract. 37
Though the District of Columbia Court of Appeals conceded
that the Board's concern for the union's need to acquire majority
33 480 F.2d at 1188, 83 L.R.R.M. at 2707.
34 191 N.L.R.B. 693, 695, 77 L.R.R.M. 1493, 1496 (1972).
35 191 N.L.R.B. at 694-95, 77 L.R.R.M. at 1495-96.
36 Under § 9(c)(3) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(3) (1970), the Board may not direct an
election in a bargaining unit in which a valid election had been conducted within the
preceding twelve months. The § 8(b) proviso exempts construction industry employers and
unions working under a pre-hire contract from this bar.
37 191 N.L.R.B. at 695-96, 77 L.R.R.M. at 1496.
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status was warranted, 38
 it nevertheless agreed with the Board dis-
senters that the election machinery made available to the employer
by the section 8(f) proviso, rather than the employer's own judg-
ment, was the exclusive method for the employer to prove the
union's minority status and to lawfully repudiate the contract or
avoid bargaining duties. 39 The court interpreted section 8(f) as es-
tablishing the election machinery as the sole means of testing the
union's status, especially since leaving the employer's discretion as
an alternative method would render contracts voidable at will."
The decision—that the employer must fulfill bargaining and
other statutory obligations until an election proves the union to be
supported by less than a majority—appears correct in light of the
purpose of section 8(f) and practical circumstances. If the employer
is permitted to repudiate the pre-hire contract at will, he may then
refuse to enforce a union security contractual provision, and in that
way prevent the union's attainment of majority status. Further-
more, if the employer can repudiate the contract and unilaterally
alter conditions of employment, the employer will be able to lower
the prestige of the union and consequently discourage employee
membership and prevent the union from achieving majority status.
Thus, unless the union can resort to the Board to remedy employer
unfair labor practices, such as refusals to bargain over contract
alterations, the employer will be permitted to prevent the union's
attainment of majority status, and then to rely on that as justifying
its repudiation of the pre-hire contract. It would be inequitable to
allow the construction industry employer to breach the pre-hire
contract, since such conduct would unfairly reduce the union's
chances of attaining majority status.
Permitting unilateral contract repudiation without the statutory
prerequisite of an election will compromise the integrity of pre-hire
construction contracts, and thus weaken the congressionally-
approved structure of collective bargaining in the industry. Al-
though the R.J. Smith decision was accepted by the Board on
remand as the law of the case, 4 ' the Board did not express agree-
ment with the decision. In order to promote stability in construction
industry bargaining and give effect to the representation scheme
contemplated by section 8(1), the Board would do well to reverse
itself and follow the lead of the District of Columbia Circuit. 42
38
 480 F.2d at 1190, 83 L.R.R,M. at 2709.
39
 id, at 1189-90, 83 L.R.R.M. at 2709.
40
 See id. at 1190, 83 L.R.R.M. at 2709.
R.J. Smith Constr. Co., 208 N.L.R.B. No. 90, 85 L.R.R.M, 1187 (1974).
42
 In NLRB v. Irvin, 475 F.2d 1265, 82 L.R.R.M. 3015 (3d Cir. 1973), another § 8(f)
Survey year decision, the Third Circuit also held that the employer's unilateral repudiation of
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B. Election Interference
1. Waiver of Union Dues: Savair Manufacturing
The 1973-1974 Survey year evidenced a significant Supreme
Court willingness to overrule Board-promulgated policies in the area
of regulation of elections, 43 and to substitute for the Board policy
those policies thought more desirable by the judiciary. In NLRB v.
Savair Manufacturing Co., 44
 the Supreme Court rejected the Board
request for deference to its administrative expertise and discretion in
the regulation of elections. 45 Instead, it held that a campaigning
union's waiver of initiation dues for employees, who sign union
authorization cards before the election, violates the principle of free
and fair elections, and thus is an impermissible campaign tool."
The facts in Savair Manufacturing are as follows: Prior to the
election, union agents solicited signatures of authorization cards
from the employees, who were currently unrepresented. The agents
promised that the union would exempt the employees who signed
the cards before the election from the otherwise usual obligation to
pay initiation dues.'" The obligation to pay initiation dues, as the
signing employees were contemporaneously informed," would not
attach unless the union won the election and then executed a collec-
tive bargaining agreement containing a union security provision
specifying payment of such dues by employees." Although the
initiation dues were only ten dollars, the employer nevertheless
contended that the conditional waiver of that obligation in soliciting
card support unlawfully interfered with the later election, won by
the union in a 22-20 vote. 50
 Relying on its prior decision in DIT-
MCO, Inc., 51
 the Board had rejected the employer's contention that
the waiver of dues made the subsequent election invalid. 52 Instead,
it held that the union's inducement to sign the cards in no way
the pre-hire contract violated his duty to bargain. However, there the union was entitled to
presumption of majority status because the union security provision had been enforced, and
thus the factual situation clearly foreclosed an employer challenge to the union's majority
outside the election machinery.
45 29 U.S.C.	 159(c) (1970) authorizes the Board to conduct secret ballot elections
among employees in order for them to select by majority will their collective bargaining
representative.
44 414 U.S. 270 (1973).
45
 Id. at 276.
46 Id. at 276-81.
Id. at 273.
68 Id. at 282.
45 Id.
513 Id. at 278.
51 163 N.L.R.B. 1019, 64 L.RRM. 1476 (1967), enforced, 428 F.2d 775, 74 L.R.R.M.
2664 (8th Cir. 1970).
" See Savair Mfg. Co., 194 N.L.R.B. 298, 78 L.R.R.M. 1605 (1971), enforcement
denied, 470 F.2d 305, 82 L.R.R.M. 2085 (6th Cir. 1972).
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influenced the employees' freedom of choice exercised in the secret
ballot elections. 53
In its DIT-MCO decision, the Board had reasoned that the
union waiver of initiation fees, although inducing signature of the
cards, results in no restriction upon the employees' independence at
the polls. 54
 Hypothesizing that an employee could sign the card
merely to qualify for the waiver of the initiation dues but actually
oppose the union's selection as the bargaining representative, the
Board in D1T
-MCO pointed out that he is not induced to sublimi-
nate his actual desires and vote for the union." If avoiding initia-
tion dues is his objective, he can best promote that end and still
fulfill his actual choice by voting against the union. Voting against
the union would promote a union election loss, which in turn would
automatically prevent any liability, not only for union membership
initiation fees, but also for any other dues. Furthermore, even
though he voted anti-union at the polls, the employee who had
signed the card would not forfeit his qualification for the waiver of
initiation dues that would accrue if the union won the election and
negotiated a contract containing union security provisions." With
these considerations in mind, the employee, antagonistic to the
union, would have nothing to gain by casting a vote favorable to the
union, 57
 whether or not he was induced to sign an authorization
card by the union's promise to waive initiation dues. With respect to
pro-union employees who have qualified for the dues waiver by a
pre-election signature of an authorization card, the economic benefit
to be received would not have any coercive impact upon his vote,
which would, in any case, be cast for the union."
Despite this compelling Board argument, the majority of the
Court in Savair Manufacturing strained to find some circumstances
in which the union's economic inducement to sign the cards could
result in an inducement to vote for the union, and thus taint the
election with unfairness. It stated that by sanctioning this means of
card solicitation, the union is permitted to "buy endorsements and
paint a false portrait of employee support during its election
campaign,"59 which in turn may be used to convince co-workers to
express their support of the union at the polls. Secondly, the Court
stated that although the employee may be aware that the waiver-
induced signature of the card imposes no legal obligation to vote for
53 414 U.S. at 275-77.
54 163 N.L.RB. at 1021-22, 64 L.R.R.M. at 1477-78.
55
56 Id .
" Id.
59 Id.
59 414 U,S. at 277.
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the union, he may nevertheless feel a duty to continue, at the polls,
the support of the union initially indicated by his card signature. 6 °
These possibilities, though unsupported by evidence in the record,
were relied upon by the Court in its overruling of the Board's
decision. 6 '
The dissenting opinion written by Mr. Justice White, with
whom Justices Brennan and Blackmun joined, 62 found the
majority's postulations insufficiently persuasive to warrant denying
the Board the broad discretion it is entitled to in regulating
elections. 63 Especially where a conditional exemption from a mere
ten dollar fee is concerned, the dissent properly stated that the
voter's decision is unlikely to be significantly affected," even if the
employee thought that the way he voted would affect the economic
benefit to be received from the waiver of initiation dues. 65 Because
there were such persuasive arguments to disprove the theory that
the union waiver affects the employee's free choice at the polls, the
dissent concluded that this issue was one best resolved by the
application of administrative expertise and discretion.
There is certainly a conflicting interest between the union's
right to make itself attractive to employees without mis-
representation and the employee's unfettered choice
to vote for or against the union. . . . [I]t is rational for the ,
Board to conclude on the basis of the facts presented that
the decision of the Union to waive small fees was not
coercive . . . . 66
The Court's decision in Savair Manufacturing appears
unjustified in light of the argument that the union's conditional
waiver of initiation dues for those signing cards before the election
does not materially affect the voting decision. Moreover, the Board
is normally afforded broad discretion in the regulation of elections.
The Board has been entrusted with the task of encouraging the
statutory policy of promoting the use of collective bargaining, 67
which necessarily requires the protection of legitimate campaign
tools used by unions to organize the employees." The Court re-
" Id. at 277-78.
61
 Id.
62 Id. at 281.
63 The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized the great amount of discretion afforded
the Board's determinations as to proper regulations necessary to ensure fair elections. E.g.,
NLRB v. A.J. Tower Co., 329 U.S. 324, 330 (1946).
64 414 U.S. at 284-85.
65
 Id. at 289.
66 Id. at 290.
67 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1970).
65 414 U.S. at 285 n.4.
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stricted the methods by which the collective bargaining option is
presented to the employees, without providing an evidentiary
rationale for overturning the Board's policy. Thus, Savair Manu-
facturing unreasonably restricts the Board's effort to promote the
statutory policy favoring collectivization without compromise of the
employees' exercise of a free and fair choice in selecting that option.
The Savair Manufacturing decision argues for a curtailment of
Board discretion, thus further encouraging litigation, which can
only lead to a substitution of judicially desired policies for those
labor policies reasonably fashioned by a labor board experienced in
the regulation of elections.
2. Board Procedure: Modine Manufacturing
As was apparent in Savair Manufacturing, 69 the proper alloca-
tion of responsibility between the Board and the judiciary for de-
termining the proper labor policies. to be applied in the representa-
tion area is a matter of continual concern. In an important Survey
year decision, Modine Manufacturing Co.," the Board sought to
increase judicial deference to the discretion exercised by the Board
in adjudicating objections to the results of Board-conducted
elections. 7 I The authority of the judiciary to review Board deci-
sions, denying the election challenger a hearing upon his claims of
election interference, was not questioned. 72 However, the Board did
seek to present compelling arguments for deference to its discre-
tion to a judiciary currently contemptuous of the Board method of
handling election challenges."
In Modine Manufacturing, the winner of the election had been
certified as the employees' collective bargaining representative. Prior
to the certification, the Board had received the Regional Director's
report of the investigation into complaints of union misrepresenta-
tions allegedly made during the last minute before the election."
The Board concluded that the objections did not allege "substantial
and material issues," which would entitle the employer to a
hearing." Having been charged with violating his section 8(a)(5)
64 See text supra at notes 65-68.
7° 203 N.L.R.B. No. 77, 83 L.R.R.M. 1133 (1973).
7 ' 29 U.S.C. § 159 (1970) authorizes the Board to conduct elections among employees in
order for them to select, by majority will, their collective bargaining representative. While the
Act specifies no duty of the Board to conduct hearings upon post-election objections, the Board
has ordered hearings in certain cases as a means of administering fair and free elections. 203
N.L.R.B. No. 77, 83 L.R.R.M. at 1135.
72 83 L.R.R.M. at 1135,
73
 Id. at 1134.
74 Id. at 1133-34.
75 Id. at 1134. Under Board promulgated rules, post-election objections warrant a
hearing if they contain allegations raising "substantial and material issues." 29 C.F.R.
1117
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
duty to bargain with the certified representative of the employees,
the employer sought to relitigate his claim of right to hearing,
asserting this right as an affirmative defense to the section 8(0(5)
unfair labor practice complaint." Since the Board unanimously"
decided that its original decision to dismiss the objections and refuse
the petition for a hearing was correct, it dismissed, as an attempt to
relitigate an issue already litigated, the employer's claim of denial
of a hearing as a defense to the unfair labor practice complaint."
The significance of the case lies in the Board's arguments put forth
to justify its initial refusal to direct a hearing upon the election
challenges.
Standards for determining which allegations of election mis-
conduct are sufficient to merit a post-election hearing were an-
nounced in the Board's 1962 decision in Hollywood Ceramics Co. 79
There, it was held that last minute, pre-election misrepresentations
constituting a substantial departure from the truth and which could
reasonably be expected to have a significant impact upon the elec-
tion would warrant invalidating the results of the election. 8° Thus,
Hollywood Ceramics established standards of election invalidation
for determining whether a hearing is merited. In Modine Manufac-
turing, the Board propounded legal and pragmatic reasons why the
judiciary should exercise restraint in overruling Board judgments as
to whether the allegation contained in the objections state circum-
stances meeting the Hollywood Ceramics standards. Among the
pragmatic reasons advanced by the Board as warranting increased
judicial deference to the Board's decisions was the need to adjust
judicial policies to the nearly unlimited demands placed upon the
Board's limited resources. 81 The Board conducts 9,000 elections, in
which many of the campaigns are hard fought; and thus fertile soil
for allegations of election misconduct." Therefore, the Board ex-
plained that it must be given sufficient latitude to determine which
objections justify the expenditure of its own time and resources."
Since it must allocate the limited amount of public funds as
efficiently as possible, the Board indicated that judicial orders to the
§ 102.69 (1973). See Hollywood Ceramics Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 221, 224, 51 L.R.R.M. 1600,
1601 (1962).
76 83 L.R.R.M. at 1133-34.
77 The entire membership of the Board voted to hold that its original decision in the
representation case was correct. Member Kennedy concurred. 83 L.R.R.M. at 1138.
78 Id. at 1133-34.
79 140 N.L.R.B. 221, 51 L.R.R.M. 1600 (1962).
g° Id. at 221-22, 51 L.R.R.M. at 1601-02.
al 83 L.R.R.M. at 1135.
82 Id.
83 Id. at 1135-36.
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Board to conduct representation hearings would interfere with re-
sources otherwise directed toward adjudicating unfair labor practice
complaints. 84
The courts should not hasten to direct hearings, the Board
further cautioned, because the hearings often are unreliable in de-
termining the actual impact of the challenged conduct on the
voting. 85
 Moreover, hearings unnecessarily interfere with the com-
mencement of collective bargaining. Certification of the election
winner bars another election only for one year, a time period which
may, in any case, be consumed by post-election hearings. 86 Thus,
the postponement of collective bargaining caused by the hearings
may not yield any benefit, since a second election may be awaiting
the outcome of the hearing. These practical considerations, in the
opinion of the Board, justify use of what it considers an "adminis-
trative" test of objections sufficient to meet Hollywood Ceramics
standards for ordering a hearing. Thus, the Board considers that the
proper test is whether the alleged misconduct would have a "ten-
dency materially to mislead" the voters' minds rather than whether,
upon the evidence developed at a hearing, the misrepresentations
actually did have a significant impact upon the election votes."
Because of the need for an administrative rather than an evidentiary
test, the Board felt its discretion should be given great weight: "The
existence of a tendency is a matter calling for the exercise of our own
administrative expertise, rather than something which is susceptible
to development through an evidentiary hearing. "88
The distinction in these tests may be revealed by noting one
particular area where the Board's "administrative" test and the
courts' evidentiary "actual impact" test collide. In reaching their
decisions, the courts have noted that the closeness of the election
tallies have encouraged the courts to direct the Board to order
hearings. 89
 The Board, on the other hand, feels that a close vote
indicates that the misconduct was not material, since if it were, it
would likely have caused a lopsided vote. 90 The courts' approach
however, substitutes for the Board's administrative "tendency" test,
a test of actual impact upon voter choice. Board utilization of such a
e4 Id .
35
 Id. at 1136-37.
36 Id. at 1136. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(2) (1970) makes a valid election a bar to a subsequent
election in the bargaining unit for a period of one year,
37 83 L.R.R.M. at 1137.
118 Id.
59 E.g., 48 F,2d at 64, 85 L.R.R.M. at 2181. See 83 L.R.R.M. at 1137, where the Board
stated that the closeness of the election results would support the denial of a hearing, since if
the alleged misconduct was truly material to voter choice, the vote would more likely be
lopsided.
" 83 L.R.R.M. at 1137.
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test would result in direction of hearing in many cases where there
was a close vote and objections were filed.
It is likely that a factual determination of what constitutes
substantial misrepresentation, by an evidentiary inquiry into the
extent the misconduct actually influenced voter choice, would be a
prohibitively difficult and unreliable task. Thus, the Board's use of
this administrative test to determine the right to a hearing appears
warranted. However, Survey year decisions by several courts of
appeals" have exhibited a continuing refusal to defer to the Board's
judgments.
In both the cases affirming the Board's denial of a hearing92
and in those reversing the Board93 by ordering an evidentiary hear-
ing, the courts of appeals have demonstrated a willingness to review
in depth the reasons, if any, expressed by the Board for its refusal to
conduct a hearing. This willingness to review these Board decisions
critically requires the Board to delineate all the reasons it may have
for its refusal, and thus places severe administrative burdens upon
the Board.
C. Board Jurisdiction: Bodle*
Although the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations
Board extends to all employers whose operations affect commerce,
nevertheless there is express congressional authorization for a Board
refusal to assert its jurisdiction over a particular class of employers
"where, in the opinion of the Board, the effect of such labor dispute
on commerce is not sufficiently substantial to warrant the exercise of
its jurisdiction."' The Board's refusal to assert jurisdiction over a
class of employers has a severe impact upon the organizational
activity of employees of these employers since, without access to the
Board, those employees are without the protections from employer
91 NLRB v, Carlton McLendon Furniture Co., 488 F.2d 58, 85 L.R.R.M. 2177 (5th Cir.
1974); Thiem Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 489 F.2d 788, 85 L.R.R.M. 2063 (9th Cir. 1973).
Contra, Harlan No. 4 Coal Co. v. NLRB, 490 F.2d 117, 85 L.R.R.M. 2312 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, — U.S. —, 86 L.R.R.M. 2156 (1974); NLRB v. Shawnee Plastics, 492 F.2d 869, 85
L.R.R.M. 2308 (6th Cir. 1974).
92 E.g., 490 F.2d at 123-25, 85 L.R.R.M. at 2314-18.
91 488 F.2d at 59-67, 85 L.R.R.M. at 2178-84.
* The authors wish to acknowledge the helpful research and comments on Board
jurisdiction provided by Peter Moll of the Boston College Industrial & Commercial Law
Review.
' 29 U.S.C. § 164(c)(1) (1970) states:
The Board, in its discretion, may, by rule of decision or by published rules
adopted pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act, decline to assert jurisdiction
over any labor dispute involving any class or category of employers, where, in the
opinion of the Board, the effect of such labor dispute on commerce is not sufficiently
substantial to warrant the exercise of its jurisdiction: Provided, That the Board shall
not decline to assert jurisdiction over any labor dispute over which it would assert
jurisdiction under the standards prevailing upon August 1, 1959.
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interference 2 that would otherwise be guaranteed by Board applica-
tion of the NLRA. Although the Board's refusal to exercise its
jurisdiction permits the employees to request assumption of jurisdic-
tion by the applicable state labor board, 3 state law may contain
much weaker protection for employee representational and organi-
zational activities.
During the Survey year, the Board rendered numerous deci-
sions relating to the exercise of its jurisdiction. One of these cases, in
which the Board declined to exercise jurisdiction over law firms as a
class of employers, 4 is deserving of comment. 5
 In Bodle, Fogel,
_hither, Reinhardt, & Rothschild, 6 a three-member Board majority
voted to decline to assert jurisdiction over law firms as a class of
employers, although the dollar volume of revenue and dollar
amounts of input into interstate commerce would permit it to assert
jurisdiction. 7 The majority's decision to decline jurisdiction rested
upon its view that the activity of law firms, although heavily in-
volved in counseling and guiding clients to engage in transactions
within or affecting interstate commerce, does not in itself so affect
commerce in such a way that labor unrest within the law firms
would interfere substantially with the flow of the interstate com-
merce in which law firms' clients are engaged. 8
Although the majority's decision was largely based upon its
reasoning that labor disputes within law firms as a class would not
greatly interfere with the business of their clients, it also cited policy
reasons for declining to assert jurisdiction. First, the majority opin-
ion pointed out that "potential conflicts of interest are likely to
develop if employees of law firms are to be represented by, and owe
a substantial loyalty to an organization which may well have in-
terests conflicting with those of clients whom lawyers represent." 9
2 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1970) contains specific prohibitions of employer interference with
unionization among employees and imposes specific collective bargaining duties upon em-
ployers.
29 U.S.C. § 164(c)(2) (1970) states:
Nothing in this subchapter shall be deemed to prevent or bar any agency or the
courts of any State or Territory (including the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico,
Guam, and the Virgin Islands), from assuming and asserting jurisdiction over labor
disputes over which the Board declines, pursuant to paragraph (1) of this subsection,
to assert jurisdiction.
4 Bodle, Fogel, Julber, Reinhardt & Rothschild, 206 N.L.R.B. No. 60, 84 L.R.R.M.
1321 (1973).
5 Analysis of Bodle will be brief. A comprehensive treatment of the case exists in this
issue of the Law Review. See Note, 15' B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 1313 (1974).
206 N.L,R,B. No. 60, 84 L.R.R.M. 1321. Chairman Miller, Members Kennedy and
Jenkins were in the majority. Members Fanning and Pendia dissented.
7 84 L.R.R.M. at 1322-23.
a Id. at 1322.
9 Id. at 1323.
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For example, in Bodle, the Teamsters Union sought to represent
employees who had access to confidential information concerning
labor unions-clients who were competitors of the Teamsters.m Sec-
ond, the Board reasoned that delineation of dollar volume require-
ments for jurisdiction over law firms would be prohibitively difficult
because of the difficulty of deciding which cases handled by the law
firm affect interstate commerce. Thus, the Board concluded that
administrative problems in deciding which law firms would fall
within its jurisdiction warranted its refusal to assert jurisdiction."
Bodle is the first case where the Board has decided to decline to
assert jurisdiction over law fims as a class of employers. 12 However,
a strong dissenting opinion of two Board members" indicates that
the issue of the Board's jurisdiction over law firms may be decided
in the opposite way when the composition of the Board changes.
II. UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Union Discipline
1. Fines Against Rank-and-File Strikebreakers: Boeing; Booster
Lodge; General Electric
Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the NLRA' defines the scope of a union's
power to maintain adherence to its prescribed policies through dis-
ciplinary action against union members. Such discipline may be
imposed in the form of monetary fines or restrictions upon future
eligibility for union membership. The language of section 8(b)(1)(A)
states that a union commits an unfair labor practice when it acts to
"restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaran-
teed" in section 7. Although section 7 guarantees to employees the
freedom to refrain from concerted activities, 2 which include strikes,
'° Id.
" Id.
12 See Evans & Kunz, Ltd., 194 N.L.R.B. 1216, 79 L. R.R.M. 1181 (1972), where the
Board had refused to assert jurisdiction on the narrow grounds that the law firm's dollar
volume of business was insufficient to warrant its jurisdiction, and the decision was limited to
the facts of that case.
13
 84 L.R R.M. at 1323 (dissenting opinion).
' 29 U.S.C.
	 158(b)(1)(A) (1970) states:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents—
(1) to restrain or coerce (A) employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in
section 157 of this title [section 7J: Provided, that this paragraph shall not impair the
right of a labor organization to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition
or retention of membership therein . . .
2
 29 U.S.C. .4 157 (1970) states:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing
and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or
other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or
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nevertheless section 8(b)(1)(A) has been definitively interpreted by
the Supreme Cotirt as permitting union discipline of members who
refrain from supporting a union-authorized strike. 3 That interpreta-
tion is valid, even though such discipline or threat thereof would,
strictly speaking, restrain or coerce the employee in the exercise of
his section 7 freedom to refrain from the concerted activity of
striking. In a significant Survey year case, NLRB v. Boeing Co., 4
the Supreme Court rendered a decision which may operate to
further increase the power of the union to impose discipline upon
strikebreakers without transgressing the limitations of section
8(b)(1)(A). The Court in Boeing eliminated the issue of the reason-
ableness of the amount of the fine from the scope of the Board
inquiry when considering the validity of the fine under 8(b)(1)(A)
standards.
In Boeing, the union had fined employee-union members $450
each and suspended them from eligibility for election to union office
for five years as a penalty for crossing picket lines and returning to
work during the union-endorsed strike. 8 After the union instituted a
suit in state court against the strikebreakers to collect the unpaid
fines, Boeing filed an 8(b)(1)(A) charge with the NLRB. 6 The charge
asserted that the attempted court enforcement of such allegedly
unreasonably large fines constituted "restraint or coercion" of the
fined employees and thus fell within the prohibition of 8(b)(1)(A).
The Board refused to consider the issue of the reasonableness of the
amount of the fines, stating that such an issue was irrelevant to the
lawfulness of union discipline.? Ob appeal, however, the court of
appeals disagreed and remanded the case for Board determination
of the reasonableness of the amount of the fines. 8
In upholding the Board's refusal to rule on that issue, the
Supreme Court in Boeing reviewed its prior research into the legisla-
tive intent underlying the formulation and enactment of 8(b)(1)(A).
In NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co., 9 decided in 1967,
the Court had held that although section 7 of the Act guarantees the
all of such activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an
agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employ-
ment as authorized in section 158(a)(3) of this title.
3 NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 195 (1967).
4 NLRB v. Boeing Co., 412 U.S. 67 (1973). For a comprehensive analysis of Boeing, see
Note, 15 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 406 (1973).
412 U.S, at 69-70.
6 Id. at 70.
Booster Lodge 405, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists (Boeing Co.), 185 N.L.R.B. 380, 383
n.16, 75 L.R.R.M. 1004, 1007 n.16 (1970).
8 Booster Lodge 405, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. NLRB, 459 F.2d 1143, 1161, 79
L.R.R.M. 2443, 2455 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
9 388 U.S. 177 (1967).
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right to refrain from concerted activities such as strikebreaking,
Congress did not intend 8(b)(1)(A) to remove the power of unions to
impose fines against strikebreaker-members and to sue for collec-
tion. The Allis-Chalmers decision was not based on the proviso to
8(b)(1)(A), which guarantees the union power to prescribe and ad-
minister its own rules of eligibility for union membership. The
Court noted that a suit to collect a union-imposed fine could not be
fairly placed within the statutory proviso that pertains to union
membership rules. '° Instead, the Court in Allis-Chalmers based its
holding that 8(b)(1)(A) did not prevent a union from suing to collect
the fine upon its conclusion that Congress did not intend to use
8(b)(1)(A) to interfere in internal union affairs, at least to the extent
of frustrating the union's use of discipline in its effort to maintain
unity among employees and a strong bargaining position during a
strike."
Some discussion of a second Supreme Court decision sheds light
on why the Boeing Court excluded the reasonableness of the fines
from the section 8(b)(1)(A) standards. In a 1972-73 Survey year case,
NLRB v. Textile Workers Local 1029 (Granite State), 12 the Supreme
Court gave definition to the meaning of the term, internal union
affairs. There, the Court affirmed the Board's decision that a union
violated 8(b)(1)(A) by suing to collect a fine levied against strike-
breakers who had resigned their union membership prior to engag-
ing in the strikebreaking conduct. The Granite State Court reasoned
that the immunity normally provided for internal union affairs was
not applicable where the disciplinary action was taken to punish
strikebreaking activities which had occurred after the employee had
resigned from union membership; in that case the union was reach-
ing beyond its internal affairs.' 3 The Court reasoned:
[T]he power of the union over the member is certainly no
greater than the union-member contract. Where a member
lawfully resigns from a union and thereafter engages in
conduct which the union rule proscribes, the union com-
mits an unfair labor practice when it seeks enforcement of
fines for that conduct. That is to say, when there is a
lawful dissolution of a union-member relation, the union
has no more control over the former member than it has
over the man in the street."
Id. at 191-92.
" Id, at 195.
12 409 U.S. 213 (1972). For an analysis of Granite State, see Comment, 1972-1973
Annual Survey of Labor Relations Law, 14 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 1173, 1224 (1973).
13 409 U.S. at 215, 217.
14 Id. at 217..
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Although the particular employees in Boeing had tendered no
resignation before breaching the union rule against strikebreaking,
and thus were not protected from discipline by the rule in Granite
State, it was nevertheless argued that the union violated 8(b)(1)(A)
because it sought to collect unreasonably large fines. In upholding
the Board's finding that it did not have jurisdiction to entertain that
contention, the Court in Boeing reasoned that a reading of the
statute which - would allow the issue of reasonableness to enter the
case would result in excessive Board involvement in internal union
affairs, contrary to the legislative intent behind 8(b)(1)(A),I 5
Noting that fines were generally analyzed as a penalty for the
member's breach of membership contract with the union, the Court
thought that the reasonableness of the fine was an issue more
appropriate for the courts than for the Board, especially since a
Board inquiry
into the issue of reasonableness would necessarily lead the
Board to a substantial involvement in strictly internal
union affairs. While the line may not always be clear
between those matters that are internal and those that are
external, to the extent that the Board was required to
examine into such questions as a union's motivation for
imposing a fine it would be delving into internal union
affairs in a manner which we have previously held Con-
gress did not intend."
Since state courts deciding union suits to collect fines have
traditionally considered the reasonableness of the amount of the fine
under contract theories, the Boeing Court saw no need to read into
the Act a mandate for a parallel Board inquiry. The Court found
the policy of establishing uniform national standards for union fines,
through Board adjudication of the issue of reasonableness of the
fines, without sufficient merit; the statute did not mandate that
policy and the state courts were viewed as providing adequate
protection against union abuse of the disciplinary power."
One result of the Boeing decision may be that individual em-
ployees contesting the issue of the reasonableness of union fines will
have to bear the expense of a defense in the court suit, rather than
receiving the legal assistance of the NLRB General Counsel, who
would otherwise file and argue an 8(b)(1)(A) unfair labor practice
complaint. As Justice Douglas' dissenting opinion indicates, the
union possesses great advantage over the individual employee in
15 412 U.S, at 74.
lb id .
17 Id. at 74-78.
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court. 18 Thus, Boeing appears to strengthen the disciplinary arm of
the union, and therefore gives the union greater assurance of prob-
able adherence to its strike policy. This in turn may permit unions
to present a stronger bargaining position, since both they and man-
agement will realize that the union can present a more unified strike
threat to back up its bargaining demands.
Although Boeing evidenced a broader judicial view of union
power to collect fines, its companion Survey year decision by the
Supreme Court, Booster Lodge 405, International Association of
Machinists v. NLRB (Booster Lodge)," did reinforce one major
existing limitation on the disciplinary arm of the union. The issue in
Booster Lodge concerned the application and interpretation of the
1972 Granite State decision, which held that 8(b)(1)(A) prohibits
court enforcement of union fines against employees who had re-
signed from the union before strikebreaking. 20 It was argued in
Booster Lodge that a union rule against strikebreaking implies a
union prohibition against an employee resignation designed to es-
cape the obligation to the union to obey the rule; and that this
implied prohibition against resignation renders the purported resig-
nation unable to sever the member-union contractual relationship,
upon which the union disciplinary power over the member is
based. 21 The union contended that the promise of union members to
abide by the union rule forbidding strikebreaking should be inter-
preted as a contractual promise by that employee not to circumvent
the rule by a prior resignation designed to escape the obligation not
to strikebreak, since it was a promise made while the member was
in a contractual relationship with the union.
Emphasizing that Allis-Chalmers interpreted 8(b)(1)(A) as per-
mitting fines only against strikebreakers holding full union member-
ship at the time of the strikebreaking activity, the Court in Booster
Lodge was unwilling to imply a union member's promise not to
resign before strikebreaking, from the member's explicit contractual
promise to obey a union rule against strikebreaking. 22 It is impor-
tant to note that the Court stated that it did not decide the case
where a specific union rule not only prohibited members from
strikebreaking, but also from tendering a resignation. 23 In that
hypothetical case, the issue would be whether the additional union
rule against a resignation prior to strikebreaking would permit the
union to enforce a fine in court for post-resignation strikebreaking.
18 Id. at 79, 82 (dissenting opinion).
19 Id. at 84 (1973).
211 409 U.S. 213, 217-18.
21
 412 U.S. at 88-89.
22 Id. at 89.
23 Id. at 88.
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It is submitted that, when faced with that issue, the Court will
and should require the Board to find no 8(b)(1)(A) violation by the
union. Such a specific union rule forbidding the resignation tendered
prior to the act of strikebreaking should not take the situation out of
the protected area of internal union affairs. The member's resigna-
tion in breach of his agreement to abide by the union rules should be
considered ineffective to extricate him from union membership and
its obligations. Thus, the statutory protection given by section
8(b)(1)(A) to internal union discipline would apply. Such .a specific
rule would put the strikebreaker-resignee on notice that he would be
fined if he resigned in order to strikebreak. This rule would give the
union member advance notice of the prohibition against such con-
duct, the absence of which in Booster Lodge was important to the
Court's decision to refuse to recognize the union's power to collect
the fine. 24
Justice Blackmun, who wrote a concurring opinion in Booster
Lodge, 25
 made several arguments which would justify the protection
of the union power to discipline a resignee whose resignation, prior
to the strikebreaking, constituted a . breach of an explicit union rule.
In Booster Lodge, where no such rule existed, he argued that since
the particular strikebreaker-resignee had voted in favor of a strike,
voted to authorize fines, and initially participated in the strike, his
conduct was sufficient to induce the reliance of fellow strikers, and
thus constituted an implied promise to remain committed to the
strike pact. These arguments are even more persuasive justification
for validating the union discipline in a case where the specific union
rule prohibiting resignation exists; in such a case the Court should
permit the union discipline and prevent a Board-induced erosion of
the strike weapon. Such a decision could be justified upon the
Allis-Chalmers rationale that the union discipline is still primarily
internal, and thus within the protection of the Allis-Chalmers rule.
The Booster Lodge decision confirms the current Board rule 25
that a valid union resignation serves to immediately cut off the
power of the union to enforce its imposition of fines for strikebreak-
ing after the resignation. It also precludes a finding that the resigna-
tion is invalid where no specific union rule prohibits a resignation
followed by strikebreaking. Howev'er, a First Circuit decision dur-
ing the Survey year has held that a valid union resignation does not
remove the power of the union to punish strikebreaking by a sus-
pension from membership eligibility, rather than by a monetary
fine. In NLRB v. District Lodge 99, International Association of
24 Id. at 89.
25
 Id. at 90-91 (concurring opinion).
26
 E.g., Booster Lodge 405, 185 N.L.R.B. at 383, 75 L.R.R.M. at 1007.
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Machinists (General Electric), 27 the court denied enforcement of a
Board order which had found an 8(b)(1)(A) unfair labor practice on
the part of the union. In argument before the court, the Board had
contended that the suspension discipline imposed for strikebreaking
occurring after a resignation from the union constituted an unfair
labor practice. The Board argued that such discipline implied that
the union continued to have disciplinary power over the resignee,
even after the resignation had worked a severance of the employee-
union contractual relationship, 28 upon which the union's disci-
plinary power is based.
It is clear that the Supreme Court in Booster Lodge held that
the union's freedom to enforce discipline in the form of fines ended
when the member validly severed his contractual membership rela-
tionship with the union. 29 However, the First Circuit in General
Electric found two reasons why discipline of strikebreaker-resignees
imposed in the form of membership suspension was distinguishable
from that imposed in the form of court enforcement of union fines.
First, the five-year suspension merely constituted a ratification of
the employees' voluntary severance of the membership relation-
ship. 3° Second, even if the Board was correct in arguing that a
suspension implies a continuation of union power over the resignee
so as to violate the Booster Lodge rule, the proviso to 8(b)(1)(A)
guaranteeing "the right of a labor organization to prescribe its own
rules with respect to the acquisition or retention of membership
therein" 3 ' protected the suspension discipline from attack. 32 The
court not only pointed out that the suspension fell within the protec-
tion of the proviso, but also noted that the method of union en-
forcement of the suspension discipline was purely internal to the
union. 33
 The case was seen as factually distinguishable from Booster
Lodge, where the union was prohibited from seeking the external
aid of courts in enforcing its disciplinary fines against the strike-
breakers.
Thus, while § 7 may protect an employee from union
control enforced by the courts or employers, the proviso of
§ 8(b)(1)(A) preserves a union's most basic power: that of
granting or withholding membership. And it is this power
27
 489 F.2d 769, 771, 85 L.R.R.M. 2145, 2146 (1st Cir. 1974).
28 Id. at 771, 85 L.R.R.M. at 2145-46.
29 412 U.S. at 85.
39 489 F.2d at 771, 85 L.R.R.M. at 2146, citing Pattern Makers' Ass'n, 199 N.L.R.B.
No. 14, 81 L.R.R.M. 1177 (1972).
3 ' 29 U.S.C.	 158(b)(1)(A) (1970).
32 489 F.2d at 771, 85 L.R.R.M. at 2146.
33 Id. at 772, 85 L.R.R.M. at 2146.
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which extends over employees, such as those in the present
case, who have resigned from membership. 34
The decision of the court of appeals in General Electric seems quite
logical. If the proviso to section 8(b)(1)(A) has any value, it should
be construed to allow the union to affirm a resignation through
union discipline imposed in the form of suspension from member-
ship eligibility. Any other decision would seem to violate the legis-
lative intent of Congress to restrain interference with internal union
affairs, and would severely undermine the union's ability to retain a
loyal membership and hence, its ability to function as an effective
bargaining representative. 35
Past decisions of the Board have held that where the union
imposes discipline upon a member who worked during a union-
authorized strike which violated a no-strike contract provision, it
commits an 8(b)(1)(A) unfair labor practice. 36 In a Survey year
decision, Local 1127, Communication Workers (New York Telephone
Co.), 37 the Board extended this rule by holding that union imposi-
tion of fines was also unlawful where the strike was violative of the
sixty day notice provisions of section 8(d) of the Act. 38 In this case,
the union had struck before the completion of the obligatory notice
period of sixty days from the time the union notified the telephone
company of its intent to negotiate a new contract. Thus, the strike
was unprotected because of the violation of section 8(d), and the
Board found that this fact abrogated the power which the union
would ordinarily have to discipline strikebreakers. 39 In the compan-
ion opinion to New York Telephone Co., Local 1101, Communica-
tion Workers," arising out of the same fact situation, the Board
held that as long as the section 8(b)(1)(A) complaint of unlawful
union discipline alleged that the discipline to punish strikebreaking
was imposed within the six month statute of limitation period for
unfair labor practice charges,'" the complaint was not barred by the
34
 Id.
35 See Allis -Chalmers, 388 U.S. at 183-84.
36
 E.g., Glaziers Local 1162 (Tosco Glass, Inc.), 177 N.L.R.B, 393, 73 L.R.R.M. 1125
(1969); Local 12419, UMW (National Grinding Wheel Co.), 176 N,L.R.B. 628, 71 L.R.R.M.
1311 (1969).
" Local 1127, Communication Workers (New York Tel. Co.), 208 N.L.R.B. No. 31, 85
L.R.R.M. 1102 (1974).
" 29 U.S.C. § 158(04) (1970) provides that a party desiring termination or modification
of the collective bargaining agreement must give written notice sixty days prior to the
termination date or date of proposed modification, during which time the existing contract
continues in full force and effect. The statute further prohibits the use of strikes during this
sixty day period.
39 85 L.R.R.M. at 1102-03.
40 208 N.L.R,B. No. 32, 85 L.R.R.M, 1104 (1974).
41
 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1970) requires that unfair labor practice complaints charge illegal
activities which have occurred within six months prior to the filing of the charge.
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statute of limitations solely because proof of the unlawful nature of a
strike required evidence of the circumstances of a strike which had
occurred outside the six month period of the statute of limitations. 42
The Board persuasively reasoned that it is the imposition of the
discipline rather than the unlawfulness of the strike that constitutes
the basis of the 8(b)(1)(A) complaint, and thus only the imposition of
the discipline must fall within the limitation period. 43
It is apparent from prior Board decisions" barring union disci-
pline aimed at punishing strikebreaking during strikes which vio-
lated no-strike clauses that the Board considers these holdings essen-
tial to the discouragement of unlawful strikes. Thus, it appears to be
a logical development for the Board to impose the same sanctions
against a union which has struck in violation of the notice provi-
sions of section 8(d). Furthermore, it is logical that a union not be
permitted to use its disciplinary power to compel adherence to
unlawful conduct.
2. Fines against Strikebreaking Supervisors: The Board and
Courts of Appeals in Conflict
The National Labor Relations Act defines the meaning of
supervisors" and distinguishes them from statutory "employees""
for purposes of the Act. Section 8(b)(1)(A) protects only "employees"
from unlawful union discipline, and the section 7 delineation of
individual rights protected by the Act applies only to "employees."
Indeed, supervisors do not have the statutory right to join or form
unions, because section 14(a) of the Act° gives the employer the
right to insist that his supervisors abstain from union membership.
However, many employers do permit supervisors to hold or retain
union membership, a number of whom had reached that position
42 85 L.R.R.M. at 1104-05.
43 Id.
44
 Local 12419, UMW, 176 N.L.R.B. at 631-32, 71 L.R.R.M, at 1315.
45
 29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (1970):
The term "supervisor" means any individual having authority, in the interest of
the employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, assign,
reward or discipline other employees, or responsibly to direct them or to adjust their
grievances, or effectively to recommend such action, if in connection with the
foregoing the exercise of such authority is not of a merely routine or clerical nature,
but requires the use of independent judgment. '
46
 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1970) defines the statutory meaning of the term "employee."
41 29 U.S.C. § 164(a) (1970):
Nothing herein shall prohibit any individual employed as a supervisor from
becoming or remaining a member of a labor organization, but no employer subject to
this subchapter shall be compelled to deem individuals defined herein as supervisors
as employees for the purpose of any law either national or local, relating to collective
bargaining.
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after working in the rank-and-file." As union members, such
supervisors normally accept obligations to their fellow members,
including the obligation to respect the union's strike picket line.
Clearly, unless the supervisors are also union members, they have
no duties to the union and they are not subject to its discipline. 49
The issue presently in controversy is whether a union may lawfully
fine supervisors who are union members, where they have violated
union rules by refusing to participate in a union-authorized strike
and have crossed the picket line to perform rank-and-file struck
work for their employer.
The effectiveness of a strike depends to a great extent upon the
union's ability to cause a full cessation of the employer's operations.
If unions are permitted to induce supervisor-members not to per-
form struck work through the threat of court-enforceable fines, one
major result would be the increased effectiveness of the strike
weapon as a tool to attain union bargaining demands. On the other
hand, if the Act is finally interpreted as prohibiting discipline of
supervisor-union members, employers may be more assertive in
defending their bargaining positions because of the knowledge that a
union strike will not be as effective in keeping supervisors from
performing struck work and maintaining plant operations.
Section 8(b)(1)(B) states that a union commits an unfair labor
practice where it acts to "restrain or coerce an employer in the
selection of his representatives for the purposes of collective bargain-
ing or the adjustment of grievances . . . ." 5° It is the interpretation
given to this section of the Act that controls in great part decisions
relating to the lawfulness of union fines against supervisors. The
Board has consistently held that union discipline of supervisor-
members constitutes an unfair labor practice under section
8(b)(1)(B)." Yet Survey year decisions in three circuits have refused
to enforce such decisions on the grounds that section 8(b)(1)(B) does
not ordinarily exempt supervisor-members from union discipline
meted out for strikebreaking. 52
Sec IBEW v. NLRB, 487 F.2(1 1143, 1148, 83 L.R.R.M. 2582, 2584, (D.C. Cir.
1973).
49 See, e.g., NLRB v. Local 1029, Textile Workers, 409 U.S. 213, 214-17 (1972); NLRB
v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 178-84 (1967).
50
 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(B) (1970).
" E.g., Local 641, IBEW (Florida Power & Light Co.), 193 N.L.R.B. 30, 78 L.R.R.M.
1065 (1971); Local 134, 1BEW (Illinois Bell Tel.), 192 N,L.R.B. 85, 77 L.R.R.M. 1610(1971).
32
 Erie Newspaper Guild v. NLRB, 489 F.2d 416, 84 L.R.R.M. 2896 (3d Cir. 1973);
Local 134, IBEW v. NLRB, 487 F.2d 1143, 83 L.R.R.M. 2582 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (en bane),
rev'g on rehearing 487 F.2d 1113, 81 L.R.R.M. 2257 (D.C. Cir. 1972); NLRB v. Local 21,
San Francisco Typographical Union, 486 F.2d 1347, 83 L.R.R.M. 2314 (9th Cir. 1973).
Contra, NLRB v. Local 2150, IBEW, 486 F.2d 602, 83 L.R.R.M. 2827 (7th Cir: 1973).
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Interpreting section 8(b)(1)(B), the Board has held that union
discipline of supervisor-members for strikebreaking abridges the
employer's 8(b)(1)(B) right to have loyal bargaining representation
and grievance adjustment, and thus violates that provision of the
Act." The starting point for this Board interpretation, rejected by
the Survey year courts of appeals, was its 1968 decision in San
Francisco-Oakland Mailers Union No. 18. 54
 There, a supervisor-
member was disciplined by the union, not for performing
rank-and-file struck work, but for his interpretation of the collective
bargaining agreement as requiring certain work assignments that
subsequently proved disagreeable to the. union. The Board found
that the union did not actually attempt to coerce the employer into
replacing the disciplined supervisor, but nevertheless held that the
union violated 8(b)(1)(B). 55
 Noting that the union may not have
literally coerced the employer into selecting a new collective bargain-
ing representative to replace the one who was disciplined by the
union, the Board conceded that the union's discipline did not ex-
pressly transgress the language of section 8(b)(1)(B), which prohibits
union coercion in the selection of his collective bargaining and
grievance adjusting representatives." However, the Board reasoned
that the discipline was unlawful because it would have the necessary
result of causing the particular supervisor to perform his
8(b)(1)(B)-protected collective bargaining and grievance adjustment
functions in a manner less loyal to the employer and more agreeable
to the union, since the supervisor might reasonably consider this
necessary to avoid future union discipline." Under the Board's
Oakland Mailers rationale, the union coerces "an employer in the
selection of his representatives for the purposes of collective bargain-
ing or the adjustment of grievances"" by imposing discipline which
is likely to compromise the loyalty given by the supervisor-union
members to their employer—a loyalty the Board views as guaran-
teed from union interference by section 8(b)(1)(B)."
Thus, Oakland Mailers announced an expansive Board in-
terpretation of 8(b)(1)(B). Not only did it prohibit union discipline
which coerces the employer's selection of his bargUining and griev-
ance representatives, but it also prohibited discipline which tends to
weaken the loyalty of the supervisor to the employer and which
53
 193 N.L.R.B. at 31, 78 L.R.R.M. at 1066.
54
 Local 18, Intl Typographical Union (Northwest Publications, Inc.), 172 N.L.R.B.
2173, 69 L,R.R.M. 1157 (1968).
55
 Id. at 2173, 67 L.R.R.M. at 1158.
56 See id.
57
 Id. at 2174, 67 L.R.R.M. at 1158-59.
55
 Id. at 2173-74, 67 L.R.R.M, at 1158-59.
59
 Local 641, IBEW, 193 N.L.R.B. at 31, 78 L.R.R.M. at 1066.
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arguably may result in a detrimental effect upon the supervisor's
effective performance of collective bargaining and grievance adjust-
ing functions on behalf of the employer.
Moreover, the Board, in decisions later reversed by Survey year
courts of appeals decisions, greatly extended the Oakland Mailers
rationale to the situation where supervisor-union members are disci-
plined for crossing a picket line to perform rank-and-file struck
work, rather than for merely performing 8(b)(1)(B) collective bar-
gaining and grievance adjustment functions in a manner disagree-
able to the union. 66
 In this line of cases," the Board has decided
that the unions had coerced the employer in violation of section
8(b)(1)(B) by fining the strikebreaking supervisors. Thus, the Board
went beyond its Oakland Mailers decision by immunizing from
union discipline supervisors performing rank-and-file struck work
rather than their normal collective bargaining, grievance adjusting,
or managerial work. The Board's rationale was that the threat of, or
imposition of, union 'discipline upon supervisor-union members in
order to induce respect for the union's strike will also induce respect
for the union's position when the supervisors return to their super-
visory, grievance adjusting and collective bargaining functions. 62
Thus, the conclusion drawn by the Board was that the ultimate
result would be a more union-oriented slant to the future perform-
ance of supervisory functions. This, in turn, would cause unlawful
coercion of the employer in the selection of his representatives.
In the Survey year decisions by the Third, Ninth and District of
Columbia Circuits, 63 this Board interpretation of 8(b)(1)(B) was
rejected. In Local 134, International Brotherhood of Electrical
Workers v. NLRB (Bell Telephone)," the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit, in a 5-4 en banc reversal of a prior
panel decision, 65 held that section 8(b)(1)(B) did not prohibit the
imposition of union discipline upon strikebreaking supervisor-
members. The court reasoned that a possible deterioration of the
loyalty of the supervisor to the employer as a result of union disci-
pline was not only an unlikely possibility, but would, in any case, be
" E.g., Local 134, IBEW (Illinois Bell Tel.), 192 N.L.R.B. 85, 77 L.R.R.M. 1610
(1971).
51
 E.g., Local 641, IBEW, 193 N.L.R.B. 30, 78 L.R.R.M. 1065 (1971); Local 134,
IBEW, 192 N.L.R.B. 85, 77 L.R.R.M. 1610(1971); Local 2150, IBEW, 192 N.L.R.B. 77, 77
L.R.R.M, 1607 (1971).
" 2
 See 192 N.L.R.B. at 78, 78 L.R.R.M. at 1608-09.
53
 Erie Newspaper Guild v. NLRB, 489 F.2d 416, 84 L.R.R.M. 2896 (3d Cir. 1973);
Local 134, IBEW v, NLRB, 487 F.2d 1143, 83 L.R.R.M. 2582 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (en banc);
NLRB v. Local 21, San Francisco Typographical Union, 486 F.2d 1347, 83 L.R.R.M, 2314
(9th Cir. 1973).
" 487 F.2d 1143, 83 L.R.R,M. 2582 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
65
 487 F.2d 1113, 81 L.R.R.M. 2257 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
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a result which the employer was not entitled to challenge. 66 Since
the District of Columbia Circuit expounded an analysis fuller than
that of either the Third or Ninth Circuit, it will be given primary
attention in this discussion.
In both Board decisions consolidated on appeal in Bell Tele-
phone, the supervisors had been fined for performing rank-and-file
struck work, rather than for performing their usual managerial
functions. 67 Furthermore, the employers in both cases had waived
their section 14(a) statutory right 68 to keep supervisors out of the
union. The exercise of that employer right would have clearly im-
munized the supervisors from all union discipline, and thus would
probably have insured the employer of supervisors untainted by
union influence. It is likely to be clear to an employer that mere
union membership among his supervisors may properly result in a
growth on their part of some loyalty to the union, together with
imposing upon them the duty to obey particular rules to which all
members become obligated. Moreover, becausê of their union mem-
bership, the supervisor-union members receive valuable fringe
benefits from the union, which not only induces greater attachment
to the union, but also may give the union, as the source of those
benefits, reasonable cause to demand some measure of allegiance.
These factors were relevant to the District of Columbia's inquiry
into whether, assuming the discipline did compromise the future
loyalty of the supervisors to the employer, the employer was entitled
to challenge that result. 69
Additionally, in one of the two cases on appeal in Bell Tele-
phone, the disciplined supervisors received the benefit of union
bargaining representation; in that case the supervisors were also
members of the bargaining unit, a situation to which the employer
voluntarily, and contractually, consented." As members of the bar-
gaining unit, those supervisors were, and should logically have been
expected to be, directly interested in the strike, which was au-
thorized as a weapon for improving the conditions of employment
for all the members of the unit; 7 ' yet the strikebreaking supervisors
were engaging in conduct antagonistic toward their fellow union
69 487 F.2d at 1155-57, 83 L.R.R.M. at 2589-92.
67 Survey year Board decisions indicate that the Board continues to hold that union
discipline to punish supervisors' performance of supervisory or managerial functions is prohi-
bited by section 8(b)(1)(B). E.g., Local 6, N.Y. Typographical Union, 206 N.L.R.B. No. 83,
84 L.R.R.M. 1555 (1973); Pattern Makers' Ass'n, 203 N.L.R.B. No. 166, 83 L.R.R.M. 1261
(1973).
68
 29 U.S.C. § 164(a) (1970).
99
 487 F.2d at 1148-59, 83 L.R.R.M. at 2584-90.
79
 id. at 1150, 83 L.R.R.M. at 2583-84.
71 See id.
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members and in breach of union rules. As a consequence of this
conduct, the challenged fines were imposed.
The majority of the court in Bell Telephone pointed out that
because the discipline irf that case consisted of fines as well as
expulsion from union membership, such discipline would more
likely push the supervisor's loyalties towards the employer than
towards the union, since the supervisor would no longer have union
membership obligations. 72 Further, even assuming that the threat of
strikebreaking discipline would weaken loyalty to the employer to
the extent of inducing restraint from strikebreaking, the court did
not agree that this would cause the supervisor to act favorably to the
union when performing his section 8(b)(1)(B) functions of representa-
tion of the employer for purposes of collective bargaining and griev-
ance adjustment." The court thought it significant that the union
discipline was imposed as a penalty for the supervisors' performance
of rank-and-file work rather than the performance of their usual
managerial functions:
The dividing line between supervisory and non-
supervisory work in the present context is sharply defined
and easily understood. There is accordingly no reason to
believe that by being forced to take sides with the union in
a dispute unrelated to the performance of his supervisory
functions, and to take sides only to the extent of withhold-
ing his labor from rank-and-file non-supervisory work, a
supervisor will suffer from a change in attitude when, after
the strike, he returns to the performance of his normal
supervisory duties. 74
Viewing the Board's interpretation of 8(b)(1)(B) as an unwar-
ranted prejudice in favor of a labor policy which would assure that
"supervisors' who are permitted by their employer to join unions owe
their undivided loyalty to their employer in any dispute between the
union and the employer," 75 the Bell Telephone court found no basis
for such a policy either in the Act or in equity. Pointing to the Act,
the court reasoned that if employers wished to retain the undivided
loyalty of supervisors even during strikes, they could exercise their
section 14(a) right to keep supervisors out of the union, or at least
condition their waiver of that section 14(a) right upon a collective
bargaining provision granting immunity to supervisor-union
members 76
 from union discipline imposed for performing
72 Id. at 1156, 83 L.R.R.M. at 2590-91.
73 Id. at 1157, 83 L.R.R.M. at 2591.
74 Id.
15 Id. at 1159, 83 L.R.R.M. at 2593.
76 Id. at 1165, 83 L.R.R.M. at 2598.
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rank-and-file struck work. Moreover, the court of appeals in Bell.
Telephone believed that the Board was unjustly undermining the
contractual concept of the union-employee relationship, a concept
seen as inherent in the policy of the Act. 77 The majority opinion
pointed out that such undermining was a necessary consequence of
Board protection for supervisors, since they were receiving
economic benefits from their union membership without fulfilling
the corresponding union obligations voluntarily assumed by them:
"The Board's immunity from union discipline for strikebreaking
supervisors makes a shambles of the mutuality of obligation implicit
in the contract approach to union membership." 78
In this respect the court's reasoning more logically comports
with the statutory concept of the relationship between the union and
the member, and also adheres to equitable principles. The contrac-
tual concept of union membership dictates that a duty is owed to the
union by supervisors when they receive fringe benefits that may be
improved by the strike, or when the supervisor is a member of the
bargaining unit that is striking for improved conditions of employ-
ment. Thus, it is inequitable that the supervisor be allowed to
obtain the ultimate gains of a strike while undermining the strike
aimed at achieving those benefits. The court noted that supervisors,
like rank-and-file union members, had the option of tendering a
valid resignation if they desired to validly escape their membership
obligation not to strikebreak. 79
The Bell Telephone court persuasively reasoned that fairness
not only demanded that supervisor-members fulfill the obligations of
a union membership that either they or their employer could have
prevented as a matter of statutory right, but also that equity within
the union-employer relationship required the result that supervisors
may be disciplined.'" When the employer waived his section 14(a)
right to require that employees shed their union membership upon
promotion to supervisory positions, the employer acquired super-
visors who receive, at the very least, those valuable union fringe
benefits that are normally provided by employers. In addition the
employer, in return for giving up his statutory right to non-union
supervisors, received a pool of experienced supervisors, because he
could induce rank-and-file employees to move up without requesting
them to forfeit the union membership and the concomitant valuable
economic benefits. It seems equitable that when the employer
" See NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 182 (1967).
78 487 F.2d at 1167-68, 83 L. R. R. M. at 2600.
78 See, e.g., Booster Lodge 405, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. NLRB (Booster Lodge), 412
U.S, 84 (1973).
'° 487 F.2d at 1168-70, 83 L.R.R.M. at 2600-02,
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waives his section 14(a) right and thereby acquires these benefits, he
should not receive the assistance of the Board in insuring the
supervisor's loyalty; at least in respect to those activities (such as
strikebreaking) which are unrelated to the 8(b)(1)(B) collective bar-
gaining representation and grievance adjusting duties.
It is submitted that the court of appeals decision in Bell Tele-
phone that the union did not violate 8(b)(1)(B) by fining the strike-
breaking supervisor-members is correct both in law and in equity.
There is no reason to believe that union inducement of supervisors
to encourage obedience to the strike-picket line will so compromise
loyalty as to deprive the employer of future loyal representation in
collective bargaining and grievance adjustment. The discipline may
be just as likely to turn the supervisor against the union. Secondly,
it seems equitable to restrain the employer from preventing
supervisor-union members from fulfilling their membership obliga-
tions to the union when the employer: 1) waived his statutory right
to use section 14(a) to achieve that end, and instead opted for the
benefits of having union supervisors; and 2) nevertheless could have
attempted to extract from the union a contractual promise not to
discipline supervisors in these situations.
The Bell Telephone decision has been followed in two other
Survey year courts of appeals decisions 81 and rejected in a third. 82
In one of the decisions which follows the rationale of the Bell
Telephone majority, Erie Newspaper Guild v. NLRB, 83 the Third
Circuit provided another limitation on Board policy in this area by
restricting the class of supervisors who are immune from union
discipline under the provisions of section 8(b)(1)(B). The court in
Erie Newspaper reversed a Board finding that union discipline im-
posed upon a strikebreaking supervisor-member constituted an
8(b)(1)(B) coercion of the employer in his selection of his collective
bargaining and grievance adjustment representatives. The record
revealed no proof that the supervisor had actually performed the
functions of grievance adjustment or collective bargaining or that
the supervisor would do so in the future." The Board's policy, as
expressed in its Erie Newspaper decision, 85 had been to assume that
a supervisor, as defined by section 2(11) of the Act, 86 automatically
qualified as an employer representative for 8(b)(1)(B) purposes,
61 Erie Newspaper Guild v. NLRB, 489 F.2d 416, 84 L.R.R.M. 2896 (3d Cir. 1973);
NLRB v. Local 21, San Francisco Typographical Union, 486 F.2d 1347, 83 L. R. R.M. 2314
(9th Cir. 1973).
R3 NLRB v. Local 2150, IBEW, 486 F.2d 602, 83 L.R.R.M. 2829 (7th Cir, 1973).
63 Erie Newspaper Guild v. NLRB, 489 F.2d 416, 84 L.R.R.M. 2896 (3d Cir. 1973).
84 Id. at 420-22, 84 L,R.R.M. at 2878-2900.
66 See id.; 197 N.L.R.B. No. 159, 80 L.R.R.M. 1364.
16 29 U.S.C.	 152(11) (1970).
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without any evidence that the supervisor actually had performed or
would likely perform collective bargaining or grievance adjustment
functions for the employer. The court remanded the case to the
Board for a finding by substantial evidence that the supervisor
qualified as a section 8(b)(1)(B) representative of the employer. The
court felt that this finding was a prerequisite to any ruling on
whether the union fines of supervisor-members constituted an unfair
labor practice. 87
Thus, courts of appeals during the Survey year have sharply
restricted the Board's definition of the scope of union discipline that
is prohibited by 8(b)(1)(B). The Third Circuit in Erie Newspaper
required that the Board protect from union discipline only those
supervisor-union members who by evidence are shown to be rep-
resentatives of the employer for purposes of collective bargaining
and grievance adjustment. Along with the Third Circuit, the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit and the Ninth Circuit"' have held the
Board not entitled to prohibit, under section 8(b)(1)(B), union disci-
pline imposed upon supervisors for performing rank-and-file struck
work. The Seventh Circuit has held the Board correct in prohibiting
such discipline. 89
 Because of the significance of the issue, the Su-
preme Court should grant certiorari and resolve the conflict between
the Board and the circuit courts. Once the issue is authoritatively
resolved, management and unions can attempt to fulfill their respec-
tive needs by negotiating collective bargaining agreement provisions
regulating the union's disciplinary power over supervisors who are
also union members.
B. Employer Interference and Discrimination
1. Solicitation/Distribution: Magnavox
In a major Survey year decision, NLRB v. Magnavox Co.,' the
Supreme Court handed down a decision likely to result in a marked
increase in the amount of solicitation/distribution activities carried
on by employees at their place of work. The Court decided that an
employer-union contractual provision denying employees' the right
to engage in solicitation/distribution concerning the selection or re-
tention of their bargaining representative is not a valid waiver of
" See 489 F.2d at 427, 84 L.R.R.M. at 2904.
" 8
 NLRB v. Local 21, San Francisco Typographical Union, 486 F.2d 1347, 83 L.R.R.M.
2314 (9th Cir. 1973).
" NLRB v. Local 2150, IBEW, 486 F.2d 602, 83 L.R.R.M. 2829 (7th Cir. 1973).
— U.S. —, 94 S. Ct, 1099, 85 L.R.R.M. 2475 (1974), rev'g 474 F.2d 1269, 82
L.R.R.M. 2852 (6th Cir. 1973).
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that right. Resolving a conflict among several circuits, 2
 the decision
affirmed the Board's finding of a violation of section 8(a)(1). 3 The
employer had enforced a company no solicitation/no distribution
rule against employees expressing support of the union which had.
executed the contractual waiver." The Supreme Court indicated that
the union's contractual waiver of the solicitation/distribution rights
of the employees did not authorize the employer to limit unlawfully
the exercise of those rights by supporters of the current union.
Furthermore, the scope of the Court's decision necessarily incorpo-
rates the rule that the union's contractual waiver will not authorize
employer interference with the rights of those employees expressing
opposition to the retention of the incumbent union as the bargaining
agent. 5
Section 7 6
 of the NLRA guarantees to employees the right to
engage in concerted activities, and to form and join labor organiza-
tions for the purposes of collective bargaining. Section 7 has long
been construed to allow employees to solicit union support and
distribute union literature at their place of work.' In defining the
scope of the lawful exercise of these employee activities, the Board
and courts have recognized the rights of employers to maintain plant
discipline and order. It has been necessary for the Board and the
courts to balance section 7 solicitation/distribution rights against
employers' legitimate business needs. This balancing process has
resulted in the formulation of presumptions of the validity or in-
2 The Sixth Circuit's decision in Magnavox denied enforcement of the NLRB § 8(a)(1)
order against the employer, 474 F.2d 1269, 82 L.R.R.M. 2852 (6th Cir. 1973). That decision
conflicted with those reached in the Eighth Circuit and the Fifth Circuit. Both International
Ass'n of Machinists v. NLRB, 415 F.2d 113, 72 L.R.R.M. 2206 (8th Cir, 1969), and NLRB
v. Mid-States Metal Prods. Inc., 403 F.2d 702, 69 L.R.R.M. 2656 (5th Cir. 1968) enforced
similar Board orders on the ground that the union did not have authority to waive employees'
solicitation/distribution rights pertaining to the selection of the collective bargaining represen-
tative.
3
 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1970) states: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an
employer—(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed in section 157 of this title . .
	 ." Section 157, 29 U.S.C. 157 (1970), states:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor
organization, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing,
and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or
other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or
all of such activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an
agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employ-
ment as authorized in section 158(a)(3) of this title.
Magnavox Co., 195 N.L.R,B. 265, 266, 79 L.R.R.M. 1283, 1284-85 (1972). The Board
detailed presumptions of validity and invalidity for employer rules pertaining to
solicitation/distribution in Stoddard-Quirk Mfg. Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 615, 51 L.R.R.M. 1110
(1962).
5
 94 S. Ct. at 1102, 85 L.R.R.M. at 2476.
29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970).
7
 See Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 798 (1945).
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validity of those employer plant regulations placing limits on
solicitation/distribution activity. These presumptions, which turn on
whether the employers' rules limit activity during working or non-
working time, or in working or non-working areas of the plant,
were authoritatively announced by the Board in 1962 in Stoddard-
Quirk Manufacturing Co. is
In Magnavox, the collective bargaining provision contained a
purported union authorization of employer solicitation/distribution
regulations which presumptively would have been invalid under
Stoddard-Quirk standards, since those rules prohibited activity on
the employees' non-working time and in non-working areas of the
plant. 9 The issue in Magnavox was whether the contractual authori-
zation of this broad no solicitation/no distribution rule permitted the
employer to enforce the otherwise invalid regulations against em-
ployees seeking to exercise their solicitation/distribution rights in
support of the union that had contractually authorized the regula-
tions by waiving those rights. In its 1963 Gale Products" decision,
the Board had held that the employer is not protected by a union
contractual authorization of employer interference with employee's
Section 7 right to advocate opposition to the union's retention as the
collective bargaining agent. However, in Gale Products, the Board's
decision was seen as necessary to prevent an incumbent union from
freezing out competition by executing a contractual waiver of
solicitation/distribution rights in order to stifle expression of opposi-
tion to the retention of the union as the bargaining agent. Thus, the
Gale Products rule constituted what was considered a necessary
exception to the general principle that agreements executed by the
union in good faith bind all the employees represented by it."
The Court in Magnavox extended the scope of employee protec-
tion from union-employer contractual waiver of solicitation/
distribution rights beyond that provided by Gale Products. The
Court specifically held that employees expressing support for the
union were entitled to protection from employer interference purport-
edly sanctioned by the collective bargaining agreement. 12 Rather
than viewing the pro-union or anti-union status of the employees as
of great weight in evaluating the validity of the union's contractual
138 N.L.R.B. 615, 51 L.R.R.M. 110 {1962). Employer regulations purporting to limit
these rights are presumptively valid if the limitation is only during working time or in
working areas, and presumptively invalid if they extend to non-working time and non-
working areas of the plant.
94 S. Ct. at 1101-02, 85 L.R.R.M. at 2476.
I" 142 N.L.R.B. 1246, 53 L.R.R.M. 1242 (1963).
'' See id. at 1248, 53 L.R.R.M. at 1243-44.
11 94 S. Ct. at 1102, 85 L.R.R.M. at 2476.
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authorization of the otherwise unlawful employer interference, the
Court saw as determinative the special nature of the employee rights
the union had attempted to waive by contract. A distinction was
made between the union's waiver of 'employee economic rights, such
as the right to strike, and the union's attempted waiver of the
fundamental right of the employees to advocate and express their
choice of a collective bargaining representative.' 3 The Court
reasoned that union authority to bargain away such fundamental
rights could seriously diminish the employees' statutory right to
select the bargaining representative which is guaranteed by section
9(a) of the NLRA."
The rationale of the Magnavox decision was that
solicitation/distribution rights are determinative of the ability of
employees to freely choose their representative. This reasoning was
adopted from the Board's Gale Products decision." However, in
Magnavox the Supreme Court extended Gale Products and con-
cluded that the rights of those employees who choose to advocate
support of the union that had waived their solicitation/distribution
rights should be entitled to protection equal to that afforded those
who wish to express opposition to the union. In the Gale Products
decision, the Board had held that "neither an employer nor an
incumbent union is entitled, absent special circumstances which do
not appear here, to freeze out another union by trenching on the
statutory rights of employees to engage in protected activities." 16
The rationale in that case was that the NLRA does not sanction a
union's use of the collective bargaining process to guarantee, against
all challenge, its elected position as the bargaining representative.
The opinion of Mr. Justice Stewart, concurring in part and
dissenting in part, agreed with the Gale Products holding that the
union has no authority to muzzle opposition by agreeing to employer
removal of their solicitation/distribution rights. 17 However, he saw
the Court's extension of protection to union supporters, despite the
union's contractual authorization of the employer interference, as
creating serious inequities. He pointed out that the Court's decision
bestowed a windfall upon the union by allowing it to receive the
3 Id.
14
 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1970):
Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining
by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be the
exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of
collective bargaining . „
15
 See 142 N.L.R.B. at 1249, 53 L.R.R.M. at 1244.
16 Id .
1.1 94 S. Ct. at 1103, 85 L.R,R.M. at 2477.
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benefit of the employer's concessions without sacrificing what was
presumably the quid pro quo for the employer's concessions—the
union's waiver of solicitation/distribution rights of its supporters.'s
Mr. Justice Stewart properly noted that some degree of inter-
ference with the collective bargaining process occurs whether union
supporters or union opponents are permitted to escape the
employer's enforcement of the contractual provision relating to
solicitation/distribution activities. He found it possible to justify that
degree of interference with the integrity of collective bargaining
agreement that results from the ability of union opponents to avoid
the sweep of the union's contractual waiver. The justification was
the need to protect the "policy of the labor law [that] forbids either
the union or the employer to freeze out another union or to entrench
the incumbent union by infringing the section 7 rights of dissident
employees." 19 In the Magnavox factual situation, however, the fact
that the union supporters were permitted to avoid the contractual
waiver allowed the union to receive campaign support which it had
bargained away in the contract.
Despite the substantiality of the arguments advanced by Mr.
Justice Stewart, it is submitted that the Magnavox decision is cor-
rect. It was the section 7 right to engage in activities relating to the
choice of a collective bargaining representative that justified the
Gale Products protection of solicitation/distribution by union oppo-
nents. Since that statutory right accrues to the individual employee,
protection of that right from contractual waiver should be afforded
to all employees, whether they support or oppose the current collec-
tive bargaining representative. If the Court had limited its holding
to protection of employees opposing the retention of the incumbent
union as the bargaining representative, that particular segment of
the bargaining unit would have a right of access to the employee-
electorate that union supporters would not have. This result would
be likely to have a significant effect on the solicitation/distribution
rights of union supporters.
Supporters of the union may themselves be in the minority and
thus it may be especially necessary for them to retain
solicitation/distribution rights in the face of the union's contractual
waiver of those rights in order to participate effectively in the choice
of bargaining representatives. Further, to hold union supporters
bound by the union's contractual waiver would ignore the fact that
the primary benefit of solicitation/distribution rights is the power
thereby given to employees to affect the choice of a bargaining
IR Id. at 1103-04, 85 L.R.R.M. at 2478.
19 142 N.L.R.B. at 1249, 53 L.R.R.M. at 1244.
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representative. 20 On the basis of this fact, employees who support
the incumbent union should be distinguished from the union itself
for purposes of protecting these rights.
The criticism that the Magnavox approach bestows a windfall
upon the incumbent union is of limited validity. Although the wind-
fall may be gained by the particular union involved in the Mag-
navox case, such a windfall will not likely be gained by other
unions. Employers will be put on notice by Magnavox that conces-
sions should not be exchanged for a union's contractual waiver of
solicitation/distribution rights of either union supporters or oppo-
nents, since the Magnavox rule will prohibit the employer from
enforcing such a contract provision.
While extremely significant, the effect of Magnavox upon the
law of solicitation/distribution is not all-encompassing. The case
does not reach three areas of that law. First, Magnavox will not
affect employers' rights to enforce plant rules which are lawful
limitations on plant solicitation/distribution activity under the
Stoddard-Quirk standards. The case dealt only with the employer's
attempt to enforce otherwise invalid plant solicitation/distribution
rules that were agreed to by the employees' collective bargaining
representative. Secondly, the decision will not likely be applied so as
. to prohibit employer enforcement of the waiver of the distribution of
the incumbent union's institutional literature. 2 ' Since a large degree
of plant solicitation/distribution may involve the union's own litera-
ture, the employer's ability to enforce its contractual waiver under
these circumstances may constitute a large area free from the sweep
of the Magnavox decision. Thirdly, the Magnavox holding does not
forbid employer enforcement of the union's waiver of solicitation/
distribution not concerned with the selection of the collective bar-
gaining representative. Although most solicitation/distribution activ-
ity probably is within with this area, the employer is still entitled to
enforce a contractual waiver of that activity when involved with
matters extraneous to the representation of his employees.
2. Economic Discrimination
a. Strikers' Reinstatement Rights—In Brooks Research and
Manufacturing, 22 a Survey year decision, the Board held that the
statutory right of economic strikers to reinstatement by the employer
continues for an indefinite period of time after the strike, at least
2° NLRB v. Mid-States Metal Prods. Inc., 403 F.2d 702, 704, 69 L•R.R.M. 2656,
2657-58. (5th Cir. 1968).
21 94 S. Ct. at 1104 n., 85 L.R.R.M. at 2477-78 n.
22 202 N.L.R.B. No. 93, 82 L.R.R.M. 1599 (1973).
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where not otherwise limited by a collective bargaining agreement.
The three member panel decided that an employer violates section
8(a)(3) 23 by attempting to disregard those rights by discontinuing
maintenance of reinstatement hiring lists. In Brooks Research, a
lawful economic strike ended when the majority of strikers, whose
jobs had been taken by permanent replacements hired during the
strike, made unconditional applications for reinstatement. The em-
ployer and union then composed a preferential hiring list to be used
to fill jobs at the time the jobs would become vacant by departure of
the permanent replacements. There was no discussion with respect
to the duration of the use of the list. Nevertheless, about six months
after the strike had ended, the employer notified the remaining
unreinstated strikers that the company policy of terminating senior-
ity of individuals who had been laid off for a period of six months
dictated the loss of their reinstatement rights. 24
In NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co., 25 the Supreme Court de-
cided the issue of the nature rather than the duration of reinstate-
ment rights of strikers. There, the Court held that the section 8(a)(3)
prohibition of employer discrimination with regard to hire or tenure
of employment, which would have the effect of discouraging union
membership, required that the employer fill jobs remaining vacant
after the end of strike by rehiring the strikers. The Court in Fleet-
wood reasoned that a refusal to reinstate a striker because of his
participation in the statutorily protected activity of striking, rather
than because of a valid business reason, would operate to discourage
employees from maintaining union membership. 76 The employer in
Fleetwood had justified his post-strike hiring of inexperienced em-
ployees in preference over the strikers on the ground that strikers
need only be considered for rehire at the date of their reapplication,
at which time the employer possessed no job openings. The Court
disagreed, 27
 noting that since strikers continued to be statutory
employees despite their work stoppage, 28 their section 8(a)(3) rights
to be free from job discrimination based on union membership could
not be made to "depend upon the technicalities"29 relating to the
date of the strikers' reapplication for employment.
23 29 U.S.C.	 15840.1(3) (1970).
24 82 L.R.R.M. at 1600.
25 389 U.S. 375 (1967).
26 Id. at 378.
27 Id. at 380-81.
28 29 U.S.C.	 152(3) (1970) provides in part that the category of "employees shall
include • . any employee whose work has ceased as a consequence of, or in connection with,
any current labor dispute or because of any unfair labor practice and who has not obtained
any other regular and substantially equivalent employment . . • ."
29 389 U.S. at 381.
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The employer is not required to reinstate strikers where his
failure to do so is based upon "legitimate and substantial business
justifications" 3 ° such as the hiring of permanent replacements dur-
ing the strike. 3 ' However, strikers have the right to reinstatement
upon the departure of the permanent replacements. 32 In Brooks
Research, the employer justified his termination of the reinstatement
rights of the strikers upon the grounds that "it would be unreason-
ably onerous to require an employer to keep for an indefinite time
records of strikers who might be eligible for reinstatement." 33 The
Board rejected this as a valid business reason, noting that the
clerical burdens imposed upon the employer are not sufficient to
justify the resulting destructive effect upon the strikers' Fleetwood
Trailer right to reinstatement. 34 The Board also ruled that changes
in the employer's production techniques during the period of the
strike do not constitute a valid business justification. The Board
reasoned that the employer's subjective beliefs or speculation will
not fulfill his burden of proof that the strikers were unqualified for
their jobs where prior to the strike the employees had routinely
adapted to changes in production techniques. 35
Brooks Research is the first clear indication that the Board will
not allow the employer to unilaterally place a time limitation upon
the reinstatement rights of strikers. 36 It seems that the Board's
decision is reasonable and necessary. Since the employer unlawfully
discriminates when he refuses to rehire during the initial return to
production period following the strike, it seems no less discrimina-
tory when the refusal occurs at a time further removed from the end
of the strike. Since the employer may have already lawfully hired
permanent replacements for the strikers, it may be especially impor-
tant that the strikers retain the right to regain their jobs for an
indefinite length of time. Indeed, inability to acquire a comparable
job, expiration of union or governmental unemployment benefits,
and depletion of personal assets may create the greatest economic
need for reinstatement at a time further removed from the strike.
30 NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26, 34 (1967),
51 NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333, 345-46 (1938).
32 Laidlaw Corp., 171 N.L.R.B. 1366, 58 L.R.R.M. 1252 (1968), enforced, 414 F.2d 99,
71 L.R.R.M. 3054 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 920 (1970).
33 82 L,R.R,M. at 1601.
34 Id.
35 Id. at 1602.
36 A union and employer may reach a collective bargaining agreement which would
validly operate to set a time limitation upon the reinstatement rights. United Aircraft Corp.,
192 N.L.R.B. 382, 77 L.R.R.M. 1785 (1971).
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b. Temporary Replacements for Locked-Out Employees: Inter-
Collegiate Press; Ralston Purina; Hess Oil
After bargaining to impasse with the union, an employer
may lockout employees and then hire temporary replacements to
continue production, according to a Survey year decision of the
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. In this case, Inter-
Collegiate Press v. NLRB, 37
 the Eighth Circuit aligns with the Sixth
Circuit38
 but is in opposition to the position of the Seventh Circuit,
as it was expressed in 1971. 39
 A narrow majority of the Board
adopted the Inter-Collegiate Press position in two Survey year cases,
Hess Oil Virgin Islands Corp. 4° and Ralston Purina Corp.'" These
decisions hold that an employer who advances valid business
reasons for the use of temporary replacements, during what is an
otherwise lawful lockout of the union employees, does not violate
either sections 8(01)42
 or 8(a)(3). 43 In Inter-Collegiate Press, the
Eighth Circuit enforced a Board order" which dismissed an unfair
labor practice complaint against an employer who produced school
commencement diplomas and yearbooks. 45
 Following an impasse in
contract bargaining, the employer in Inter-Collegiate Press had
locked out his employees in order to end the possibility of a precipi-
tous strike during the upcoming peak business season. Having failed
to receive a no-strike promise from the union one month into the
lockout, the employer notified the union that temporary replace-
ments would be hired and retained until a contract was signed or
until the end of the peak season, whichever came first. 46
In approving the employer's conduct, the Eighth Circuit
reasoned that the employer's tactics were merely aimed at support-
ing his bargaining position and protecting his business from a strike
that could cause severe disruption during the peak season. It sug-
gested that the employer's notification to the union that the em-
ployees would be reinstated as soon as the contract was signed
demonstrated that the employer did not seek to discourage union
membership or to avoid his statutory duty to bargain with the
37
 84 L.R.R.M. 2562 (8th Cir. 1973).
3 ' Ottawa Silica Co. v. NLRB, 482 F.2d 945, 84 L.R.R.M. 2300 (6th Cir. 1973),
enforcing morn. 197 N.L.R.B. No. 53, 80 L.R.R.M. 1404 (1972).
39
 Inland Trucking Co. v. NLRB, 440 F.2d 562, 76 L.R.R.M. 2929 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 858 (1971).
49
 205 N.L.R.B. No. 3, 83 L.R.R.M. 1529 (1973).
41
 204 N.L.R.B. No. 43, 83 L.R.R.M. 1341 (1973).
42
 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1970).
43
 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1970).
44
 Inter-Collegiate Press, 199 N.L.R.B. No. 35, 81 L.R.R.M. 1508 (1972).
45
 84 L.R.R.M. at 2564.
" Id. at 2564-66.
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union, but was essentially a weapon designed to strengthen his
bargaining position. 47
Upon the facts, the Eighth Circuit further concluded that the
employer conduct did not so discourage the employees' exercise of
their statutory right of self-organization as to be "inherently destruc-
tive" of that right." Thus, the court imposed upon the Board the
duty to present substantial, independent evidence of employer anti-
union animus in order to find a section 8(a)(3) violation against
Inter-Collegiate Press. The court felt evidence of anti-union animus
was necessary to find a section 8(a)(3) violation in the use of this
economic weapon where the employer action was apparently based
on good business reasons. 49 For authority, the Eighth Circuit noted
that the decision of the Supreme Court in NLRB v. Great Dane
Trailers Inc. 5° held that economic weapons of employers are nor-
mally lawful where justified by valid and substantial business
reasons, unless there is proof of employer anti-union animus. The
only exception to this general rule of Great Dane Trailers was one
which allowed the Board to proscribe, without proof of employer
anti-union motivation and without regard to the business reasons for
the use of the weapons, employer use of economic weapons that
were "inherently destructive" of employee statutory rights." That
exception required no proof of anti-union animus in order to find
that the employee violated section 8(a)(3). Holding that the lockout
and subsequent use of temporary replacements was not within the
"inherently destructive" category, the court in lnter-Collegiate Press
decided that the general rule announced in Great Dane Trailers
applied and resulted in the dismissal of the complaint against the
employer, since there was no evidence of employer anti-union
motivation. 52
The union argued strenuously that the court should hold these
economic weapons "inherently destructive" of employee rights; a
decision which would create a per se rule and foreclose the need to
show that the employer either lacked valid business reasons or
possessed anti-union animus. 53
 Though such a per se rule was
established in 1971 by the Seventh Circuit in Inland Trucking Co. v.
NLRB, 54
 the Eighth Circuit chose to reject this approach. The
47 Id. at 2567.
414
 84 L.R.R.M. at 2567-68.
4° Id.
5° 388 U.S. 26, 34 (1967).
51
 Id. at 33.
51 84 L.R.R.M. at 2568-69.
53 Id. at 2563-64.
54 440 F.2d 562, 76 L.R.R.M. 2929 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 858 (1971).
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Eighth Circuit argued that any per se rule would impose unneces-
sary rigidity upon the development of the law regarding use of
economic weapons, a result against which the Supreme Court has
frequently warned." Further, the court was inhibited from estab-
lishing such a rule56 because the Board itself, after expert analysis,
had refused to establish a per se rule that the use of temporary
replacements for locked out employees is "inherently destructive" of
employee statutory rights. 57
Turning to the substantive issues, the Eighth Circuit concluded
that establishment of this "inherently destructive" rule was unwar-
ranted. First, because the impact of the challenged economic
weapons would likely fall upon the bargaining position of the union,
rather than upon the employees' allegiance to the union, the use of
those weapons would not necessarily discourage the employees to
maintain union membership in violation of section 8(a)(3). 58 Where,
as in Inter-Collegiate Press, there is an established bargaining rela-
tionship between the parties, it appeared to the court that use of
measures, announced as temporary, 59 would dislocate the union
from its bargaining position rather than dislocate the employees
from allegiance to the union." This situation was found distin-
guishable from one in which the collective bargaining relationship is
newly created and the union is attempting to prove itself deserving
of the employees' allegiance. The court was confident of the persua-
siveness of these arguments, since the Supreme Court, in NLRB v.
Brown Food Store, 6 ' had propounded similar arguments in refusing
to establish the per se unlawfulness of the use of temporary re-
placements for locked-out employees.
Assuming that the Eighth Circuit properly refused to categorize
the use of a lockout followed by use of temporary replacements for
the locked-out employees as employer conduct "inherently destruc-
tive" of employee statutory rights, its application of the general rule
probably justified the decision. The lack of evidence of employer
intent either to discourage union membership or to punish the
employees for the exercise of their right to collectively bargain to
impasse required that the court vindicate the employer. Since the
employer had advanced valid business reasons for the use of the
challenged tactics, no inference of such anti-union animus on the
55 E.g., NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 236 (1963).
56
 84 L.R.R.M. at 2563-64.
57 Inter-Collegiate Press, 199 N.L.R.B. No. 35, 81 L.R.R.M. 1508, enforced, 84
L.R.R.M. 2562 (8th Cir. 1973).
5$ 84 L.RR.M. at 2567.
59 Id. at 2565-66.
6° Id. at 2567.
61 380 U.S. 278, 280-89 (1965).
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part of the employer was available. Without evidence of such un-
lawful motivation, no section 8(a)(3) violation could fairly be found
under the general rule.
The Board, in its two Survey year decisions, Hess Oil 62 and
Ralston Purina, 63 also concluded that the general rule, and not the
"inherently destructive" test, should be applied to fact situations
similar to that present in Inter-Collegiate Press. However, three
different positions were espoused by the Board members, who voted
3-2 in each case to hold unlawful the challenged economic weapons.
A discussion of the different positions is relevant because the divi-
sion within the Board indicates that the employer's use of these
economic weapons in slightly different factual situations could lead
to an opposite decision.
In Ralston Purina, the union and the company reached a bar-
gaining impasse. After locking out his employees in order to bring
economic pressure upon them to concede to company proposals," a
tactic concededly lawful, 65 the company then utilized supervisory
and office personnel in order to temporarily continue production.
The company felt this additional, temporary tactic was necessary to
avoid spoliation of perishable material then part of the inventory. 66
In Hess Oil, the employer employed the same tactics to break the
bargaining impasse, but did not advance any special needs, such as
avoidance of inventory spoliation, as justification for the use of
temporary replacements. 67
 In neither case was there any evidence of
anti-union animus on the part of the employers.
In writing the majority opinion in Ralston Purina and Hess
Oil, Members Kennedy and Penello reiterated the view expressed in
the 1972 Board decision, Ottawa Silica Co." There, the Board
relied upon the Supreme Court's decision in NLRB v. Brown Food
Store, 69 and held that the employer's proof of legitimate business
reasons for the use of a lockout and temporary replacements fore-
closed the finding of a section 8(a)(3) violation against the
employer." In Brown Food Store, the Supreme Court rejected the
"inherently destructive" rule in the case where the employer hired
temporary replacements for locked-out employees. There, the local
62 Hess Oil Virgin Islands Corp., 205 N.L.R.B. No. 3, 83 L.R.R.M. 1529 (1973).
63 Ralston Purina Co., 204 N.L.R.B. No. 43, 83 L.R.R.M. 1341 (1973).
64 83 L.R.R.M. at 1342.
65 See American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 309 (1965).
66 83 L.R.R.M. at 1342.
67
 Id. at 1529-30.
66 197 N.L.R.B. No. 53, 80 L.R.R.M. 1404 (1973), enforced, 482 F.2d 945, 84
L.R.R.M. 2300 (6th Cir. 1973).
380 U.S. 278 (1965).
70 80 L.R.R.M. at 1406-09.
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union representing the locked-out employees was engaging in a
whipsaw strike against a member of the employer's multi-employer
bargaining association.'" The Court refused to apply the "inherently
destructive" label because the overwhelming evidence demonstrated
that the employer was utilizing the lockout weapon only to combat
the union's whipsaw strike and to maintain the bargaining position
of the multi-employer association. 72
While the use of temporary nonunion personnel in prefer-
ence to the locked-out union members is discriminatory,
we think any resulting tendency to discourage union mem-
bership is comparatively remote, and that this use of tem-
porary personnel constitutes a measure reasonably adopted
to the effectuation of a legitimate business end. 73
Thus, relying on both Ottawa Silica and Brown Food Store,
Members Kennedy and Penello indicate that they would permit an
employer to replace temporarily, locked-out employees if there were
substantial business reasons for so doing and no employer anti-union
motivation. Members Kennedy and Penello applied this test to the
factual situations of Ralston Purina, and Hess Oil, and on the same
test used by the Eighth Circuit in Inter-Collegiate Press, found no
employer violation of section 8(a)(3).
The result advocated by Members Kennedy and Penello would
not have occurred in Ralston Purina and Hess Oil except for the
concurrence of Chairman Miller, 74 who took a somewhat different
approach to the lawfulness of these economic weapons. Chairman
Miller, as he fully articulated in the Board's decision in Inter-
Collegiate Press," would subject the challenged employer tactics to
a rigorous .inquiry, not being content to allow lack of anti-union
animus or the presence of valid business reasons to automatically
immunize the employer from a section 8(a)(3) violation. Pointing to
the Supreme Court's Brown Food Store decision, Chairman Miller
felt the Board was there instructed to "balance the impact of such
economic weapons upon the possible discouragement of union
membership against the importance and the legitimacy of the objec-
tives of the employer." 76 Two factors were relevant to this balancing
test: the employees' awareness that their lockout and replacement
was temporary and merely a bargaining weapon, the injury from
71
 380 U.S. at 283-84.
72 Id. at 284.
73 Id. at 288.
74 83 L.R.R.M. at 1342; 83 L.R.R.M. at 1529-30.
75 81 L.R.R.M. 1508, 1509-10.
76 Id. at 1510.
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which could at any time be attenuated by agreeing to the employer's
contract proposals; and, the sincere belief on the part of the em-
ployer that use of the strike prevention weapons was essential—a
possible strike timed to stop production during his peak season
could deal a disastrous blow to his business. 77 Although Chairman
Miller wrote no concurring opinion in either Ralston Purina or Hess
Oil, it may fairly be assumed that the similarity in relevant factors
between those cases and the Inter-Collegiate Press case caused him
to concur separately with Members Kennedy and Penello.
Members Fanning and Jenkins dissented in both cases and
advocated a third position. 78 They argued that the majority test of
substantial valid business reasons and Chairman Miller's balancing
test both are inapplicable where the employer executes a lawful
lockout but then uses temporary replacements in order to continue
production. The dissenters claimed that such employer conduct falls
within the "inherently destructive" category. Thus, they believe that
such action constitutes an unfair labor practice, despite the absence
of proof of employer anti-union motivation and despite the evidence
of employer business reasons for the use of the challenged tactics. In
arguing in Ralston Purina for the adoption of the per se inherently
destructive rule, Members Fanning and Jenkins conceded that the
decision of the Supreme Court in American Ship Building Co. v.
NLRB 79 immunizes the employer from a section 8(a)(3) unfair labor
practice finding if the lockout was simply an economic weapon used
by the employer to dislocate the union from its impasse bargaining
position. However, the dissenters contended that when the employer
himself avoids the economic consequence of his lockout by maintain-
ing production through use of temporary replacements for the
locked-out employees, the employer engages in conduct "inherently
destructive" of his employees' section 7 rights." Reasoning that the
employer is destroying the employees' opportunity to earn while
retaining that opportunity , for himself," the dissenters would
characterize such conduct as automatically discouraging union
membership, since union members must stand by while others earn
their wages and the employer continues his business. Unlike the case
of the strike, where the initiators of the work stoppage, intending to
economically coerce the employer, also incur economic deprivation
as well, the lockout combined with replacement of the locked-out
77 Id. at 1510-12.
78 83 L.R.R.M. at 1343; 83 L,R.R.M. at 1530.
79 380 U.S. 300 (1965).
"° 83 L.R.R.M. at 1343-44.
" 1 Id.
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employees gives the employer such a great economic advantage over
the union employees as to discourage them from collectivizing and
maintaining union membership. 82
However, the position of Members Fanning and Jenkins was
apparently rejected by the Supreme Court in Brown Food Store.
There, the Court held that the Board would need to have substan-
tial evidence of anti-union animus to find an 8(a)(3) violation, since
use of temporary replacements for locked-out employees was viewed
as not having a strong tendency to discourage union membership so
as to place it within the "inherently destructive" category. 83 Since
only two of the five Board Members presently espouse the per se
rule, it appears that the rule will not govern cases until the Board
composition changes. Furthermore, because adoption of the per se
rule would require an analysis suitable for the "expertise" of the
Board, the courts are unlikely to promulgate a rule not previously
adopted by the Board, especially since Brown Food Store remains
precedent.
Thus, the law in this area will turn on the particular facts of
each case. Where the employer cannot show unique and important
business justification such as the prevention of a devastating strike
during the peak season, the prevention of spoliation of inventory, or
the protection of a multi-employer unit from a whipsaw strike,
Chairman Miller may be persuaded that the balancing test favors
the union." Thus, Chairman Miller, together with Members Fan-
ning and Jenkins could form a Board majority that would limit the
use of these economic weapons by an employer.
C. The Duty to Bargain
1. Employer Withdrawal from Multi-Employer Bargaining Unit
Two Survey year Board decisions, Hi-Way Billboards, Inc.
and Associated Shower Door Co., 2 have indicated an increasing
willingness on the part of the Board to limit the ability of an
employer to withdraw from a multi-employer bargaining unit after
the unit has already commenced bargaining with the union. The
preservation of employer association-union bargaining has been rec-
ognized as important to national labor policy because this structure
of collective bargaining appears to promote industrial peace. 3
82 83 L.R.R.M, at 1344.
L .380 U.S. at 287-88.
" 83 L.R.R.M. at 1342; 83 L.R.R.M. at 1529.
206 N.L.R.B. No. 1, 84 L.R.R.M. 1161 (1973).
2 205 N.L.R.B. No. 95, 84 L.R.R.M. 1108 (1973).
3 NLRB v. Local 449, International Bhd. of Teamsters (Buffalo Linen), 353 U.S. 87,
94-96 (1957).
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Nevertheless, the Board has long held4 that "unusual circum-
stances" may justify an employer's withdrawal from the employer
association after the commencement of collective bargaining, and
that union acquiescence to an otherwise unlawful employer with-
drawal immunizes the employer from a section 8(a)(5) 5 violation for
refusing to bargain. Since an untimely or unjustified employer with-
drawal may frustrate the bargaining plans of the parties and thus
severely disrupt the bargaining process, the definitions of "unusual
circumstances" and "union acquiescence" are crucial in that those
definitions will determine the limits of allowable employer with-
drawal; and thus greatly influence the extent of disruption imposed
upon the multi-employer bargaining process.
Board definitions of unusual circumstances have been .tradi-
tionally limited to situations which confront the withdrawing em-
ployer with a realistic threat to survival of the business, such as
proceedings in bankruptcy (' or imminent plant closure due to un-
foreseeable economic conditions. 7 Mere severe injury to the
employer's competitive position has not been placed within the
scope of unusual circumstances. 8 in Hi-Way Billboards, an impasse
in collective bargaining negotiations between the multi-employer
association and the union was held not such an unusual circum-
stance as to permit the employer's withdrawal after the impasse
arose. The decision was rendered after reversal by the Fifth Circuit,
which had found 9 that the original Board decision'° erred in its
factual finding that no impasse had occurred. Noting that it was
without the benefit of a Board decision on the effect of an impasse
on the lawfulness of the employer withdrawal," the circuit court
remanded to the Board for its Survey year decision.
On remand, the Board examined the nature of a bargaining
impasse, and unanimously agreed that such a situation is not an
4 Retail Associates, Inc., 120 N.L.R.B. 388, 395, 41 L.R.R.M. 1502 (1958).
5 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1970) provides: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an
employer . . . to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees,
subject to the provisions of section 159(a) of this title." 29 U.S. § 159(a) (1970) provides in
pertinent part:
Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining
by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be the
exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of
collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or
other conditions of employment . . . .
6 United States Lingerie Corp., 170 N.L.R.B. 750, 751, 67 L.R.R.M. 1482, 1483 (1968).
7 Spun-iee Corp., 171 N.L.R.B. 557, 558, 68 L.R.R.M. 1121, 1122 (1968).
8 See 84 L.R.R.M. at 1162 & nn. 13-14.
9 NLRB v. Hi-Way Billboards, Inc., 473 F.2d 649, 82 L.R.R.M. 2527 (5th Cir. 1973).
"I 191 N.L.R.B. 244, 77 L.R.R.M. 1461 (1971).
473 F.2d at 655, 82 L.R.R.M. at 2532.
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unusual circumstance.' 2 The Board reasoned that although the im-
passe temporarily suspends the parties' statutory duty to bargain,
such a deadlock does not end the bargaining process. The use of
economic weapons, such as strikes, lockouts, or employer-instituted
alterations in working conditions, often results in a shift in the
deadlocked bargaining positions, and thus revives the duty to
bargain." Thus, the Board concluded that an impasse is a predict-
able and normal event in the collective bargaining process, and does
not itself sanction the withdrawal. The Board had previously held
that a bargaining impasse together with union acquiescence will
justify an employer withdrawal," although there is dicta in an
Eighth Circuit opinion indicating that an impasse alone will justify
the withdrawal." However, Hi-Way Billboards is the first Board
decision holding an impasse insufficient to remove the section 8(a)(5)
duty of an employer to retain membership in the multi-employer
unit once bargaining has commenced, and to adhere to any resulting
contract.
The Hi-Way Billboards decision seems correct in light of prior
law in this area and in light of proper labor policy. The bargaining
impasse does not threaten the survival of an employer's business,
and thus does not constitute an unusual circumstance. Even if the
impasse leads to a strike by the union, the strike would generally be
called against the other members of the multi-employer bargaining
association. Since those employers are normally competitors, the
strike would have only a limited effect upon each employer's com-
petitive position in the market. The Board's decision also protects
the policy of encouraging the use of multi-employer units in collec-
tive bargaining. The ability of an employer to withdraw without the
union's consent solely because of an impasse would not only penalize
the union for its reliance upon this structure of bargaining, but
would also penalize the remaining employers in the multi-employer
unit, for whom the major benefit of this agreed-upon bargaining
structure is solidarity among the original employer-members. Any
other decision would discourage both union and employer entry into
multi-employer unit bargaining.
Though Hi-Way Billboards suggests a trend of Board applica-
tion of the unusual circumstances rule in a more stringent fashion,
the Board has been criticized in this respect by dicta in a Survey
' 2 84 L.R.R.M. at 1162-63.
15
 Id. at 1162.
14 Teamsters Local 717, 145 N.L.R.B. 865, 55 L.R.R.M. 1059 (1964).
15 Fairmont Foods Co. v. NLRB, 471 F.2d 1170, 1172-73, 82 L.R.R.M. 2017, 2018-19
(8th Cir. 19721.
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year decision in the Seventh Circuit. In NLRB v. Unelko Corp., 16
the Seventh Circuit did enforce a section 8(a)(5) order against an
employer who withdrew from the multi-employer unit due to an
asserted conflict of interest between the employer and the other
members of the unit.' 7 In enforcing the Board's order, the court
relied on its agreement with the Board's factual finding that the
employer was tardy in the notice of withdrawal to the union, 18 and
thus held that the employer forfeited what the court felt was his
right to withdraw after bargaining had commenced. However, in
dicta, the Unelko court disapproved of the narrow interpretation
given by the Board to the definition of unusual circumstances—an
interpretation which resulted in the Board's finding that the
employer's withdrawal constituted a section 8(a)(5) violation.
The withdrawing employer in Unelko had previously been a
signatory to contracts between a multi-employer association and the
union. The contracts contained provisions which allowed several of
the participating employers to pay a certain class of employees a
wage scale lower than that required of Unelko." The favored
employers, who, unlike Unelko, encountered stiff competition from
southern firms,. were given the special provision to insure their
ability to compete. Unelko asserted its conflict of interest with these
favored employers as sufficient justification for its withdrawal from
participation in the current multi-employer unit after bargaining
had already commenced. The opinion of the Administrative Law-
Judge, which was adopted by the I3oard, 2 " had held that the conflict
of interest is not such an unusual circumstance as would justify the
employer's withdrawal, especially where the employer had been
aware of that conflict long before agreeing to join the multi-
employer unit in the current negOtiations with the union. 2 '
In light of the Board 22 and court policy23 of promoting the
integrity of multi-employer bargaining, the dicta in. Unelko indicat-
ing approval of the employer's reason for withdrawal appears
unjustified. If an employer can disrupt a bargaining structure that is
voluntarily agreed upon by employers and the union simply because
of an economic conflict with other members of the unit over contract
L6 478 F.2d 1404, 83 L.R.R.M. 2447 (7th Cir. 1973).
83 L.R.R.M. at 2450.
is Id.
Id. at 2448.
2° Unelko Corp., 195 N.L.R.B. 236, 79 L.R.R.M. 1328 (1972).
21
 Id. at 238-39, 79 L.R.R.M. at 1329.
22 E.g., Retail Associates, Inc., 120 N.L.R.B. 388, 41 L.R.R.M. 1502 (1958).
" See NLRB v. Local 449, International Bhd. of Teamsters (Buffalo Linen), 353 U.S.
87, 94-96 (1957).
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provisions, multi-employer units will be frequently destroyed during
the negotiations with the union. Often, it is not until those negotia-
tions have commenced and contract proposals are being reduced to
contract provisions that an employer will finally be certain that the
provisions are antagonistic to his self-interest and thus attempt to
withdraw. It is precisely during the negotiations that an employer
withdrawal is most destructive of the bargaining process. It is
submitted that a mere conflict of interest asserted by an employer
after bargaining•has commenced should not justify his withdrawal
from the multi-employer bargaining unit.
Although unusual circumstances will excuse employer with-
drawal after bargaining has commenced, Board policy is that an
otherwise unlawful withdrawal can nevertheless be excused if the
union has acquiesced in the withdrawal. 24 The definition of union
acquiescence, like that of unusual circumstances, has not been reli-
ably determined, 25
 but may be gleaned from a recent Board pro-
nouncement in this area:
[W]hen the union abandons its insistence on acceptance of
the association contract, as such, and, instead, negotiates
different terms or expresses its willingness to consider
counterproposals, the Board readily has found that the
union has acquiesced in the employer's abandonment of
multiemployer bargaining. 2 b
In a Survey year decision, Associated Shower Door, Inc., 27 the
Board significantly limited the scope of union conduct which will be
termed "union acquiescence," and thus rendered a decision which
severely curtails an employer's ability to lawfully withdraw.
Prior to Associated Shower Door, the most recent application of
the law in this area had been made in Fairmont Foods Co. v.
NLRB. 28
 There, the union and multi-employer unit had reached a
bargaining impasse due to the insistence of Fairmont upon a par-
ticular provision which the other employers were willing to forego. 29
Fairmont withdrew, and the union signed the contract, minus the
objectionable provision, with the multi-employer unit. Subse-
quently, the union bargained individually with Fairmont over
economic issues, failing to confine itself to merely demanding
24
 See, e.g., Fairmont Foods Co., 196 N.L.R.B. 849, 80 L.R.R.M. 1172 (1972).
25
 See Comment, 1972-1973 Annual Survey of Labor Relations Law, 14 B.C. Ind. &
Corn. L. Rev. 1173, 1202-05 (1973).
26 I,C. Refrigeration Service, 200 N.L.R.B. No. 107, 81 L.R.R.M. 1529, 1532 (1972).
27
 205 N.L.R.B. No. 95, 84 L.R.R.M. 1108 (1973).
" 471 F.2d 1170, 82 L.R.R.M. 2017 (8th Cir. 1972).
29
 Id. at 1171, 82 L.R.R.M. at 2017-18.
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Fairmont's signature of the contract. 3° The court held that the union
had acquiesced in Fairmont's withdrawal because of the union's
willingness to contract with the remaining members of the multi-
employer unit before protesting Fairmont's otherwise untimely and
unlawful withdrawal. 3 ' The court reasoned that it was inequitable
to allow the union to circumvent the bargaining impasse resulting
from the multi-employer bargaining structure by contracting with
the remaining members of that unit; and then penalize Fairmont for
withdrawing—an act which broke the impasse and permitted the
making of an agreement which the union had been seeking. 32
In Associated Shower Door, the Board refused to follow the
broadening of the definition of union acquiescence that was evi-
denced in the Fairmont Foods decision. In Associated Shower Door,
the union concededly consented to the withdrawal of three em-
ployers from the multi-employer bargaining unit when, following an
impasse, the union bargained with and signed individual contracts
with each of the three employers. Associated, one of the remaining
members of the multi-employer unit, then informed both the union
and multi-employer association of its own withdrawal from the
negotiations, but the union refused to agree to that withdrawal. 33
When the union finally reached agreement with the multi-employer
association, and Associated refused to sign, a section 8(a)(5) refusal
to bargain charge was filed against Associated.
The Board panel held that although the union had consented to
the withdrawal of the three employers with whom it had signed
individual contracts, such conduct did not imply a union acquies-
cence to the total breakup of the multi-employer unit so as to justify
Associated's withdrawal and refusal to sign the contract. 34 In a
separate opinion Chairman Miller argued that even though the
union expressly refused to consent to Associated's withdrawal, the
union's separate bargaining with the other employers "so effectively
decimated the multiemployer unit that the Union should not thereaf-
ter be heard to complain that the original multiemployer unit was no
longer viable."35 Although Chairman Miller's contention was mere
dicta, because the entire Board panel agreed that Associated had
later reentered the multi-employer unit and thus consented to be
bound by the contract, his dicta does appear to be a logical
3° Id. at 1174, 82 L.R.R.M. at 2019-20.
31 Id. at 1173, 82 L.R.R.M. at 2019-20.
32 Id. at 1174, 82 L,R.R.M. at 2020.
" 84 L.R.R.M. at 1109,
34 Id.
35 Id. at 1110 (concurring opinion).
•I
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definition of union acquiescence. Here, the union engaged in con-
duct which would foreseeably destroy the unity among the
member-employers. Those employers which had not yet withdrawn,
like Associated, would be without the bargaining power they had
been relying upon at the time they voluntarily joined the multi-
employer unit. Although the union did not specifically consent to the
entire breakup of that unit, it engaged in conduct which destroyed
the reason for its formation—group bargaining with the union. It is
submitted that when confronted with a case that turns on the
resolution of this issue, the Board should identify the union conduct
as acquiescence in the breakup of the bargaining unit, and adopt the
reasoning of Chairman Miller's opinion. In this way, the Board
could prevent the union from engaging in conduct which is tan-
tamount to acquiescence to a withdrawal from the multi-employer
bargaining structure,' and could further encourage the use of multi-
employer bargaining by assuring the continuity of that structure
until the parties agree to abandon it. -
2. Surface Bargaining: U.S. Gypsum
Sections 8(a)(5) 36
 and 8(d)37 of the NLRA impose upon the
employer the duty to bargain in good faith with the representatives
of the employees, but section 8(d) states that the duty to bargain
contains no requirement that the parties agree to any or all substan-
tive contract proposals. 38 The decision as to whether the employer is
actually conducting the bargaining "in good faith," with a real
intent and desire to reach agreement, necessarily requires a Board
inquiry into the state of mind of the employer, as inferred from the
surrounding facts and circumstances. 39 The present conflict in this
area of "surface bargaining," that is, bargaining without a sincere
intent or desire to reach agreement, is over the scope of the evidence
which is admissible for purposes of Board resolution of an 8(a)(5)
surface bargaining complaint. In a Survey year decision, Wal-Lite
36 29 U.S.C. § 158)a)(5) (1970).
37
 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) provides in pertinent part:
For the purposes of this section, to bargain collectively is the performance of the
mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the employees to meet at
reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours and other
terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any
question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written contract incorporating
any agreement reached if requested by either party, but such obligation does not
compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession... .
]Emphasis added.]
3° See H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99 (1970).
39 See NLRB v. Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., 205 F.2d 131, 134, 32 L.R.R.M. 2225, 2227
(1st Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 887 (1953).
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Division of United States Gypsum Co. v. NLRB (U.S. Gypsum),"
the Eighth Circuit refused to enforce a Board order 41 finding a
surface bargaining violation by the employer. The Board had re-
ceived evidence of employer anti-union statements made seven
months prior to commencement of bargaining, evidence of the in-
transigence of the employer's bargaining position as reflected in the
similarity of his initial and final contract proposals, and evidence of
the limited negotiating authority granted to the employer's chief
negotiator. 42 Although the Board noted that each of the factors
alone would not support an inference of bad faith bargaining, it did
hold that "the totality of the bargaining conduct itself establishes
that Respondent's state of mind throughout the negotiations was one
of unwillingness to reach agreement except, perhaps, exclusively
upon its own terms."43
Underlying the bargaining impasse had been the parties'
conflict over whether to use the current contract, negotiated and
signed by Gypsum's predecessor, and assumed by Gypsum only for
the contract's duration, as the starting point for negotiations for a
new contract. Although the Board majority had not cited the
employer's failure to accept this starting point as evidence of surface
bargaining, Chairman Miller's dissent claimed that such employer
conduct was the basis of the majority's decision." He felt compelled
to dissent, indicating that such an evidentiary basis for the decision
violated the section 8(d) prohibition against the Board requiring
parties to make certain proposals or concessions. 45
The Eighth Circuit, in its Survey year decision, agreed with
Chairman Miller and denied enforcement of the Board's order,
which it saw as primarily derived from the evidence of the
employer's refusal to accept the predecessor employer's contract as
the base for bargaining." The court had dismissed all other evi-
dence as irrelevant to the issue of the employer's good faith in
bargaining and thus felt the case turned on that evidence. 47 The
court then reasoned that the effect, of using such evidence to find a
section 8(a)(5) violation against the employer would be to force the
employer to make certain proposals, a result contrary to the purpose
" 484 F.2d 108, 84 L.R.R.M. 2129 (8th Cir. 1973).
41 200 N,L.R.B. No. 132, 82 L.R.R.M. 1064 (1972). For a discussion of this Board
decision, see Comment, 1972-1973 Annual Survey of Labor Relations Law, 14 B.C. Ind. &
Corn. L, Rev. 1173, 1197-1202 (1973),
42 82 L.R.R.M, at 1065-68.
43 Id. at 1066.
" Id, at 1069.
45 Id.
" 84 L.R.R.M. at 2130.
47 Id.
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of section 8(d). If consideration is to be given to the NLRA statutory
scheme of providing the mechanism for meaningful negotiations but
prohibiting government regulation of the substance of those
negotiations, 48 the Eighth Circuit's refusal to allow the Board to
find a violation of section 8(a)(5) by relying on evidence of substan-
tive contract proposals would appear warranted.
However, it is submitted that the U.S. Gypsum court failed to
confront the real issue in the area of surface bargaining—
whether the Board may use evidence of the employer's intransigence
in bargaining over substantive contract proposals as evidence of
both lack of intent to reach agreeable terms and refusal to bargain in
a spirit of give and take. If this is the type of evidence which the
Board decision in U.S. Gypsum actually relied upon, it is at least
arguable that the Board was not inquiring into the substance of
contract proposals, but only viewing those proposals at the different
points during the negotiation process as a means of evaluating the
employer's willingness to negotiate. In that case, the Board could
not be criticized, as it was by the Eighth Circuit, for evaluating the
reasonableness of the employer's contract proposals in its surface
bargaining inquiry.
3. Successor Employer
a. Duty to Remedy Predecessor's Unfair Labor Practices—In
Golden State Bottling Co. v. NLRB," a Survey year decision, the
Supreme Court has given its imprimatur to the Board rule that
successor employers, having purchased the business with knowledge
that the predecessor employer committed an unfair labor practice,
are obligated to remedy the unfair labor practice. The unanimous
decision of the Court is notable not only for its broad interpretation
of the Board's remedial powers as authorized under section 10(c) of
the NLRA, 5 ° but also because it constituted the first analysis given
by the Court to the successorship doctrine since its 1972-73 Survey
year opinion in NLRB v. Burns International Security Services,
Inc. 51
48 See H.K. Porter, 397 U.S. at 105-06.
48
 414 U.S. 168 (1973).
" 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) provides in pertinent part:
If upon the preponderance of the testimony taken the Board shall be of the opinion
that any person named in the complaint has engaged in or is engaging in any such
unfair labor practice, then the Board shall state its findings of fact and shall issue
and cause to be served on such person an order requiring such person to cease and
desist from such unfair labor practice, and to take such affirmative action including
reinstatement of employees with or without back pay, as will effectuate the policies
of this subchapter: Provided, That where an order directs reinstatement of an
employee, back pay may be required of the employer or labor organization, as the
case may be, responsible for the discrimination suffered by him . .
51 406 U.S. 272 (1972).
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In Golden State, the predecessor employer had unlawfully dis-
charged an employee, and the Board, having found violations of
sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3), ordered both Golden State and its succes-
sors to reinstate the discharged employee with back pay. The Board
found that All-American, as a successor employer, had purchased
the operation with knowledge of this outstanding Board order
against the predecessor. 52
The Board's rule, as enforced against a successor who had
committed no unfair labor practice, had been announced in Perma
Vinyl Corp. 53
 The Board there reasoned that equitable principles
justified imposing liability on a successor who purchased the opera-
tion with knowledge of his predecessor's unfair labor practice, since,
although the successor had no causal connection with the unlawful
conduct, it is in the best position to assure employees their statutory
rights and thus promote industrial peace." It was noted in Perma
Vinyl that any economic burden thus imposed upon the successor
could be recovered from the predecessor by including an indemnity
clause in the sales contract or by reflecting that burden in the
purchase price." More importantly, the Board there saw the rule as
rooted in the concept of successorship:
Thus, "it is the employing industry that is sought to be
regulated and brought within the corrective and remedial
provisions of the Act in the interest of industrial peace."
When a new employer is substituted in the employing
industry there has been no real change in the employing
industry insofar as the victims of past unfair labor prac-
tices are concerned, or the need for remedying those unfair
labor practices. Appropriate steps must still be taken if the
effects of the unfair labor practice are to be erased and all
employees reassured of their statutory rights. 56
The Court in Golden State seized upon this reasoning in finding
that both a sound statutory interpretation and proper labor policies
weighed in favor of the Board rule. Since there was complete
continuity in the operation of the business, despite the change in
ownership, the Court noted that employees would reasonably expect
their "job situations" to remain essentially the same. In such circum-
stances, the successor's failure to remedy the violation would appear
52 414 U.S. at 170-73.
53 164 N.L.R.B. 968, 65 L.R.R.M. 1168 (1967), enforced sub nom., United States Pipe
& Foundry Co. v. NLRB, 398 F.2d 544, 68 L.R.R.M. 913 (5th Cir. 1968).
54
 164 N.L.R.B. at 969, 65 L.R.R.M. at 1168-69.
55 Id.
56 Id,
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to the employees to be a continuation of the predecessor's unlawful
conduct, thus encouraging industrial strife." The Court noted that
although the Burns Court had held that continuity in the "job
situations" of the employees did not justify imposition of the
predecessor's collective bargaining agreement upon the successor, in
this case there was no statutory policy' prohibiting the imposition
upon the successor of mere remedial, non-contractual obligations."
Along with these policy considerations, the Golden State Court
faced the issue of whether the Board's remedy was authorized by
section 10(c)" of the Act. The Board itself has historically fluctuated
between endorsing the narrow view that section 10(c) permits Board
imposition of liability only upon the agent of the unlawful conduct,
and applying, as it does currently, the view that 10(c) permits Board
action against the successor of the agent. 6° The Court accepted the
current Board view, reasoning that the section 10(c) language au-
thorizing such Board remedies "as will effectuate the policies of the
Act" logically includes the authority to impose liability upon a
successor. The Court also ruled" that the remedy is not barred by
Rule 65(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 62 the language of
which states that injunctions and restraining orders shall be "bind-
ing only upon the parties to the action, their officers, agents, ser-
vants, employees and attorneys, and upon those persons in active
participation with them who receive actual notice of the order by
personal service or otherwise." Noting that this Rule has tradition-
ally been interpreted as permitting enforcement against those in
"privity" with the violator, the Supreme Court held that such "priv-
ity" status exists between the successor and the predecessor em-
ployer when the successor purchases the operation with knowledge
that the violation remains unremedied. 63
Although an essential factor in the Court's decision was that the
successor had knowledge of the outstanding Board order at the time
of purchase, the successorship doctrine, which is based upon the
policy of promoting continuity for the employees who remain in
essentially the same operation under a different ownership, was
accorded considerable weight. The Court utilized this policy in
justifying both the exercise of discretion by the Board and the
statutory interpretations of section 10(c) and Rule 65(b) made by the
57
 414 U.S. at 184-85.
58 Id, at 184.
59
 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1970).
b° 414 U.S. at 174-75 (citing cases).
81 Id. at 177-78.
92 Fed. R. Civ. P. 6 5(d).
63 414 U.S. at 179.
1162
ANNUAL SURVEY OF LABOR LAW
Board." The Court's approval of the policy of continuity and
fulfillment of employee expectations, which is the backbone of the
successorship doctrine, is extremely significant. In 1972 the Court's
Burns decision had cast doubt upon the viability of the policy
underlying that doctrine, at least as applied in the area of contract
survival. In light of the small burden imposed upon the successor
who can recoup his losses against the predecessor, 65 and the Court-
approved rule of joint and several liability between both employers
for all back pay accrued until the date of reinstatement, the Court's
decision seems both legally and functionally sound.
b. Contract Survival—In its 1972-1973 Survey year decision,
NLRB v. Burns International Security Services, Inc." the Supreme
Court decided three issues: (1) whether a "successor" employer as-
sumes the obligations of the existing collective bargaining agreement
by operation of law; 67 (2) whether a "successor" has a duty to
bargain with the representative of the predecessor's employees; 68
and (3) when the bargaining obligation of the "successor" com-
mences so as to terminate his right to set unilaterally the terms and
conditions of employment. 69
In the areas of contract survival and duty to bargain, the Court
expressed dicta which created some doubt as to the scope of the
Court's disapproval of Board policy and which left uncertain the
future course the Board was directed to take. In the area of contract
survival, the Burns Court had ruled that the section 8(d)" statutory
prohibition against Board imposition of substantive contract terms
upon parties, and the policy favoring encouragement of free transfer
of capital, left the Board without authority to require that the
successor assume the predecessor's obligations under the current
collective bargaining agreement. 7 ' However, the Burns Court noted
that, on the facts of the case at bar, the successor had explicitly
disavowed assumption of those contractual obligations, 72 and also
pointed out that "in a variety of circumstances involving a merger,
stock acquisition, reorganization, or assets purchase, the Board
might properly find as a matter of fact that the successor had
64
 Id. at 181-85.
69 Id. at 185.
66
 406 U.S. 272 (1972). For an analysis, see Comment, 1972-1973 Annual Survey of
Labor Relations Law, 14 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 1173, 1209-16 (1973).
67 406 U.S. at 291.
68 Id. at 278-79.
69 hi. at 294-95.
7° 29 U.S.C.	 158(d) (1970).
71 406 U.S. at 281-84, 288.
12
 Id. at 286.
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assumed the obligations under the old contract." 73 Although the
Court did not discuss whether the absence of such an explicit
contract disavowal or the presence of one of those circumstances
would justify a Board inference of assumption of contract obliga-
tions, that language and the narrow fact situation upon which the
Court concededly based its holding-74 left some doubt as to the issue
of contract survival in the law of successorship.
However, Survey year Board decisions have not implemented
the Court's dicta in Burns by finding contract survival by the
successor under the "variety of circumstances" outlined in Burns. In
All State Factors," a commercial finance company assumed opera-
tion of a meat packing company, retaining the same management
and procedures. The financial reorganization did not alter the
company's method of operations. The Board panel did not find
contract survival, although the facts fell within the scope of the
Burns dicta. In a second Survey year Board decision, Ecklund's
Sweden House Inn, inc.," the Board did hold that a successor must
execute the entire set of employer obligations under the current
contract with the union, but justified that holding on peculiar facts.
There, the successor had purchased the physical plant, executing a
sales contract with the predecessor in which the successor stated
explicitly its refusal to assume the union-predecessor contract.
Nevertheless, soon after the transfer, the successor's management
assured the union that there would be no changes and noted that it
had checked off union dues for that month pursuant to the
contract. 77 Several months later the successor rejected the union's
demand for adherence to the contract. The opinion of the Adminis-
trative Law Judge, 78 adopted by the Board panel, noted that under
Burns, the specific disavowal of the collective bargaining agreement
as expressed in the sales contract would normally prohibit contract
survival. However, the opinion reasoned that where the successor
had made assurances of continuity to the union, temporarily en-
forced the check off provision, and granted wage increases under
the contractual guidelines, the employer
cancel[led] any intent to the contrary which the respondent
may have previously or subsequently manifested not to be
bound by the collective agreement; and most certainly it
abrogates its agreement with the seller . . . not to assume
73 Id. at 291.
74 Id. at 274.
73 205 N.L.R.B. No. 131, 84 L.R.R.M. 1252 (1973).
76 203 N.L.R.B. No. 56, 83 L.R.R.M. 1173 (1973).
77 83 L.R.R.M. at 1174.
" Id.
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the contract . . . Under such circumstances, therefore,
nothing in the Burns decision would negate the
Respondent's obligation under the contract between it and
the union . . . 79
These Survey year decisions appear to indicate that the Board is not
interested in testing the effect of the Burns dicta regarding contract
survival and that it will not mechanically infer such survival merely
from a reorganization or assets purchase by the successor employer.
c. Successor's Bargaining Obligations—Another successorship
issue left unclarified by Burns was the date of the maturation of the
bargaining duty of the successor. The Board's decision in Burns had
found that Burns, the successor, violated the section 8(a)(5) duty to
bargain by unilaterally altering the conditions of employment
specified by the predecessor's bargaining agreement at the time the
predecessor's employees were hired' by Burns." In reversing this
decision, the Supreme Court held that the successor's duty to bar-
gain does not mature until after the successor had hired enough of
the predecessor's employees to indicate that the union retains major-
ity status under the new employer's business operation. 8 ' However,
the Court in Burns qualified the approval thus granted to the
unilateral alteration of the existing conditions of employment made
by Burns at the time the predecessor's employees were hired:
Although a successor employer is ordinarily free to set
initial terms on which it will hire the employees of a
predecessor, there will be instances in which it is perfectly
clear that the new employer plans to retain all of the
employees in the unit and in which it will be appropriate to
have him initially consult with the employees before he
fixes the terms. 82
Perhaps because such facts were not before the Burns Court, it did
not explain whether the duty to consult would encompass the full
statutory duty of the employer to bargain with the union to impasse
before unilaterally changing the conditions of employment specified
in the predecessor's contract." It remained for the Board to define
the scope of the "duty to consult" and to decide which factual
circumstances would indicate when the successor employer "plans to
retain all of the employees in the unit" so as to acquire the duty to
consult with the union.
79
 Id.
'II 406 U.S. at 293-94.
"' Id. at 294-95.
" Id.
" See NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962).
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In two Survey year decisions, the Board has indicated that it
interprets the Burns "duty to consult" language as mandating the
full statutory duty to bargain for successor employers who wish to
alter the conditions of employment specified under the predecessor's
contract with the union. In Bachrodt Chevrolet Co.," a Survey year
decision, the Board found that the successor employer, upon pur-
chase of the business, hired the entire complement of the
predecessor's bargaining unit employees. The hiring had occurred at
interviews conducted on the date of transfer of ownership. At the
interviews, the successor employer did not condition continued em-
ployment upon acceptance of conditions of employment different
from those specified under the predecessor's contract with the union.
The Board concluded that on the date of hiring it was clear that the
union would retain its majority status in the bargaining unit subse-
quently operated by the successor. It consequently held that the
successor violated the section 8(a)(5) duty to bargain when, one
week later, he unilaterally lowered the current wages without bar-
gaining with the union." The Board reasoned that under Burns, the
employer had had his chance to unilaterally change the existing
conditions of employment at the interviews, at which time it was
not yet clear that the entire group of employees would be retained so
as to continue the union majority. Once the hiring had occurred, the
Board pointed out, the employer knew that the union had a major-
ity in the bargaining unit, and at that time his duty to bargain
attached. 86 The Board implied that, in order to conform with
Burns, the successor's alternative was to condition the hiring of the
old employees upon their acceptance of employment terms different
from those in the predecessor's contract with the union. In that case,
it would not be true that the successor plans to retain the entire
bargaining unit, and thus has not incurred the duty to consult with
the unit's union representative before the making of unilateral
changes."
In Denham Co.," the second Survey year Board decision deal-
ing with the successor's duty to consult, the successor did announce
unilateral reductions in wages on the date of transfer of ownership
of the business. Although the successor did not formally hire the old
employees, the Board found that it was clear that the successor
planned to retain the entire unit on that date, especially since the
contract of sale of the business obligated the successor to retain the
84 205 N.L.R.B. No. 122, 84 L.R.R.M. 1052 (1973).
85 84 L.R.R.M. at 1054.
86 Id.
87 Id.
BS 206 N.L.R.B. No. 75, 84 L.R.R.M. 1359 (1973).
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bargaining unit employees for a definite period of time. The Board
held that because the successor had planned to retain the entire
bargaining unit on the date of transfer of ownership, the successor's
obligation to bargain with the union representative before making
unilateral changes had already matured on that date." In this case,
the Board indicated that where the successor has otherwise demon-
strated clearly that he plans to retain the entire bargaining unit, a
mere announcement of changes in the conditions of employment
prevailing under the predecessor's union contract, without
specifically conditioning émploynient upon acceptance of those
changes, will not allow the successor to escape the duty to bargain
with the union before making such changes.
The result of the Board's application of Burns in these two
cases is grounded upon sound law and practical economics. Once
the successor has retained substantially all of the predecessor's em-
ployees, without expressing the intention to do so only if they agree
to accept conditions of employment different from those specified in
the existing labor contract, the employer knows that the union
majority has been carried over into his new operation. It is well
established that where there is such clear evidence of majority
status, 9 ° the employer acquires the duty to bargain with the union.
Survey year Board decisions have indicated that in the successorship
situation, retention of a bargaining unit represented by a union is
such strong evidence of continued majority status that a presump-
tion of such status arises solely because of the retention of the unit. 9 '
Since the employer must bargain to impasse before making
unilateral changes in existing employment conditions, the result may
be a temporary imposition of the predecessor's contract terms upon
the successor. This result would not entirely conform with the Burns
decision, 92
 but that imposition last's only until the successor fulfills
the duty to consult with the union, a duty interpreted by the Board
in these cases as the statutory duty to bargain. Furthermore, the
Board indicates that a successor can escape even temporary contract
imposition by first fixing initial conditions of employment for the
unit employees, and then conditioning his hiring of such unit em-
ployees upon their acceptance of those conditions.
d. Defining Successorship—A major cause of challenges to the
persuasiveness of the Burns decision is the controversy over whether
the "successor," Burns, was actually a successor employer. The
" 84 L.R.R.M. at 1360.
" See NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 {1962).
9 ' B & W Maintenance Serv., 203 N.L.R.B. No. 101, 83 L.R.R.M. 1163 (1973); D & F
Super Market, 208 N.L.R.B. No. 119, 85 L.R.'R.M. 1193 (1974).
92 406 U.S. at 286-88.
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dissenting opinion of Justice Rehnquist, with which three other
Justices concurred, argued that Burns did not fit within the proper
definition of a successor. 93 Justice Rehnquist reasoned that although
the policy behind the imposition of bargaining duties upon a succes-
sor is to assure a measure of continuity in the industrial relations
within the employing operation, such a policy "may more accurately
be described as a statement of the result of a finding of successor-
ship, rather than a reason for making that finding."94 Justice Rehn-
quist explained that the reason for finding successorship has tradi-
tionally been that the employing operation continued to be substan-
tially the same despite the transfer in legal ownership, and for that
reason the employees were justified in holding expectations of some
continuity in their labor relations with the employing operation."
The dissent viewed a sale of the tangible and intangible assets as
significant evidence of substantial continuity in the employing oper-
ation. However, the dissenters thought that the factual situation of
Burns, involving a mere transfer of a group of employees between
two employers competing for the same contract to perform security
work, without more, precluded a finding of the substantial con-
tinuity in the employing operation that is necessary to a finding of
successorship. 9
In Burns, Justice Rehnquist concluded that the appropriate
bargaining unit of employees in the predecessor's organization
ceased to be appropriate for Burns, a much larger and complex
organization. He contended that therefore it was not proper to
require Burns to bargain with the representative of that unit. 97 The
dissenters were unwilling, unlike the Board, to presume continued
unit appropriateness because Burns was a "successor," reasoning
that continuity of unit appropriateness is a prerequisite to the fact of
successorship, not a presumed result of that fact. 98 Because Burns'
duty to bargan with the union with which the predecessor had dealt
attached only if the union continued to have majority status in
Burns' bargaining unit, the dissent argued against imposing bargain-
ing duties upon Burns unless there was a preliminary factual finding
of continued appropriateness of the unit. The major evidence con-
cerning the issue of unit appropriateness utilized by the Board was a
presumption that, because Burns was a "successor," the old unit
must continue to be appropriate under the business organization of
93 Id. at 296 (dissenting opinion).
94 Id. at 300 (dissenting opinion).
93 Id. at 300-02 (dissenting opinion).
" Id. at 305-06 (dissenting opinion).
97 Id. at 298-99.
98
 Id.
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the new employer. 99 Justice Rehnquist argued that a finding of
continued appropriateness of the unit should be a prerequisite to a
finding of successorship because whether there is continued appro-
priateness of the bargaining unit largely determines whether there is
substantial continuity in the employing operation,'" which under-
lies the justification for defining the new employer as a successor.
A Survey year Board decision indicates that a majority of
Board members have been persuaded to adopt Justice Rehnquist's
reasoning and predicate the finding of successorship, which carries
the duty to bargain with the representative of that unit, upon the
preliminary finding of continued appropriateness of the old bargain-
ing unit within the operation of the new employer. In Border Steel
Rolling Mills, Inc.,'" the new employer purchased the machinery
assets of the predecessor, who had done business within the same
plant as that used by the new employer. The predecessor's business
had been the performance of maintenance work for the new em-
ployer. After purchasing the machinery assets of the predecessor,
the new employer took over the maintenance operations previously
performed by the predecessor, and retained twelve of the
predecessor's fourteen employees. The twelve employees continued
to perform the same work in the same shop. However, the new
employer refused to bargain with the union which had represented
the fourteen member unit under the prior employer. Instead, the
new employer applied the terms of an existing collective bargaining
agreement between himself and another union to the twelve em-
ployees. This agreement covered his already existing plant-wide
unit. The Administrative Law Judge conducted an inquiry into the
continued appropriateness of the twelve member unit, and, finding
that the twelve employees' work had become integrated with that of
employees in the plant-wide unit, and that the twelve had no special
community of interest, concluded that the old unit would not be
appropriate within the operation of the new employer. Because of
this fact, the Board concluded he was not a successor employer to
those twelve employees, and thus had no duty to bargain with their
previous bargaining representative.. 102
The opinion of the Administrative Law Judge, adopted by a
majority of the Board panel, specifically rejected the contention of
the General Counsel that the employer was a successor and that, as
a result, the bargaining unit should be conclusively presumed ap-
" Id, at 275.
'u° Id. at 297-99 (dissenting opinion).
1 ° 1 204 N.L.R.B. No. 89, 83 L.R.R.M. 1606 (1973).
102 83 L.R.R.M. at 1608-09.
103 Id,
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propriate and kept intact.' 03 The Border Steel decision appears to
alter the Board's definition of successorship, as expressed in the
Burns case. This alteration is accomplished by making the finding of
successorship turn upon the continuity of the unit appropriateness
within the new employer's operation, rather than presuming con-
tinued unit appropriateness from a finding of successorship that was
made without a prior inquiry in the appropriateness of the old
bargaining unit in the new employer's operation. In Burns, as in
Border Steel, the new employer already had a bargaining relation-
ship with a company-wide unit. 104 Unlike Border Steel, the Board
in Burns had presumed the small, transferred unit to be appropriate
for the new employer's operation without an inquiry into its actual
appropriateness.
In Border Steel, the Board has properly changed its definition
of successorship. Successorship may be defined as a situation where,
despite the change of employers, there remains substantial con-
tinuity in the employing environment for the employees. Thus, it is
logical to predicate the finding of successorship upon a factual
finding of continued unit appropriateness—a finding which is essen-
tial to a finding of substantial continuity in the employing environ-
ment. Since all the relevant factors that constitute the employing
environment are considered in an inquiry into the appropriateness of
a bargaining unit, continuity in the appropriateness of the unit will
be evidence of continuity in the employing environment, and thus
justify a finding of successorship. Although Member Penello dis-
sented in the Border Steel decision, his expressed opposition to this
change does not appear persuasive in the light of his demonstrated
willingness to evaluate the continued appropriateness of the trans-
ferred unit.'"
It is submitted that the use of a separate inquiry into the
continued appropriateness of the transferred unit as a means of
deciding the issue of successorship is proper. The justification for
imposing bargaining duties upon an employer found to be a succes-
sor is the need to fulfill the reasonable expectation of the transferred
employees for continuity in their employment relationship where the
employing entity has remained substantially the same. Such a sepa-
rate inquiry aids in determining whether the employing environment
has remained substantially the same. The appropriateness of the
transferred unit within the new employer's total operation is an
important tool in deciding whether there is substantial continuity
between the old and the new employing entities. The very same
I" 406 U.S. at 298 (dissenting opinion).
1 °s 83 L.R.R.M. at 1609-11.
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factors that determine the appropriateness of a bargaining unit—the
nature and integration of the employees' duties, the type of work the
employer performs, and the community of interest among the group
of employees—also serve as factors in determining whether there is
substantial continuity in the nature of the employing entity and the
employees' employment environment.
D. Secondary Boycotts*
1. Right to Control Test: George Koch
The NLRA prohibits secondary boycotts. In a Survey year
decision by the Fourth Circuit, George Koch Sons, Inc. v. NLRB,'
the Board has finally convinced a circuit court of appeals to approve
its use of the "right to control" test in the area of secondary boycotts.
Until George Koch, the courts of appeals had followed a rule de-
rived from National Woodwork Manufacturers Association v.
NLRB, 2 where the Supreme Court held that union coercion of an
otherwise neutral employer aimed at preservation of work tradition-
ally performed by the union, does not constitute a secondary
boycott. In contrast, under the right to control test, the Board
determines whether or not a refusal to work, or other union pressure
directed against an employer, is lawful "work preservation"
activity3 outside the ban of the Act's secondary boycott provisions 4
* The authors wish to acknowledge the helpful research and comments on the cases
discussed in this section provided by Allan Carlin of the Boston College Industrial and
Commercial Law Review.
' 490 F.2d 323, 84 L.R.R.M. 2957 (4th Cir. 1973).
2 386 U.S. 612 (1967).
3 See National Woodwork Mfrs. Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612, 644 (1967), In this
landmark Supreme Court decision, it was held that where the union pressure is directed'
against the employees' employer in order to preserve work for those employees, there is no
secondary boycott. Id. at 644-45. The Court reasoned that although the employer may
arguably be considered neutral to the union's grie :vance because it is another employer who is
performing the work the union seeks to preserVe, the employer is actually the person in
dispute with the union, Thus, the union's pressure against him is primary, rather than
secondary, in nature,
4 Section 8(e) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (1970), prohibits the execution of contractual
agreements whereby the union and the employer agree that the employer will boycott the use
of another person's products or will cease doing business with a "secondary" person. 29
U.S.C. § 158(e) (1970), the "hot cargo" provision, states in pertinent part:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for any labor organization and any employer
to enter into any contract or agreement, express or implied, whereby such employer
ceases or refrains or agrees to cease or refrain from handling, using, selling, trans-
porting, or otherwise dealing in any of the products of any other employer, or to
cease doing business with any other person, and any contract or agreement entered
into heretofore or hereafter containing such agreement shall be to such extent
unenforceable and void . . . .
Section 8(b)(4), 29 U.S.C. § I58(b)(4) (1970), on the other hand, prohibits a union from
striking or engaging in other pressure to force the employer to boycott the products of, or
cease doing business with, a third person. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) states:
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by means of a test which places significant weight upon whether the
pressured employer has legal control over the work the union seeks
to preserve.' The Board's right to control test may thus result in a
finding of a secondary boycott even where the union pressure is
aimed at work preservation. As the Board has conceded, 6 the use of
this test to determine whether the union has engaged in secondary
boycotts, until George Koch, has been unanimously rejected by the
courts of appeal] Thus, the Fourth Circuit's Survey year decision
constitutes an important case for the Board, and if followed by other
circuits or the Supreme Court, the case may greatly expand the area
of prohibited secondary boycotts, and thus may eliminate some of
the union's economic weapons.
A discussion of the right to control test requires a preliminary
inquiry into the Supreme Court's landmark 1967 decision, National
Woodwork Manufacturers Association v. NLRB (Woodworkers));
That decision is significant because it induced the courts of appeals
to reject the Board's right to control test. Before Woodworkers those
courts had expressed approval of that test. 9 In Woodworkers, the
Court interpreted the secondary boycott prohibitions of the Act.")
There, the union represented carpenters working for the general
contractor. The general contractor-employer ordered the carpenters
to hang doors which were prefitted, although the collective bargain-
ing agreement between the union and the employer provided that
the carpenters would not install prefitted doors; that contract
guaranteed that the work of cutting and fitting the blank doors
would be allocated to the union's jobsite carpenters. Under literal .
readings of section 8(e) and section 8(b)(4)(B), the contractual provi-
It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents— .. .
(4)(i) to engage in, or to induce or encourage any individual employed by any
person engaged in commerce or industry affecting commerce to engage in, a strike or
a refusal in the course of his employment to use, manufacture, process, transport, or
otherwise, handle or work on any goods, articles, materials, or commodities or to
perform any services; or (ii) to threaten, coerce or restrain any person engaged in
commerce, or in an industry affecting commerce where in either case an object
thereof is— . .
(13) forcing or requiring any person to cease using, selling, handling, transport-
ing or otherwise dealing in the products of any other producer, processor, or
manufacturer, or to cease doing business with any other person . .
5
 The "right to control" test was determinative in the Board's decision in George Koch
Sons, Inc., 201 N.L.R.B. No. 7, 82 L.R.R.M. 1113 (1973).
6 See 82 L.R.R.M. at 1116.
E.g., Local 742, Carpenters v. NLRB, 444 F.2d 895, 76 L.R.R.M. 2979 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 986 (1971); American Boiler Mfrs. Ass'n v. NLRB, 404 F.2d 556, 69
L.R.R.M. 2858 (8th Cir, 1968); NLRB v. Local 164, IBEW, 388 F.2d 105, 67 L.R.R.M. 2352
(3d Cir, 1968); Western Concrete Prods. Inc. v. NLRB, 77 L.R.R.M. 3023 (9th Cir. 1971).
8 386 U.S. 612 (1967).'
9
 See cases cited in 201 N.L.R.B. No. 7, 82 L.R.R.M. 1113, 1116 n.17 (1973).
10
 29 U.S.C, § 158(b)(4)(B), 158(e) (1970).
1172
ANNUAL SURVEY OF LABOR LAW
sion and the work stoppage to enforce it would have been, respec-
tively, an unlawful contract to execute a secondary boycott (hot
cargo provision) and an unlawful secondary boycott." The contrac-
tual provision and the refusal to install, in a literal sense, constituted
coercion upon the employer to require him to cease or refrain from
handling the products of another employer, 12 and thus arguably was
prohibited by the Act.
However, the Supreme Court in Woodworkers pointed out that
conduct apparently prohibited because it falls within the letter of the
statute, may nevertheless be permissible because it is not within the
area of prohibition actually intended by the legislative framers."
The Court concluded that the legislative history of the secondary
boycott provisions of the Act indicated that the intent was to pro-
hibit union conduct and contract ,provisions aimed at pressuring
another person into acceding to the union's wishes by forcing an
employer, otherwise neutral to the union's complaint, to cease doing
business with the other person." The prohibition of conscription of
the neutral employer was the intended purpose of the Act's secon-
dary boycott provisions;" such conscription was bad even if the
neutral employer happened to be the employer of the employees
engaging in the refusal to work.
However, upon an examination of the facts, the Court in
Woodworkers concluded that the aim of the union was preserva-
tion of work for the employees working for the general
contractor-employer. 16 The Court 'thus refused to define the em-
ployer as neutral to the dispute." Since the aim of the union was the
preservation of work for the employees at the employer's jobsite, the
union was not conscripting a secondary, neutral employer; rather,
because its goal was the preservation of work for the jobsite carpen-
ters, the union's purpose was to pressure the employer to force him
to accede to their work preservation goals."
Although not discussed, an apparently important fact in
Woodworkers was that the employer was not bound by any contract
obligations, either to the owner of the site or to a product supplier,
to install only prefitted doors. 19 Being free to purchase prefitted
doors or purchase blank doors to be cut and fitted by his jobsite
m See 386 U.S. at 619.
12 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(13) (1970).
' 3 See 386 U.S. at 619.
14 Id. at 624-33.
15 Id. at 624-25.
16 Id. at 635-42, 645-46.
17 See id. at 644-45.
18 Id. at 646.
14 Id. at 616.
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carpenters, the employer had the ability to fulfill his employees work
preservation goals by purchasing doors to be fitted by them at the
jobsite. Thus, the pressured employer had the right to control the
work desired by the union. Prior to Woodworkers, the Board had
found union pressure against an employer to be an unlawful second-
ary boycott if the employer, unlike the employer in Woodworkers,
did not have the legal right to give the work to his employees. This
lack of control may be the result of contract specifications dictated
by either the owner of the construction site or by the general
contractor. 2 ° Woodworkers created a work preservation exception to
the prohibition of secondary boycott. Nevertheless, the Board con-
tinued to apply the right to control test after Woodworkers, main-
taining that the holding of Woodworkers did not forbid it to limit the
exception created by Woodworkers. 21 This view was justified on the
grounds that the Woodworkers holding was confined to the fact
situation in which the employer did have the legal right to control
the disputed work. Thus, since the Court had not needed to decide
the validity of the right to control test, the Board felt Woodworkers
did not control the situation where the employer did not have the
right to control the work. 22
 The Court in Woodworkers had
specifically refused to decide whether an employer's lack of legal
right to control the work would make the employer neutral to the
dispute and thus convert otherwise lawful work preservation action
into unlawful secondary activity. 23
In its George Koch decision, the Board, in its continuing effort
to convince the courts of appeals that such factual dissimilarities
distinguished Woodworkers, reasoned that a union engaging in a
boycott to enforce work preservation agreements is not entitled to
the Woodworkers immunity from a finding of a section 8(b)(4)(B)
violation if it directs its boycott at an employer who is legally
incapable of allocating the work to the union. In George Koch, the
union represented employees of the subcontractor, Phillips, who had
contracted with the general contractor, Koch, to install pipe at the
plant of General Electric. 24 Specifications in the contract executed
by General Electric and Koch required that all pipe be prefitted by
the original pipe manufacturer rather than by Phillips' employees at
the jobsite. Phillips' employees, citing the fact that their collective
bargaining agreement required that all fitting work on pipes to be
installed by Phillips be accomplished by jobsite employees, 25 refused
2° See 201 N.L.R.B. No. 7, 82 L.R.R.M. at 1116-17 n.17 (citing cases).
21 82 L.R.R.M. at 1118-19.
22 Id. at 1115-16.
23 386 U.S. at 616-17 n.3.
24
 82 L.R.R.M. at 1114-15.
25 Id.
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to install the prefitted pipe. Thus, rather than boycotting the
prefitted pipes, the union could have rightfully sued Phillips for a
breach of contract. 26 The Board held that the union was prohibited
from boycotting Phillips and Koch, because they were neutral to the
union's demands since they were legally incapable of giving Phillips'
employees the pipe fitting work because of specifications dictated by
the owner, General Electric. 27
The Board followed a three-step reasoning process in reaching
this conclusion. First, both employers, Phillips and Koch, were
found to be neutral to the union's complaint. Since the union knew
that their work preservation objectives could be achieved only by
General Electric's agreement to alter the job specifications of its
general contract with Koch, the Board concluded that the union's
refusal to install the prefitted pipes must have been aimed at affect-
ing General Electric, 28 thus demonstrating that the pressured emp-
loyers, Koch and Phillips, were indeed neutral to the union's aims
and hence deserving of protection From this activity. 29 Second, the
Board reasoned that because the challenged union conduct here can
be reasonably viewed as aimed at producing effects upon someone
other than Phillips and Koch, Woodworkers did not require valida-
tion merely because the aim of the conduct was to preserve work for
the employees. 30
 The Board noted that the Woodworkers test of
secondary boycotts was whether, "under all the surrounding circum-
stances, the Union's objectives was 'preservation of work for . .
employees [of the pressured employer], or whether the agreements
and boycotts were tactically calculated to satisfy union objectives
elsewhere."31
 Applying that test, the Board found that the union's
boycott of Koch and Phillips was secondary rather than primary
activity because it must have been aimed at affecting the conduct of
someone other than the pressured employers, Koch and Phillips. 32
26 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1970) confers jurisdiction over suits for breaches of collective
bargaining agreements upon the federal district courts, regardless of Citizenship of the parties
or the amount in controversy. Thus, so long as the collective bargaining agreement specifying
the prefitting work to he allocated to Phillips' jobsite work was work preservation in nature
and not violative of § 8(e) hot cargo provisions, the provision could be the valid basis for a
suit for breach of contract by the union against Phillips. See Woodworkers, 386 U.S. at 643.
However, according to the Board, the mere fact that the union is engaging in a boycott of the
employer to enforce a valid work preservation agreement with him will not insulate it from a
§ 8(b)(4)(B) violation if the employer, with respect to the particular subcontract under which
he is working, does not have the right to control who is to perform the pipefitting. 82
L.R.R.M. at 1117.
17 82 L.R.R.M. at 1117.
25 Id. at 1116.
29 See id.
1° Id. at 1117.
31 386 U.S. at 644.
32 82 L.R.R.M. at 1117-18.
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Seeking to convince the courts of appeals to return to
pre-Woodworker cases upholding the Board's use of the right to
control test, the Board argued that its test did not authorize the
employer to abdicate his right to control by agreeing to owner's
specifications contrary to the collective bargaining agreement he
executed with the union. 33 If the pressured employer could have
retained that right to control, the Board pointed out, the fact that he
did not possess it at the time of the union's objections, may not
permit the employer to plead no control in the face of the union's
work preservation boycott. 34
In enforcing the Board's order, 35 the Fourth Circuit agreed that
the lack of the right to control of the boycotted employers was
persuasive evidence that the union objectives were directed else-
where than at the employers. The court accepted the Board's state-
ment that it was not using right to control as a per se test of whether
the union's boycott was primary or secondary in nature. 36 The court
agreed that because Phillips and Koch were unable to allocate the
work, they were neutrals. The court conceded, however, that em-
ployers should not be accorded the status of a neutral and be
entitled to protection from the employees' boycott where, in
negotiating work contracts, the employer was in a position to give
effect to the work preservation clause in his union contract. 37 The
Fourth Circuit felt such a situation was not encompassed within the
record presented. According to General Electric's specifications,
neither Koch nor the subcontractor ever had any right to control the
allocation of the pipe-fitting work; 38
 nor was there any evidence that
they sought those specifications in order to avoid the work preserva-
tion provisions of the collective bargaining agreement with the
union. 39
Although the Fourth Circuit conditioned its approval of the
right to control test upon its use as only one of the factors relevant to
the Board's inquiry into whether the union's pressure against the
employer is secondary, its approval is significant in that the Board's
" Id.
34
 Id.
" George Koch Sons, Inc. v. NLRB, 490 F.2d 323, 328, 84 L.R.R.M. 2957, 2961 (4th
Cir. 1973).
36
 Id. at 327, 84 L.R.R.M. at 2960. The court stated that:
Despite the.union's opposing contention, the Board has not exalted right-to-control
as per se the conclusive indicium of a secondary boycott. On the contrary, the Hoard
obediently followed on the Court's instruction, according weight to all existing and
relevant circumstances.
Id.
37
 Id. at 328, 84 L.R.R.M. at 2960.
38 Id., 84 L.R.R.M. at 2961.
39 Id.
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application of right to control in George Koch was of controlling
weight. It is submitted that use of the right to control may place
restrictions on union conduct not contemplated by either the framers
of the statute or by the Supreme Court. The fact that the union is
attempting to enforce a valid work preservation agreement executed
with the employer indicates that the employer is primary to the
union's purposes. Although the union may hope to have the em-
ployer put pressure upon the general contractor or owner in order to
acquire from them the right to allcicate the work to the employees,
the union's boycott,. using the Woi?dworkers test, is not "tactically
calculated to satisfy ;union objectives elsewhere."'" The union is still
concerned with work preservation and with the labor relations
between its employees and the boycotted employer, and thus its
objectives do not lie "elsewhere." There may be some merit in the
use of the right to control to promote a policy of discouraging strikes
and other action against an employer who, at that time, has no
power to allocate the work to his employees. However, where, as in.
George Koch, the employer has validly promised to allocate that
work, union pressure designed to force adherence to that promise
should not be defined as secondary activity.
2. Hot Cargo Clauses: Marriott; Acco Equipment
a. The Board's Hot Cargo Jurisdiction—Section 8(e) of the
Act41 prohibits the making of agreements by a "labor organization"
and an "employer" in which the employer agrees to refrain from
transacting business with another person or to refrain from handling
the products of another person. Thus, this "hot cargo clause" pro-
hibition forbids the making of agiTements whereby the employer
agrees to assist the union in carrying out a secondary boycott against
another person. 42
 By prohibiting the employer from voluntarily
agreeing with the union to engage in the secondary boycott against
the third person, section 8(e) suppldments section 8(b)(4)(B), 43
 which
prohibits a union from engaging in action designed to force the
employer to boycott the products or business of the third person.
49 386 U.S. at 644.
41
 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (1970) states in releiiant parts:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for any labor organization and any employer
to enter into any contractor agreement, exp'ress or implied, whereby such employer
ceases or refrains or agrees to cease or refrain from handling, using, selling, trans-
porting, or otherwise dealing in any of the, products of any other employer, or to
cease doing business with any other person, and any contract or agreement entered
into heretofore or hereafter containing such an agreement shall be to such extent
unenforceable and void .. .
42
 National Woodwork Mfrs. Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612, 638 (1967).
43
 29 U.S.C.	 158(b)(4)(B) (1970).
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Enacted in 1959, both provisions were considered by legislators as
an interlocking and extensive restraint on secondary activity. Al-
though supplementary and intended by the legislative framers to
affect a comprehensive proscription of secondary boycott activity,"
section 8(b)(4)(B) prohibits a union from exerting pressure upon "any
person" to force that person to boycott another person, while section
8(e) merely prohibits a union from making an agreement with "any
employer" (emphasis added) to boycott another person:
In Marriott Corp. v. NLRB, 45 a Survey year decision, the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the section 8(e)
prohibition of hot cargo agreements is not confined to those agree-
ments made between a union and an "employer" who falls within
the NLRA's statutory definition of that word." Instead, the court's
approval was given to the Board's assumption of jurisdiction over
alleged hot cargo agreements between a labor organization under
the Board's jurisdiction and an employer not within the Board's
statutory jurisdiction, if their agreement to boycott such third per-
son would affect employment conditions of employeeS who are sub-
ject to the Board's jurisdiction. 47 Thus, for purposes of jurisdiction
over hot cargo agreements, the meaning of the word "employer" in
section 8(e) is not confined to its statutory definition. According to
the Board and the Ninth Circuit, section 8(e) prohibits agreements
between a labor organization and any person to carry out a secon-
dary boycott. If Marriott is followed, the Board will be permitted to
invalidate hot cargo agreements effecting a secondary boycott to the
same extent it is able, under section 8(b)(4)(B), to forbid the secon-
dary boycott itself.
Since the Ninth Circuit approved the Board's interpretation of
its hot cargo jurisdiction without a substantial degree of indepen-
dent reasoning," the Board's opinion" warrants close examination.
Lufthansa Airlines and the Machinists Union negotiated a hot cargo
provision. The concededly unlawful hot cargo provision provided
that Lufthansa, whose New York in-flight food catering was per-
formed by its own employees represented by the Machinists Union,
would cease contracting out its catering requirements in other cities
44
 386 U.S. at 635-39.
45
 491 F.2d 367, 85 L.R.R.M. 2257 (9th Cir. 1974).
29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1970) excepts the federal, state, local governments, certain
non-profit hospitals and those employers within the jurisdiction of the Railway Labor Act
from the statutory definition of employer.
47 Machinists Union (Lufthansa German Airlines), 197 N.L.R.B. No. 18, 80 L.R.R.M.
1305 (1972), enforced sub. nom., Marriott Corp, v. NLRB, 491 F.2d 367, 85 L.R.R.M. 2257
(9th Cir. 1974).
45 491 F.2d at 370, 85 L.R.R.M. at -2258-59.
45 197 N.L.R.B. No. 18, 80 L.R.R.M. 1305 (1972).
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to non-union caterers. One of those non-union caterers was Marriot,
whose catering contract was cancelled by Lufthansa after the latter
had agreed to the hot cargo provision. Since Lufthansa was an
employer subject to the jurisdiction of the Railway Labor Act, 5° it
was exempt from the jurisdictional definition of "employer" under
the NLRA. 51 The Machinists Union represented Lufthansa's cater-
ing employees who, as individuals employed by a Railway Labor
Act employer, are not employees subject to the Board's
jurisdiction. 52 Nevertheless, the Union was a labor organization
subject to the Board's jurisdiction because approximately ninety
percent of the total number of employees it represented were NLRA
statutory employees, and because almost all of its collective bargain-
ing agreements had been executed with employers subject to Board
jurisdiction. 53
The Board opinion contained a detailed comparative analysis of
the legislative history of sections 8(e) and 8(b)(4)(B) and concluded
that
Congress in 1959 intended to make it an unfair labor
practice for a labor organization . . . to agree with 'any
person' that the latter would cease doing business with any
other person. Thus, despite its use of the phrase 'any
employer' in Section 8(e), it is clear from the, above that
Congress intended to enact in Section 8(e) a ban on hot
cargo agreements at least as encompassing as the ban
envisaged by the drafters of Section 8(b)(4)(B) which would
have applied to hot cargo clauses executed by 'any
person.'54
Thus, the Board was not persUaded to adopt the union's and
Lufthansa's contention that section 8(e) did not prohibit the execu-
tion of this otherwise unlawful hot cargo provision. The union and
Lufthansa conceded that had the union struck or exerted other
pressure upon Lufthansa to force it to cease contracting out to the
non-union caterer, Marriott, a violation of section 8(b)(4)(B) would
have occurred. 55 Consequently, to sanction achievement of the same
result by a section 8(e) hot cargo contract clause appeared illogical to
the Board, especially since the entire thrust of the 1959 secondary
5° Id.
5 ' 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1970).
52
 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1970).
53 SO L.R.R.M. at 1305.
54 Id. at 1310. Member Fanning in dissent engaged in a reading of the § 8(e) legislative
history contrary to that of the Board majority. Id. at 1311, 1313.
55 Id. at 1310.
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boycott amemdments to the Act was the closing of loopholes previ-
ously existing. 56
The Board's broad interpretation of its jurisdiction over hot
cargo agreements appears justified. Its decision does not incorporate
the entire National Labor Relation Act law into labor relations
between Railway Labor Act employers and Railway Labor Act
employees. Rather, the Board's decision merely prevents them from
regulating the terms and conditions of employment of employees of
a NLRA employer, such as Marriott, by means of a secondary
boycott designed to unionize the NLRA employer. Furthermore,
incorporation of only hot cargo law into Railway Act labor relations
is a result apparently within the legislative intent.
Such incorporation does not affect labor relations between em-
ployers and unions subject to the Railway Labor Act since a hot
cargo provision is one which, by definition, is designed to affect
employment conditions of persons other than the contracting par-
ties. Since Marriott was a NLRA-employer, supervision of its labor
relations by the Board is permissible. The Board's decision, affirmed
by the Ninth Circuit, does not appear to deny the union any legiti-
mate economic weapons. The union would be prohibited from forc-
ing the Railway Labor Act employer to boycott (the NLRA em-
ployer) by virtue of the section 8(13)(4)(B) prohibitions against such
coercion of "any person." To deny them the right to achieve the
same end by a contractual hot cargo provision is not unfair. How-
ever, it is not certain that the Board would assert hot cargo jurisdic-
tion in a situation where the contracting union was not an NLRA
statutory labor organization. This uncertainty results from the
Board's reliance in Marriott upon the fact that although the con-
tracting employer was not subject to its jurisdiction, the contracting
union was. 57
b. Construction Industry Proviso
—Section 8(0" prohibits the
execution of hot cargo contractual clauses, i.e., clauses in which the
employer promises the union that it will boycott the products of
another person or cease doing business with a third person. 59 The
employer's promise may not be absolute, but may obligate him to
boycott the third person, conditional upon the occurence of condi-
tions precedent, such as the use by the third person of non-union
labor. 6 ° Congress, however, carved out exceptiOns6 1
 to the hot cargo
56 Id. at 1310-11.
57 Id. at 1311.
55 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (1970).
59 See National Woodwork Mfrs. Ass'n, 386 U.S. 612, 638 (1967).
" See United Shd. of Carpenters v. NLRB (Sand Door), 357 U.S. 93 (1958).
6 ' Proviso to § 8(e) permits the execution of certain hot cargo agreements in the construc-
tion industry and the garment industry. 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (1970).
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clause prohibitions for the benefit of the construction industry, rec-
ognizing the exceptional need for union use of those clauses in that
industry. 62
Formulated as a proviso to section 8(e), the construction indus-
try exception permits hot cargo agreements, between a labor union
and a construction industry employer, relating to the "contracting or
subcontracting of work to be done at the site of the construction,
alteration, painting, or repair of a building, structure, or other
work." 63 In a Survey year case decided by the Board, fl cco Con-
struction Equipment Inc.," the language of this proviso was held
not to validate an otherwise unlawful hot cargo agreement which
applied to the jobsite repair of equipment.
The union had a hot cargo contract with the general contractor
providing that after the expiration of warranties on equipment used
at the jobsite, any repairs could no longer be performed by the
employees of the equipment dealer or manufacturer. After such
time, the contract required that any equipment repairs be performed
by the union's members. 65 Except for the statutory proviso, the
contractual provision concededly would have been unlawful because
it required the general contractor to cease doing business with
another person, the equipment dealer. The general contractor
breached the agreement by allowing the dealer's employees to per-
form the post-warranty jobsite repairs." The union then invoked its
62 The structure of the employment relationship in the construction industry is different
from that present in other industries, where the employees' working conditions are capable of
formulation by negotiation directly with their employer. The typical construction employee is
hired by an independent employer to whom a general contractor has subcontracted a portion
of the project. From the viewpoint of the construction union, the unionization of their
primary employers (the small subcontractors) to improve working conditions is nearly impos-
sible unless the general contractor has the practice of awarding his work to unionized
subcontractors. Unless the union could execute hot cargo clauses with general contractors to
insure the use of that practice, the subcontracts would go to the less costly, non-union
subcontractors, thus depriving the unionized subcontractors and their employees of work.
Such a result would have seriously undermined unionization and the promotion of collective
bargaining in that industry.
63 The construction industry proviso to	 8(e), 29 U.S.C.	 158(e) (1970), states:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for any labor organization and any employer
to enter into any contract or agreement, express or implied, whereby such employer
ceases or refrains or agrees to cease or refrain from handling . the products of any
other employer, or to cease doing business with any other person, and any contract
or agreement . .. shall be to such extent unenforceable and void: Provided, That
nothing in this subsection shall apply to an agreement between a labor organization
and an employer in the construction industry relating the contracting and subcon-
tracting of work to be done at the site of the construction, alteration, painting, or
repair of a building, structure, or other work . . . .
" 204 N.L.R B. No, 115, 83 L.R.R.M. 1457 (1973). See Comment, 15 B.C. Ind. &
Corn. L. Rev. 1292 (1974).
65 83 L. R RM. at 1457-58.
66 Id.
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contractually-designated remedy and "fined" the general contractor
for his breach.
Upon the issuance of a section 8(e) complaint against the union,
the Board held that as applied to jobsite repair of equipment, the hot
cargo clause was not protected by the proviso. 67 The Board
reasoned that although actually performed on the construction site,
the jobsite repairs were not "work to be done at the site of the
construction"—the validating language of the proviso. 68 The Ad-
ministrative Law Judge, whose conclusions were adopted by the
Board majority, had reasoned that because such repairs could have
been performed off the jobsite, that work was not "work to be done
at the site."69 He further argued that since jobsite repairmen are
only temporarily involved with the construction site, their work is
not construction in nature and not within the scope of the hot cargo
proviso.
Acco Equipment espouses a narrow reading of the language of
that proviso. Although the majority opinion expressed the views of
only three of the five Board Members," the decision may indicate
an increasing desire on the part of the Board to limit the hot cargo
validating proviso through resort to strained statutory interpreta-
tions. Restricting such hot cargo provisions may encourage unrest in
construction industry labor relations. Valid hot cargo clauses,
though enforceable through suits, may not be enforced by economic
weapons.'" However, work preservation and union standards
clauses, which may become replacements for the recently invali-
dated jobsite repair hot cargo clauses, are enforceable by resort to
union self-help. Thus, the Board's Acco Equipment decision may
lead to an increase in the use of economic weapons in the labor
relations within the construction industry, and thus encourage in-
dustrial unrest.
III. ARBITRATION
A. Arbitration of Safety Disputes: Gateway Coal
The 1973-74 Survey year saw a significant application and
refinement of the federal arbitration law originally outlined in 1960
87
 Id, at 1458.
88 Id.
69 Id. (emphasis added).
7° Chairman Miller and Members Jenkins and Penello were in the majority. Member
Fanning dissented.
7i See National Woodwork Mfrs. Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612 (1967); United Bhd. of
Carpenters v. NLRB (Sand Door), 357 U.S. 73 (1958).
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in the Steelworkers Trilogy cases.' In Gateway Coal Co. v. United
Mine Workers, 2 the Supreme Court held that disputes over plant
safety would be presumed to be covered by a broad arbitration
contract provision, and that Section 502 of the Act 3 does not consti-
tute a broad exception to the union's duty to arbitrate safety dis-
putes.'
An understanding of Gateway Coal requires a brief review of
the Supreme Court's arbitration decisions, commencing with the
1960 Steelworkers cases and culminating in 1970 in Boys Market,
Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union Local 770. 5 In Steelworkers, the Su-
preme Court held that federal courts, when deciding whether a
party had breached the collective bargaining agreement arbitration
clause by refusing to arbitrate a particular dispute, 6 must presume
that a broadly worded binding arbitration clause was intended to
require arbitration of the instant dispute, unless the particular class
of disputes was expressly excluded from the coverage of the clause.?
The Court reasoned that this presumption of arbitrability of labor
disputes was essential to, and warranted by, the congressionally-
declared policy8 of promoting the settlement of labor disputes by
methods voluntarily agreed upon by the parties.
Two years later, in Teamsters Local 174 v. Lucas Flour Co., 9
the Court expressed its belief that continued protection of the policy
of promoting arbitration of industrial disputes required that a union
be held to have impliedly agreed not to strike to resolve those
disputes which it had promised would be resolved by binding arbi-
tration. This implied no-strike promise of the union thus trans-
' United Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United
Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United
Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
— U.S. — 94 S. Ct. 629, 637-38, 85 L.R.R.M. 2049, 2053-54 (1974).
3
 29 U.S.C. § 143 (1970) states in pertinent part that "the quitting of labor by an
employee or employees in good faith because of abnormally dangerous conditions for work at
the place of employment of such employee or employees (will not] be deemed a strike . . . ."
4 94 S. Ct. at 640-41, 85 L.R.R.M. at 2058.
398 U.S. 235 (1970).
6 Section 301 of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1970), confers upon federal district courts
jurisdiction over suits for breach of collective bargaining agreements. The contract law to be
used must be fashioned by the federal courts, and applied by any state courts exercising
jurisdiction over such suits. Teamsters Local 174 v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 104 (1962).
Under Steelworkers, however, the courts are prohibited from inquiring into the merits of the
labor dispute, and must limit their inquiry into whether the parties intended that the clause
providing for binding arbitration cover the instant dispute. Warrior and GuV, 363 U.S. 574,
583-85 (1960).
7 363 U.S. at 581.
8
 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1970) states:
Final adjustment by a method agreed upon by the parties is declared to be the
desireable method for settlement of grievance disputes arising over the application of
grievance disputes or interpretation of an existing collective-bargaining agreement.
369 U.S. 95 (1962),
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formed an otherwise lawful strike into a breach of contract. Finally,
in Boys Market,'G the Court authorized federal courts to issue
injunctions to halt strikes violative of the no-strike promise. Con-
cluding that this authority was essential to the policy of promoting
arbitration, the Court reasoned that unless employers are entitled to
the most expeditious means of enforcing the union's no-strike prom-
ise, they will be discouraged from agreeing to the quid pro quo for
the union's no-strike promise—binding arbitration."
Unlike Steelworkers, where the disputes arose over economic
matters such as discharge of employees,' 2 in Gateway Coal the
dispute concerned plant safety, which, according to the union, had
been undermined by the employer's reinstatement of foremen con-
victed of falsifying company safety records. 13 The union walked out
in protest over the allegedly unsafe situation created by the presence
of the foremen, and refused the company's request to arbitrate the
dispute under a contract provision calling for arbitration of "all local
disputes." 14 The federal district court granted the company's request
for a Boys Market - type injunction against the union's apparent
breach of the no-strike promise, which was implied from its promise
to use arbitration as the exclusive method of resolving "local
disputes."" However, the Third Circuit, concluding that the nature
of safety disputes and the section 502 protection for walkouts over
unsafe working conditions distinguished Gateway Coal from
Steelworkers, 16 reversed the district court. Although recognizing the
Steelworkers mandate to presume that the arbitration provision was
intended to cover all disputes not specifically excepted, the court of
appeals reasoned that the labor policies justifying the presumption
of arbitrability did not apply to safety disputes, since the lives rather
than the mere economic well-being of the employees were at stake
and since the section 502 exception of safety dispute walkouts from
the definition of strikes indicated a congressional recognition of an
exception to this arbitration policy.' 7
The Supreme Court took a different approach to the question of
the relevance of section 502 to the presumption of arbitrability of
safety disputes. The Third Circuit had analyzed section 502 in terms
of its effect upon the labor policies behind the presumption of
" 398 U.S. 235 (1970).
'I Id. at 247-48.
12 American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. at 564 -65. Enterprise Wheel & Car, 363 U.S. at 595.
13 94 S. Ct. at 634, 85 L.R.R.M. at 2050-51.
14 Id. at 635, 85 L.R.R.M. at 2052.
15 80 L.R.R.M. 2634 (W.D. Pa. 1971).
16 466 F.2d 1157, 1160, 80 L.R.R.M. 3153, 3155 (3d Cir. 1972).
17 Id. at 1160, 80 L.R.R.M. at 3155.
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arbitrability. However the Supreme Court reasoned that the
significance of section 502 was that it authorized a union to strike
over safety issues despite its prior no-strike promise." Thus section
502 appeared relevant only where the union had made a no-strike
promise. To decide whether the Mine Workers had impliedly made
such a promise, the Court stated that it must be determined initially
whether the binding arbitration clause it had executed covered
safety disputes, and thus constituted a Lucas Flour implied promise
not to strike over these disputes."
Seeing no reason to carve out an exception for safety disputes
from the Steelworkers presumption of arbitrability, the Court con-
cluded that the union had agreed to arbitrate the dispute. 2" The
promotion of arbitration as a substitute for the use of economic
weapons as the favored method of dispute resolution had been
sanctioned in Steelworkers on the grounds that the parties had
agreed to repose their confidence in an arbitrator who had knowl-
edge of the practices in the industry and a sensitive awareness of the
respective needs of the parties. 2 ' Noting that the arbitrator is capa-
ble of bringing such qualities to the resolution of safety as well as
economic disputes, the Court in Gateway Coal saw no need to
interpret the contract as excluding safety disputes from binding
arbitration, especially since no specific exception was expressed in
the language of the contract. 22 Furthermore, it appeared to the
Court that the existence of plant safety would more likely be pro-
tected by "an informed and impartial assessment of the facts" rather
than by resort to economic weapons."
Thus, because of the Court's initial conclusion that the union
had agreed to arbitrate safety disputes, under Lucas Flour the union
also impliedly agreed not to strike to resolve these disputes. Ordinar-
ily, the necessary result would be that the Mine Workers walkout
constituted a breach of contract, and thus conduct enjoinable by the
district court. However, section 502 states that "the quitting of labor
by an employee or employees in good faith because of abnormally
dangerous conditions of work" is not a strike. 24 The Court stated
that under some circumstances, it would be constrained to agree
with the Third Circuit's decision to reverse the order granting the
injunction, since this statutory provision creates an exception to the
18 94 S. Ct. at 639, 85 L.R.R.M. at 2054-55.
19 Id.
2° Id. at 637-38, 85 L.R.R.M. at 2053-54.
21 Warrior & Gulf, 363 U.S. at 581-82.
22 94 S. Ct. at 636-37, 85 L.R.R.M. at 2052-53.
23
 Id. at 637-38, 85 L.R.R.M. at 2053.
24
 29 U.S.C. § 143 (1970).
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implied no-strike promise that otherwise results from a promise to
arbitrate the dispute. 25
However, disagreeing with the Third Circuit, the Court held
that section 502 did not authorize a strike over unsafe working
conditions in all circumstances where the employees believe a safety
hazard exists; instead objective evidence of a safety hazard rather
than the employees' subjective belief was viewed as necessary to
avoid unjustified resort to the protections of section 502. 26
Any employee who believes a supervisor or fellow-worker
incompetent and who honestly fears that at some future
time he may commit some unspecified mistake creating a
safety hazard could demand his colleague's discharge and
walk off the job despite the contractual agreement not to
do so. Absent the most explicit statutory command, we are
unwilling to conclude that Congress intended the public
policy favoring arbitration and peaceful resolution of labor
disputes to be circumvented by so slender a thread as
subjective judgment. . . . 27
Finding that the union had not advanced sufficient objective evi-
dence of the actuality of hazardous conditions, the Court was unwill-
ing to permit the union to use section 502 to immunize itself from a
breach of its promise to arbitrate the dispute. 28
Although this decision restricts the union's ability to force a
repair of dangerous working conditions by resort to walkouts, it
does not impose undue burdens upon the union. The union need
only demonstrate objective evidence of the presence of a safety
hazard to receive section 502 protections. This is a small price to
pay for the promotion of arbitration, which would be undermined if
the union could avoid its promise to arbitrate without the need for
such justification. The decision to include safety disputes within the
scope of the presumption of arbitrability is also devoid of harshness
upon the union. Where it agrees to arbitrate "all local disputes," a
contract interpretation placing safety disputes within that promise is
not unreasonable. Furthermore, if the union wishes to carve out
safety disputes as an area in which resolution through the use of
economic weapons is permitted, it may insist on an arbitration
clause which expressly excludes that class of disputes from the
contractual provision requiring resolution of disputes by arbitration.
25 94 S. Ct. at 640, 85 L.R.R.M. at 2056.
Id. at 640-41, 85 L.R.R.M. at 2056.
27 Id. at 641, 85 L.R.R.M. at 2056.
28 Id.
1186
ANNUAL SURVEY OF LABOR LAW
B. Grievance and Arbitration Proceedings-Effect on
Title VII Actions: Alexander
Prior to filing a complaint with a state fair employment agency
or with the EEOC under Title VII, or before instituting a suit under
section 1981 or 1983, an employee, whose employment contract is
subject to a collective bargaining agreement, might first attempt to
obtain relief from alleged discriminatory employment practices
through the grievance and arbitration machinery under the collec-
tive bargaining agreement. The Supreme Court has noted that Con-
gressional policy endorses the promotion of industrial stabilization
through the collective bargaining agreement' and there would ap-
pear to be no reason why this policy should not extend to controver-
sies involving charges of employment discrimination. The Supreme
Court affirmed this policy in the Steelworkers Trilogy 2 where it
stated, in United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 3
that "an order to arbitrate the particular grievance should not be
denied unless it may be said with positive assurance that the arbitra-
tion clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the
asserted dispute" 4 and that questionable cases should be resolved in
favor of coverage. 5
 Moreover, the Steelworkers Trilogy established
that questions of interpreting the collective bargaining agreement
should be left to the arbitrator, 6 and that the function of the courts
is limited to a determination of "whether the party seeking arbitra-
tion is making a claim which on its face is governed by the
contract."7
 Further, an employee must exhaust the established grie-
vance and arbitration remedies before filing suit to enforce specific
contractual rights. 8
As a consequence of the Steelworkers Trilogy, the federal courts
have reached varying results 9 in determining whether an employee's
' Textile Workers Union v, Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 455, 40 L.R.R.M. 2113, 2115
(195 7).
2 United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 46 L.R.R.M. 2414 (1960);
United Steelworkers v, Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 46 L.R.R.M. 2416
(1960); United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 46 L.R.R.M,
2423 (1960),
363 U.S. 574, 46 L.R.R.M. 2416 (1960).
4 363 U.S. at 582-83, 46 L.R.R.M. at 2419-20.
5
 Id. at 583, 46 L.R.R.M. at 2420.
6
 363 U.S. at 569, 46 L.R.R.M. at 2416, 363 U.S. at 599, 46 L.R.R.M. at 2426.
7 363 U.S. at 568, 46 L.R.R.M. at 2415.
Republic Steel Corp. v, Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 652, 657, 58 L.R.R.M. 2193, 2194,
2196 (1965).
'1 See, e.g., Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 402 U.S. 689 (1971), afrg 429 F.2d 324, 332,
2 FEP Cases 687, 692 (6th Cir. 1970); Oubichon v. North American Rockwell Corp., 482
F.2d 569, 574, 6 FEP Cases 171, 175 (9th Cir. 1973); Macklin v. Spector Freight Sys,, Inc.,
478 F.2d 979, 990-91, 5 FEP Cases 994, 1001-02 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Rios v. Reynolds Metals
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statutory right to a trial de novo under Title VII may be foreclosed
by prior submission of his claim to final arbitration. Since the union
rather than the employee has control over the presentation of a
grievance, the employee's interests may not be adequately rep-
resented during arbitration when the union has interests adverse to
those of the aggrieved employee."' In determining the effect of
arbitration awards upon subsequent Title VII actions, some courts
adopted rules of preclusion." Where the union has inadequately
represented the employee, such rules operate to deprive an employee
of his Title VII rights if the decision of the arbitrator is adverse.
In a landmark decision during the Survey year, Alexander v.
Gardner-Denver Co., 12
 The Supreme Court held that an employee
may institute a Title VII suit following an adverse grievance-
arbitration award. In reaching this result, the Court concluded that
the Steelworkers Trilogy did not require a rule precluding the in-
stitution of post-arbitral actions to enforce Title VII rights and
rejected the minority rule that a voluntary election to pursue a
grievance to final arbitration under the nondiscrimination clause of
a collective bargaining agreement constitutes a binding election of
remedies." The decision of the Seventh Circuit in Bowe v.
Colgate-Palmolive Co." foreshadowed the holding of the Supreme
Court in Alexander. The Seventh Circuit, in a sex-discrimination
case, held that an employee is not required to make a binding
election of remedies prior to adjudication of a Title VII claim of
employment discrimination, but that such an election should be
made after adjudication to preclude unfair duplicate relief." Arbi-
trators and the NLRB have concurrent jurisdiction to resolve un-
fair labor practice disputes. Similarly, the Seventh Circuit held that
arbitrators and the courts have concurrent jurisdiction to decide
Co., 467 F.2d 54, 58, 5 FEP Cases 1, 4 (5th Cir. 1972); Newman v. Avco Corp., 451 F.2d
743, 746-47, 3 FEP Cases 1137, 1140 (6th Cir. 1971); Hutchings v. United States Indus., Inc.,
428 F.2d 303, 2 FEP Cases 725, 733 (5th Cir. 1970); Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416
F.2d 711, 715, 2 FE? Cases 121, 123 (7th Cir. 1969).
1° Comment) 1971-1972 Annual Survey of Labor Relations Law, 13 B.C. Ind. & Corn.
L. Rev. 1347, 1353-54 (1972). See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 186 (1967); Republic Steel Co.
v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 652 (1963).
" See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 466 F.2d 1209, 1210, 4 FE? Cases 1210 (10th
Cir. 1972), rev'd, 94 S. Ct. 1011, 7 FE? Cases 81 (1974); Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 429
F.2d . 324, 332, 2 FEP Cases 687, 692 (6th Cir. 1970) aff'd, 402 U.S. 689 (1971).
12
 94 S. Ct. 1011, 7 FEP Cases 81 (1974).
13 94 S. Ct. at 1020-22, 7 FEP Cases at 86-87.
416 F.2d 711, 2 FEP Cases 121 (7th Cir. 1969). For a discussion of prior cases
involving the issue of the effect of grievance and arbitration upon Title VII actions, see
Comment, 1971-1972 Annual Survey of Labor Relations Law, 13 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev.
1347, 1353-61 (1972); Comment, 1972-1973 Annual Survey of Labor Relations Law, 14 B.C.
Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 1173, 1184-86 (1973).
13 416 F.2d at 715, 2 FEP Cases at 123.
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Title VII issues. 16 Furthermore, the Seventh Circuit noted the dis-
tinction between the processes of arbitration and judicial action and
the remedies afforded by each. The Supreme Court apparently
adopted this rationale in Alexander."
In Hutchings v. United States Industries, Inc., 18 the Bowe rule
of rejecting the election of remedies doctrine in Title VII actions was
applied where the plaintiff, unlike the plaintiff in Bowe, had ex-
hausted his collective bargaining agreement remedies prior to in-
stituting his Title VII action for racial discrimination. Although the
record did not reveal whether Title VII rights, or similar contractual
rights were considered," the Fifth Circuit held that the prior ad-
verse arbitration award did not bar a subsequent Title VII suit. 2 °
However, the possibility of adopting a policy of deferral to arbitra-
tion in Title VII cases presenting circumstances different from those
in Hutchings was explicitly left open. 2 t
In Rios v. Reynolds Metals Co., 22 the Fifth Circuit adopted and
applied a standard of conditional deferral to arbitration awards;
thereby exercising the option it had reserved in Hutchings. The
distinguishing circumstances referred to in Hutchings were present:
the collective bargaining agreement included an obligation upon the
employer not to discriminate in violation of Title VII; and the
arbitrator expressly rejected a claim that the employer had breached
this duty. 23 The Rios court adopted a complex and limited policy of
deferral to arbitration in Title VII cases, expanding upon the
NLRB's standard of deferral announced in Spielberg Mfg. Co. 24 The
court in Rios established the following standard:
First, there may be no deference to the decision of the
arbitrator unless the contractual right coincides with rights
under Title VII. Second, it must be plain that the
arbitrator's decision is in no way violative of the private
rights guaranteed by Title VII, nor of the public policy
which inheres in Title VII. In addition, before deferring,
the district court must be satisfied that (1) the factual issues
before it are identical to those decided by the arbitrator; (2)
the arbitrator had power under the collective agreement to
decide the ultimate issue of discrimination; (3) the evidence
18 Id, at 714-15, 2 FEP Cases at 122.
12 94 S. Ct. at 1020-22, 7 FEP Cases at 86-87.
18 428 F.2d 303, 2 FEP Cases 725 (5th Cir. 1970) (racial discrimination).
18 Id. at 314 n.10, 2 FEP Cases at 733 n.10.
2° Id. at 314, 2 FEP Cases at 733.
21 Id. at 314 n.10, 2 FEP Cases at 733 n.10.
22 467 F.2d 54, 5 FEP Cases 1 {5th Cir. 1972) (national origin discrimination).
23 Id. at 55-56, 5 FEP Cases at 2.
24 112 N.L.R.B. 1080, 1082, 36 L.R.R.M. 1152, 1153 (1955).
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presented at the arbitral hearing dealt adequately with all
factual issues; (4) the arbitrator actually decided the factual
issues presented to the court; (5) the arbitration proceeding
was fair and regular and free of procedural infirmities. 25
Rios marked a retreat from the broad implications of Hutchings. It
is submitted that, under the limited circumstances specified in Rios,
the Fifth Circuit ratified a standard analagous to that previously
adopted by the Sixth Circuit.
In Dewey v. Reynolds Metal Co., 26 the Sixth Circuit held that a
prior adverse arbitration award precluded a subsequent Title VII
action, 27
 reasoning that arbitrators have authority to make final
determinations of issues of Title VII civil rights violations. 28 How-
ever, in Newman v. Avco Corp., 29 the Sixth Circuit permitted a
Title VII action subsequent to an adverse arbitration award. The
court stated that it had applied the doctrine of estoppel in Dewey,
rather than the doctrine of election of remedies, and that district
court jurisdiction over Title VII claims, which had been conferred
by statute, could not be removed by contractual agreement. 3 ° In
rationalizing the apparent conflict with Dewey, the Sixth Circuit in
Newman asserted that the rule it had applied in the former case
required deferral to arbitral fact finding "where the parties have
agreed to resolve their grievances before (I) a fair and impartial
tribunal (2) which had power to decide them . . . ." 3 ' It then
purported to apply this two-part rule of estoppel and distinguished
Dewey on the basis of: (I) the doubtful fairness of the arbitration
proceeding; and (2) the arbitrator's lack of contractual power to
determine the issue of discrimination. 32
 The charge that the union
and the employer conspired in maintaining a scheme of racial dis-
crimination made the fairness of the arbitration proceeding
questionable. 33
 Further, the court concluded that, since the collec-
tive bargaining agreement limited the arbitrator's jurisdiction to
issues of contract interpretation, and since the contract contained no
25 467 F.2d at 58, 5 FEP Cases at 4.
26 429 F.2d 324, 2 FEP Cases 687 (6th Cir. 1970), afrd mem., 402 U.S. 689 (1971). The
judgment was affirmed by an equally divided court.)
27 429 F.2d at 332, 2 FEP Cases at 69.
28 Id.
29 451 F.2d 743, 3 FEP Cases 1137 (6th Cir. 1971) (racial discrimination).
19 Id. at 746, 3 FEP Cases at 1139.
31 Id. at 747, 3 FEP Cases at 1140. The grievance complaint included a charge of
discrimination and the Sixth Circuit stated that the arbitration award was adverse "on all
grounds." Id. at 745, 3 FE? Cases at 1139. Thus, it would appear that the arbitrator
expressly considered the charge of discrimination.
32 Id. at 748, 3 FEP Cases at 1141.
33 Id. at 747-48, 3 FEP Cases at 1140-41.
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prohibition against the form of discrimination alleged, the arbitrator
lacked authority to determine the issue of racial discrimination. 34
As a result of Newman, it would appear that the Sixth Circuit
had adopted a policy of conditional deferral to arbitration in Title
VII actions not dissimilar from that subsequently adopted by the
Fifth Circuit in Rios. The court in Newman implied that it would
defer to arbitration where: (1) the fairness of the arbitration proceed-
ing is not brought into question; (2) the collective bargaining agree-
ment explicitly proscribes the form of discrimination charged; and
(3) the arbitrator determined the 'issues. The standard of deferral
adopted by the Fifth Circuit in Rios included the substance of these
requirements. In addition, Rios required findings by the district
court: that the identical factual issues decided by the arbitrator were
presented; that the evidence relating to those factual issues was
adequately presented in the arbitral hearing; and that the arbitrator
decided the factual issues presented to the court. Thus, the Rios
standard of deferral is rigorous and limited in scope. However, it
would appear that Rios and Newman are similar insofar as both
decisions would permit deferral to arbitration under certain circum-
stances and reject an absolute rule of permissibility of Title VII
actions subsequent to an adverse arbitration award.
In contrast to the development represented by Rios, the trend
of decisions" during the Survey year, which progressed logically to
the decision in Alexander, rejected application of a rule of preclusion
and indicated disinterest in adopting a policy of deferral to arbitra-
tion in Title VII actions. In Macklin v. Spector Freight Systems,
Inc., 36
 the plaintiff instituted a class action, charging that the em-
ployer and the union engaged in a continuing conspiracy to dis-
criminate against black employee members through the maintenance
of a discriminatory hiring and job assignment system. 37 The emp-
loyee also claimed that the union •inadequately represented his in-
34
 Id, It has been suggested that the Newman rationale that the arbitrator lacked
authority to decide the issue of racial discrimination is also applicable to Dewey. The evidence
relied upon by the Sixth Circuit in Dewey did not include a prohibition of discrimination in
the collective bargaining agreement. Comment, 1971-1972 Annual Survey of Labor Relations
Law, 13 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 1347, 1359-60 (1972).
35 See text at notes 36-51, infra. But cf. Rose v. Bridgeport Brass Co., 487 F.2d 804,
811-12, 6 FEP Cases 837, 843 (7th Cir. 1973).,
36
 478 F.2d 979, 5 FEP Cases 994 (D.C. Cir, 1973). Although the plaintiff did not file
charges with the EEOC until more than 210 dayg (the time limit under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(d)
(1970), as amended, 42 U.S.C. it 2000e-5(e) (Supp. II, 1972)) after the occurrence of the
allegedly unlawful employment practice, the court held that the allegations of a conspiracy
continuing up to the time charges were filed constituted a timely filing. 478 F.2d at 987, 5
FEP Cases at 999. Title VII., as amended, permits charges to be filed up to 300 days from the
date of occurrence of the unfair labor practice charge where the complaint is'initially referred
to an appropriate state agency. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (Supp. II, 1972).
37 478 F.2d
	 983, 5 FEP Cases at 995-96.
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terests, both in collective bargaining and in the grievance proceed-
ings which had resulted in a determination adverse to the
employee." The District of Columbia Circuit held that the plaintiff
was not estopped by the adverse result in the grievance proceedings
and rejected the contention that the election of remedies doctrine
applies in employment discrimination cases. 39
In reaching the conclusion that Dewey did not require applica-
tion of the doctrine of estoppel in the instant case, the court distin-
guished Dewey, reasoning that the grievance committee in Macklin
"did not confront the racial discrimination question . . . pressed
before EEOC and the District Court," while the arbitrator had
reached and determined the religious discrimination issue in
Dewey." Therefore, the court concluded that "one of Dewey's
major underpinnings—the desirability of avoiding relitigation of
issues already heard in private grievance proceedings—is not ap-
plicable here."41
Next, the election of remedies doctrine was considered. This
doctrine would bind the complaining employee to the outcome of the
initial grievance and arbitration proceedings where the individual's
fundamental objective was the same in subsequent court proceed-
ings, regardless of whether the employee "proceeded under varying
theories and factual claims in the different proceedings. "42 Noting
that all circuits which had considered the issue of the application of
the doctrine of election of remedies in a Title VII case had rejected
that rule, the court in Macklin also held the doctrine inapplicable. 43
In Oubichon v. North American Rockwell Corp.," the Ninth
Circuit rejected the election of remedies doctrine in a Title VII
action where the prior grievance proceedings resulted in a favorable
award. 45
 In dictum, some courts had expressed disapproval of a
holding which would permit an employer to maintain a Title VII
38
 Id. at 988-89, 5 FEP Cases at 1000.
3' Id. at 990-91, 5 FEP Cases at 1001-02.
4° Id. at 990, 5 FEP Cases at 1001-02. The court, referring to Dewey stated that an
evenly divided vote of the Supreme Court "ordinarily is not viewed as a judgment on the
merits." Moreover, the grievance and arbitration awards in Macklin could only be made on
the basis of provisions of the contract. Id.
41 Id., 5 FEP Cases at 1002.
42 Id. at 991, 5 FEP Cases at 1002.
43 Id. Citing Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S, 171, 64 L.R.R.M. 2369 (1967), the court reasoned
that the finality of grievance and arbitration awards is not absolute, even outside of the
context of Title VII, if a breach of the duty of fair representation is alleged. 478 F.2d at 992, - 5
FEP Cases at 1003.
44
	
F.2d 569, 6 FEP Cases 171 (9th Cir. 1973). As in Macklin, jurisdiction was based
upon allegations of a chain of discriminatory action. Id. at 571, 6 FEP cases at 172.
" 482 F.2d at 573, 6 FEP Cases at 174. Sec Rose v. Bridgeport Brass Co., 487 F.2d at
812, 6 FEP Cases at 843.
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action subsequent to a favorable grievance or arbitration award. 46
However, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that "judicial relief can be
tailored to avoid duplication and windfall gains."'" Oubichon is
significant for establishing the rule that acceptance of a prior favor-
able grievance or arbitration award or settlement is prima facie
evidence of full compensation for individual damages, but does not
bar all Title VII relief. 48
 The Ninth Circuit developed the burden of
proof requirements in such a case.
After an employee accepts an out-of-court settlement for a
grievance arising out of a civil rights claim, he will have
the burden of proving that what he received was not
intended to be a complete settlement of his claim for
money damages. If he can prove that the apparent settle-
ment was not based on the full range of issues cognizable
under Title VII, or that it was cognizable only as a partial
settlement because the grievance artibration machinery
was limited in its available remedies, the plaintiff may
press for additional money damages."
The holding in Oubichon foreshadowed the sweeping rejection of
the doctrine of election of remedies by the Supreme Court in Alex-
ander, for Oubichon bars subsequent judicial relief in a Title VII
action only in circumstances where such relief will result in dupli-
cate recoveries, but not necessarily where the judicial relief merely
supplements a grievance or arbitration award.
When the Supreme Court determined in Alexander that prior
submission of a claim to final arbitration does not bar a subsequent
Title VII action, its rejection of a strict application of the doctrine of
election of remedies followed a clearly developed line of precedent."
However, the Supreme Court's broad repudiation of waiver and
deferral in Title VII actions, as well as its failure to discuss the
46
 See Newman v. Avco Corp., 451 F.2d 743, 749, 3 FEP Cases 1137, 1141 (6th Cir.
1971); Hutchings v. United States Indus,, Inc., 428 F.2d 303, 314, 2 FEP Cases 725, 733 (5th
Cir, 1970); Bowe v, Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416: F.2d 711, 715, 2 FEP Cases 121, 123 (7th
Cir. 1969),
47
 482 F,2d at 573, 6 FEP Cases at 174.
43
 Id. at 574, 6 FEP Cases at 175.
49
 Id.
5°
 See Oubichon v. North American Rockwell Corp., 482 F.2d 569, 572-73, 6 FEP
Cases 171, 173-74 (9th Cir. 1973); Macklin v. Specttor Freight Sys., Inc., 478 F.2d 979,
990-91, 5 FEP Cases 994, 1002 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Voutsis v. Union Carbide Corp., 452 F.2d
889, 893-94 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 889 (1971); Newman v, Avco Corp., 451 F.2d
743, 746 n, I, 3 FEP Cases 1139, 1140 n.1 (6th Cir. 1971); Hutchings v. United States Indus.,
Inc., 428 F.2d 303, 314, 2 FEP Cases 725, 732-33 (5th Cir. 1970); Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive
Co., 416 F.2d 711, 714-15, 2 FEP Cases 121, 123 (7th Cir. 1969).
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doctrine of estoppel, marked a sharp departure from the rationale of
prior decisions in several lower federal courts."
In Alexander, the union processed the employee's complaint of
unjust discharge and his demand for reinstatement with back pay
under a collective bargaining agreement which included a clause
stating that "-`there shall be no discrimination against any em-
ployee on account of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or
ancestry . . . "52 The arbitrator ruled that the company had
justifiably discharged petitioner and the EEOC found no reasonable
cause to believe that a violation of Title VII had occurred, 53 Alex-
ander instituted a civil suit, but the trial court granted the
defendant's motion for summary judgment. 54
In reversing the decision of the Tenth Circuit, which had
affirmed the judgment of the district court, 55
 the Supreme Court
considered several issues: election of remedies, powers and functions
of arbitrators, waiver of Title VII rights, and deferral to arbitration
in the context of the purpose and structure of Title VII. The Court
omitted a discussion of the doctrine of estoppel. However, the
holding that an employee may fully pursue both grievance-
arbitration remedies and a Title VII action would seem to imply a
rejection of a rule of estoppel in Title VII actions: "The federal court
should consider the employee's claim de novo. The arbitral decision
may be admitted as evidence and accorded such weight as the court
deems appropriate."56
The doctrine of election of remedies only applies in situations
where legally or factually inconsistent remedies, relating to the same
rights, are pursued and, therefore, the Supreme Court concluded
that the doctrine does not apply to cases such as Alexander." "In
submitting his grievance to arbitration, an employee seeks to vindi-
cate his contractual right under a collective-bargaining agreement.
By contrast, in filing a lawsuit under Title VII, an employee asserts
independent statutory rights accorded by Congress." 58 The Court
51
 See, e.g., Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 466 F.2d 1209, 4 FEP Cases 1210 (10th
Cir. 1972), rev'd, 94 S. Ct. 1012, 7 FEP Cases 81 (1974); Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 429
F.2d 324, 2 FEP Cases 687 (6th Cir. 1970), affd mem., 402 U.S. 89 (1971).
52
 94 S. Ct. at 1015, 7 FEP Cases at 82. However, the petitioner, Alexander, did not
raise the claim that his discharge resulted from racial discrimination until the last of four
prearbitration proceedings. The union introduced the petitioner's charge at the arbitration
hearing and the union representative testified that the employer's usual practice was to
transfer employees back to their former positions rather than to discharge them when they
performed inadequately. Id. at 1016-17, 7 FEP Cases at 82-83.
$3
 Id. at 1017, 7 FEP Cases at 83.
54
 346 F. Supp. 1012, 4 FEP Cases 1205 (D. Cob). 1971).
5S
 466 F.2d 1209, 4 FEP Cases 1210 (10th Cir. 1972).
56 94 S. Ct. at 1025, 7 FEP Cases at 90.
57
 Id. at 1020, 7 FEP Cases at 86.
se Id.
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stated that the relationship between the two forums, courts and
arbitrators, was complementary rather than mutually exclusive, and
analogized the remedial and enforcement procedures to those under
the National Labor Relations Act 59
 when both contractual and
statutory rights are involved in a single dispute. 6°
Where the statutory right underlying a particular claim
may not be abridged by contractual agreement, the Court
has recognized that consideration of the claim by the arbi-
trator as a contractual dispute under the collective-
bargaining agreement does not preclude subsequent con-
sideration of the claim by the National Labor Relations
Board as an unfair labor practice charge or as a petition
for clarification of the union's representation certificate
under the Act."
Therefore, the Court rejected the application of the doctrine of
election of remedies and, on similar grounds, disposed of the asser-
tion that the petitioner waived his cause of action under Title VII.
The Court reasoned that permitting prospective waiver of Title VII
rights through the collective bargaining process would defeat the
Congressional purpose in enacting Title VII—to guarantee that em-
ployees are free from discriminatory employment practices. 62 The
Title VII right to equal employment opportunities belongs to the
individual employee and may not be waived by the union. This
distinguishes that right from other statutory rights, such as the right
to strike, which are conferred on employees collectively." There-
fore, the Court declined to hold that pursuit of relief through griev-
ance and arbitration amounts to a waiver of a Title VII cause of
action.
In addition to rejecting a rule of preclusion, the Court refused
to adopt a policy of deferral to arbitration analogous to the policy
adopted by the NLRB in Spielberg Manufacturing Co." or by the
Fifth Circuit in Rios. 65
 Urging adoption of a rule similar to the
NLRB policy enunciated in Spielberg, the respondent contended
that federal courts should defer to arbitration in Title VII suits
where: "(i) the claim was before the arbitrator; (ii) the collective-
bargaining agreement prohibited the form of discrimination charged
. . . and (iii) the arbitrator has authority to rule on the claim and to
59
 29 U.S.C. §.§ 151 at seq. (1970).
6° 94 S. Ct. at 1020, 7 FEP Cases at 86.
61
 Id, at 1020-21, 7 FEP Cases at 86.
62
 Id. at 1021, 7 FEP Cases at 87.
65 Id.
64
 112 N.L.R.13. 1080, 1082, 36 L.R.R.M. 1152, 1153 (1955).
65
 467 F.Zd 54, 5 FEP Cases 1 (51_11 Cir. 1972).
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fashion a remedy." 66 However, the Court reiterated its conclusion
that Congress intended federal courts to exercise final enforcement
authority under Title VII. 67 The arbitral process could not ade-
quately protect and enforce Title VII rights: arbitrators lack the
expertise of courts in public law concepts and the informality of the
fact-finding process in arbitration makes it less appropriate for re-
solution of Title VII issues."
The Court refused to adopt the "more demanding deferral
standard" 69 of Rios and noted that a narrow deferral policy might
have the detrimental effect of increasing the complexity of arbitra-
tion to insure compliance with that standard, thus reducing the
effectiveness and expediency of arbitration and undermining the
policy of voluntary settlement of disputes. 7 ° Moreover, a deferral
rule, like a rule of preclusion, might undermine the arbitration
system by causing employees to bypass arbitration and go directly to
court. 71 Thus, Alexander marks a sharp disapproval of Rios, and it
is extremely unlikely that a rule similar to that adopted by the Fifth
Circuit would now be upheld by the Court in Title WI actions.
Although a rule of deferral to arbitration would appear to
present an irreconcilable conflict with Alexander, the Court there
sanctioned a policy of according "great weight" to arbitral decisions
where full consideration has been given to an employee's Title VII
rights. 72 It is submitted that this approach represents a proper
balancing of "the federal policy favoring arbitration of labor dis-
putes and the federal policy against discriminatory employment
practices . . . ." 73 A rule of deferral to arbitration is inappropriate in
Title VII cases because Congress has determined that courts alone
should have authority to finally determine the merits of charges of
employment discrimination, and because arbitration procedures af-
ford imperfect protection of individual rights. Furthermore, as the
Court stated in Alexander, a limited rule of deferral would unduly
complicate arbitration and might cause grievants to bypass arbitra-
tion altogether.
Like the deferral standard, the proposition advanced by the
employer in Alexander, that a rule of preclusion is appropriate in
Title VII actions subsequent to grievance and arbitration awards,
draws some support from several arguments. These include the
66 94 S. Ct. at 1023, 7 FEP Cases at 88.
67 Id. at 1023-24, 7 FEP Cases at 88.
68 Id. at 1024, 7 FEP Cases at 89.
69 Id. at 1023-25, 7 FEP Cases at 89-90.
7° Id. at 1025, 7 FE? Cases at 90.
71 Id .
72 Id. at 1025 n.21, 7 FEP Cases at 90 n.21.
73 Id. at 1025, 7 FE? Cases at 90.
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contentions that a contrary holding such as Alexander will have
several adverse effects: impairment of the effectiveness and desira-
bility of arbitration agreements, unfairness to employers required to
defend in two forums, and time and cost inefficiencies. It is submit-
ted that the Supreme Court correctly found these contentions
insufficient to sustain a rule that an employee's statutory right to a
trial de novo under Title VII may be foreclosed by prior submission
of his claim to final arbitration under the nondiscrimination clause
of a collective bargaining agreement.
The district court in Alexander adopted one argument in favor
of a rule of preclusion in concluding that a rule permitting Title VII
actions subsequent to adverse arbitration awards would substan-
tially undermine the employer's incentive to arbitrate and might
result in the eventual disappearance of arbitration clauses from
labor agreements. 74 In contrast, the Supreme Court persuasively
reasoned that the union's no-strike pledge is the primary incentive
for an employer to enter into an arbitration agreement, and there-
fore that "most employers will regard the benefits derived from a
no-strike pledge as outweighing whatever costs may result from
according employees an arbitral remedy against discrimination in
addition to their judicial remedy under Title VII." 75 Moreover, the
Court soundly concluded that the expediency and cost-saving nature
of arbitration would preserve its usefulness in employment discrimi-
nation controversies:76
It might be contended that Alexander is unfair to employers
because it requires them to defend against the same charges twice.
However, a rule of preclusion could result in unfairness to the
employee in the form of insufficient protection of Title VII rights.
Where the interests of the union differ from those of the employee,
considerations of the possibility of inadequate representation of the
grievant's rights and interests by the union in grievance and arbitra-
tion proceedings support a rejection of any rule of preclusion in Title
VII actions. The courts are the only impartial forums in such cases
with authority to enforce the individual's rights to be free from
discrimination in employment.' The Court rejected another conten-
tion: ". .. that to permit an employee to have his claim considered
in both the arbitral and judicial forums would be unfair since this
would mean that the employer but not the employee was bound by
the arbitral award."77 Significantly, the Court explained the rela-
tionship between arbitration and Title VII actions.
74 346 F. Stipp. at 1019, 4 FEP Cases at 1209.
7 '5 94 S. Ct. at 1023, 7 FEP Cases at 88.
1(1.
77 Id. at 1022, 7 FEP Cases at 87-88.
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This argument mistakes the effect of Title VII. Under the
Steelworker's Trilogy, an arbitral decision is final and bind-
ing on the employer and employee, and judicial review is
limited as to both. But in instituting an action under Title
VII, the employee is not seeking review of the arbitrator's
decision. Rather, he is asserting a statutory right indepen-
dent of the arbitration process. 78
The need to insure aggrieved individuals of an opportunity to fully
vindicate their statutory right to be free from employment discrimi-
nation requires the rule that an employee is not foreclosed from
bringing suit under Title VII subsequent to final arbitration of the
employee's claim.
It would seem beyond dispute that the public interest in pro-
tecting Title VII rights outweighs any argument that a rule of
preclusion, such as the doctrine of estoppel or election of remedies,
should be applied in Title VII cases based on the additional time
and cost of defending in two forums. Unlike other rights, such as
the right to strike, which are "conferred on employees collectively to
foster the processes of bargaining and properly may be exercised or
relinquished by the union as collective bargaining agent to obtain
economic benefits for unit members. . . ." 79 Title VII rights belong
to the individual. Arbitration machinery provides insufficient pro-
tection of such individual statutory rights and a rule of preclusion
would have the consequence of permanently depriving an employee
of his Title VII rights where the union representation is inadequate,
or the available remedies, or the arbitration procedures are
insufficient. Thus, both preclusion and deferral rules are inappro-
priate in Title VII cases. Moreover it is clear that Alexander prop-
erly implements the decision of Congress to vest the courts with
exclusive final authority to determine Title VII rights and to give
relief for their violation.
IV. MINORITY GROUP ACTIVITY—UNAUTHORIZED RACIAL
PROTEST AS PROTECTED ACTIVITY: The Emporium
In a controversial Survey year, decision, Western Addition
Community Organization v. NLRB (Emporium), 1 the Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia Circuit has defined a protest by
minority group employees against alleged employer racial discrimi-
78
 Id. (Emphasis added)?
79 Id.
' 485 F.2d 917, 83 L.R.R.M. 2738 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. granted, — U.S. —, 94 S. Ct.
1407 (1974). For analyses of Emporium, see Note, 15 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 1198 (1974);
Recent Cases, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 656 (1974).
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nation as a concerted activity protected from employer interference,
although such protest was unauthorized by the union and in contra-
vention of the collective bargaining agreement grievance-arbitration
provision. In Emporium, the District of Columbia Circuit held that
an employer violated section 8(a)(1) 2
 by discharging two black em-
ployees who picketed the employer's retail store to protest alleged
employer racial discrimination against employees.; The Board had
dismissed the section 8(a)(1) complaint against the employer, and
adopted the findings of the Administrative Law Judge. 4
 He had
found that although the discharged employees were engaging in
"concerted activities" 5
 within the meaning of section 7, 6 they did not
receive section 7 protection from employer interference. because the
activities were unauthorized by the exclusive bargaining representa-
tive and in derogation of the collective bargaining agreement.?
Several black employees of the Emporium had complained to
the union, their exclusive bargaining representative, about racial
discrimination by the Emporium, citing both the employer's alleged
discriminatory promotion structure and specific cases of alleged
discrimination against individual employees. The union agreed that
the employer was violating the contract provision prohibiting racial
discrimination, and promptly set the contractual grievance-
arbitration machinery into motion:' Nevertheless, the black em-
ployees, claiming to speak for all Minority group employees at the
Emporium, objected to the union-desired.method of prosecuting the
grievances on an individual case-by-case method and to the time-
consuming nature of the contractual-arbitration procedure.`' Instead
they sought a broad solution to the problem of racial discrimination
that would improve the situation of all minority group employees at
the Emporium." After rejecting Union requests to abide by the
contract method of resolving grievances, the two black employees
picketed the Emporium, distributing literature which encouraged a
consumer boycott of the employer's !store." After an initial warning
from the employer, the employees continued picketing, and were
2 29 . U.S.C.	 158(a)(1) (1970).
2 485 F.2d at 922, 83 L.R.R.M. at 2741.
4
 192 N.L.R,S. 173, 179, 77 L.R.R.M. 1669, 1670 (1971).
3
 Id. at 185, 77 L.R.R.M. at 1670-71. 	 '
° 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970).
7 192 N.L.R,B. at 185-86, 77 L.R.R.M. at 1671.
8
 485 F.2d at 920-21 & nn.3-5, 83 L.R.R.M. at 2739-40 & nn.3-5. The collective
bargaining agreement contained no-strike and no-lockout clauses, thus replacing the use of
economic weapons with the grievance-arbitration machinery as the means of dispute resolu-
tion.
9 Id. at 921-22, 83 L.R.R.M. at 2740-41,
1 ° Id.
11
 Id. at 922, 83 L.R.R.M. at 2741.
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therefore discharged. Although the conduct consisted of picketing
and literature distribution, the discharged employees conceded that
the conduct was intended to induce the president of the Emporium
to meet separately with them to discuss a settlement."
The circuit court initially noted that the union had fulfilled its
statutory duty of fair representation when it sought to remedy the
discrimination by resort to the contractual grievance-arbitration
process." Therefore, the issue was not whether a racial minority
had a protected right to bypass the collective bargaining agreement
in pursuit of its unique needs if the bargaining representative itself
had neglected its collective bargaining obligations to the employees.
Here, the bargaining representative differed with the minority group
employees only over the proper methods to be used to remedy the
employer's racial discrimination. The issue in Emporium was
whether a racial minority of the employees has the right to engage in
conduct designed to induce the employer to bargain with them over
the issue of racial discrimination rather than with the statutory
exclusive bargaining representative. 14 The court held that the racial
minority received protection under section 7 despite their efforts to
induce negotiation with the employer outside of the collective bar-
gaining process, since the union was not "actually remedying the
discrimination to the fullest extent possible, by the most expedient
and efficacious means.'"
The court carefully limited its holding to cases in which a group
of employees is protesting racial discrimination by the employer. 16
The majority conceded" that even this limited exception to the
policy of the Act of promoting collective bargaining's between the
exclusive bargaining representative of the employees and the em-
ployer would obstruct that policy to some degree by: first, derogat-
ing the statutory authority of the exclusive bargaining agent to
negotiate with the employer to set the conditions of employment for
all the unit employees; and second, by requiring the employer to
tolerate bargaining advances made by claimed representatives other
' 2 Id. at 923, 83 L.R.R.M. at 2741-42.
13 Id. at 930, 83 L.R.R.M. at 2747. The duty of fair representation has been interpreted
as the corollary of the § 9(a) authority of the exclusive bargaining representative. 29 U.S.C.
§ 159(a) (1970). Section 9(a) gives the representative-union the exclusive authority to bargain
for the conditions of employment of all the employees in the unit. However, the authority to
bind all the employees by its agreements with the employers exists only where the union has
fulfilled its duty to fairly represent all employees. See, e.g., Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171
(1967); Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
14 See Emporium, 192 N.L.R.B. at 185-86, 77 L.R.R.M. at 1671.
13 485 F.2d at 931, 83 L.R.R.M. at 2748.
16 Id. at 927, 83 L.R.R.M. at 2745.
17 Id. at 929, 83 L.R.R.M. at 2746.
' 8 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1970).
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than the statutory exclusive bargaining representative. The court,
however, minimized the degree of the interference with the collec-
tive bargaining process, reasoning that the minority group had
consulted with the union and had temporarily gone along with the
contract grievance-arbitration process." The court concluded that
such limited interference with NLRA policies was outweighed by
the benefit of incorporating employees rights protected by Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act20—rights to be free of employer racial
discrimination and to "oppose" it—into section 7 NLRA rights to
engage in concerted activities. The court reasoned that the explicit
statutory Title VII rights to be free from employer racial discrimina-
tion should not go unprotected by the NLRA, 21 where both the
union and the minority group employees seek the elimination of the
racial discrimination and differ only as to the proper remedial
means.
In considering both the needs of the NLRA-promoted collective
bargaining process and the needs of minority group employees, it
appears that the court of appeals may be in error. The court under-
estimates the disruption that its decision will impose upon the collec-
tive bargaining process; and also incorrectly seeks to intertwine the
Title VII statutory scheme, protecting rights of individual em-
ployees, with the NLRA statutory scheme that seeks primarily to
protect collective rights of employees. 22
The Emporium decision encourages employees to act indepen-
dently of the collective bargaining process. Although the decision is
limited to protection for minority activities relating to racial dis-
crimination, the court's reasoning would logically lead to protection
of extra-union activities relating to ethnic and sex discrimination.
Such protection will not only decrease the prestige of the exclusive
bargaining representative and thus weaken its power during bar-
gaining with the employer, but it will also burden the employer in a
way not contemplated by the NLRA. By requiring the employer to
tolerate activities aimed at inducing separate bargaining, in contra-
vention of the collective bargaining agreement, the decision would
logically seem to require that the employer bargain separately with
the minority over racial issues. However, section 9(a) of the
NLRA 23
 limits the employer's bargaining duty to negotiations with
the exclusive bargaining representative. Indeed, employers have
been held to violate their section 8(a)(5) duty to bargain where they
19
 485 F.2d at 929, 83 L.R.R.M. at 2746-47.
2°
 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1970).
21 485 F.2d at 927, 83 L.R.R.M. at 2745.
22 Sec J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 336-39 (1944).
23
 29 U.S.C. § 9(a) (1970).
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bargain with someone other than the statutory bargaining represen-
tative of the employees. 24
Since the incorporation of the Title VII right to be free from
employer racial discrimination into section 7 would frustrate NLRA
collective bargaining policy, that court-initiated incorporation is
unjustified. Section 7 does not in itself protect employees from
employer race or sex discrimination; but merely prohibits such em-
ployer discrimination as would operate to discourage employees to
collectivize and form or maintain an effective union. 25 In Jubilee
Manufacturing Co., 26 a 1972-1973 Survey year case, the Board
refused to establish a rule that sex discrimination per se violates
section 7 rights, reasoning that in certain cases such discrimination
will not discourage the employees' exercise of the NLRA-protected
right to engage in concerted activities. The Board in Jubilee per-
ceived the NLRA as a statutory scheme protecting the right of
employees to engage in concerted activities as the means of promot-
ing the process of collective bargaining. The Board saw invidious
discrimination as proscribed by the NLRA only where the evidence
showed that it discouraged employees from collectivizing and engag-
ing in concerted activities.
The distinction between the Title VII and the NLRA statutory
schemes was underscored recently by the Supreme Court in Alexan-
der v. Gardner-Denver Co. 27 There, the Court held that an indi-
vidual employee's Title VII claim against the employer is not barred
by a prior adverse arbitration decision made pursuant to the
grievance-arbitration of the collective bargaining contract. 28 The
Court reasoned that the Title VII statutory protection of employees
from invidious employer discrimination should not be impeded by
allowing decisions made as a result of the NLRA collective bargain-
ing process to foreclose the enforcement of explicit Title VII rights. 29
Alexander indicates that adherence by the minority to the collective
bargaining process will not extinguish their Title VII remedies for
employer discrimination.
The Alexander Supreme Court decision, makes clear that al-
though the racial minority may fail to achieve a remedy for the
racial discrimination by adherence to the contractual-arbitration
method and other collective bargaining procedures, the minority
24 See, e.g., Medo Photo Supply Corp. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 678, 683-85 (1944).
25
 Jubilee Mfg, Co., 202 N.L.12,13. No. 2, 82 L.R.R.M. 1482, 1484-85 (1973). See
Comment, 1972-1973 Annual Survey of Labor Relations Law, 14 B.C. Ind. & Corn, L. Rev.
1173, 1221-24 (1973).
26
 202 N.L.R.B. No. 2, 82 L.R.R.M. 1482 (1973).
27 Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co,, — U.S. —, 94 S. Ct. 1011, 7 FEP Cases 81 (1974).
28 94 S. CL at 1019, 7 FEP Cases at 86.
29 Id.
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retains the alternative of using Title VII methods to protect its Title
VII rights. Thus, there is little justification for allowing employees
to enforce Title VII rights by attempting to force extra-union bar-
gaining upon the employer, especially where that method of protec-
tion of Title VII rights was not designated by Congress.
V. EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
A. Introduction
Since the enactment of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964,' extensive litigation by individuals seeking relief from dis-
criminatory employment practices has produced a substantial body
of law defining procedural requirements, substantive rights and
available remedies applicable to employment discrimination cases.
However, courts in recent years also have found jurisdiction to
remedy discriminatory employment practices under the Civil Rights
Act of 1866, 2
 the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment, the Fifth Amendment, and the Civil
Rights Act of 1871, 3
 as well as under Title VII. Resort to these
additional sources of jurisdiction was necessitated by the fact that,
before 1972, Title VII was not available to remedy discriminatory
practices in public employment cases. Prior to the adoption of the
Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 4
 which amended Title
VII in several significant respects, 5
 state and local governments
were not "employers" within the coverage of Title VII. 6
 Although
public employers are now covered by Title VII, most public em-
ployment discrimination cases today are causes of action which
accrued prior to the 1972 amendments. Hence, the full impact of
' 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. (1970), as amended Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (1972).
2 Act of April 9, 1866, eh. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27, reenacted by § 18 of the Enforcement Act
of 1870, Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, § 18, 16 Stat. 140, 144, now codified in 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981 (1970). Section 1981 provides in part:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the. United States shall have the same right
in every State . . to make and enforce contracts . . . and to the full and equal
benefit of all laws and proceedings . . as is enjoyed by white persons . . . .
Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13, now codified in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
That section provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of
the United States or other persons within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall
be liable to the party injured in an action of law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceedings for redress.
4
 86 Stat. 103 (1972).
s See Comment, 1971-1972 Annual Survey of Labor Relations Law, 13 B.C. Ind. &
Corn, L. Rev. 1347, 1366 (1972).
6
 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1970), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (Supp. II, 1972).
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that change has not yet been felt.? Consequently, Title VII primarily
has served, concurrently with the Civil Rights Act of 1866 (hereinaf-
ter section 1981), as a vehicle for attacking employment discrimina-
tion by private employers. It has been held that a plaintiff alleging
discrimination by a non-governmental employer may bring suit
under section 1981 without complying with Title VII procedural
requirements. 8 Therefore, courts have taken jurisdiction over pri-
vate employer discrimination cases under both section 1981 and
Title VII. In the near future, Title VII should provide a useful
source of relief in cases involving discriminatory employment prac-
tices by state and local governments. 9
Title VII (the Act) makes it an unlawful employment practice
for an employer or a union to discriminate against applicants and
employees or members on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin.'" The Act prohibits discrimination in hiring, admis-
sion to membership, terms and conditions of employment, referrals
for employment, and in extending employment opportunities."
Title VII also makes it an unlawful employment practice for a labor
union to attempt to cause an employer to discriminate in violation of
the Act. 12 Additionally, Title VII prohibits employer discrimination
against an employee for asserting Title VII rights or participating in
Most Title VII cases which have reached the federal courts of appeals as of this writing
were initiated prior to the enactment of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act. The 1972
Act has generally not been applied retroactively. See Muscly v. United States, 6 FEP Cases
462 (S.D. Cal. 1973); New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Brown, 369 F. Supp. 702, 709, 6 FEP
Cases 1317, 1322 (E.D. La. 1974). But see Pointer v. Sampson, 6 FEP Cases 9 (D. D.C. 1973).
8 Young v. International Tel. and Tel. Co., 438 F.2d 757, 763, 3 FEP Cases 146, 151
(3d Cir. 1971); but cf., Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works of Int'l Harvester Co., 427 F.2d 476,
481, 2 FEP Cases 574, 577 (7th Cir.), cert. denied sub. nom., International Harvester Co. v.
Waters, 400 U.S. 911 (1970). For a discussion of these cases and the question of whether an
attempt to comply with Title VII conciliation proceedings is required prior to initiation of a
section 1981 suit, see Comment, 1971-1972 Annual Survey of Labor Relations Law, 13 B.C.
Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 1347, 1350 (1972).
9
 However, there are built-in delays in the Title VII machinery which might discourage
aggrieved individuals from utilizing the Civil Rights Act of 1964 remedies and _cause them to
rely on section 1983 when their constitutional rights have been violated through state action.
Where an allegedly unlawful employment practice is prohibited by state or local law and an
enforcement mechanism exists, the plaintiff must await the termination of such enforcement
proceedings or 60 days before filing a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC). 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-S(c) (Supp. II, 1972). The EEOC now has power to
initiate a civil suit for violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (Supp. Ii. 1972),
amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (1970), but before initiating a civil action, the EEOC must
attempt to obtain voluntary compliance for 30 days. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (Supp. II,
1972). If the EEOC does not file a civil action or determines that reasonable cause does not
exist to believe a Title VII' violation has occurred, it must notify the aggrieved person, who
then has 90 days in which to bring suit. The courts are required to assign such cases for early
hearings and to expedite them. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(f)(1), (2) (Supp. II, 1972).
1 ° 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (Supp. II, 1972).
' 1 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (Supp. II, 1972).
12 42 U.S.C.	 2000c-2 (Supp. II, 1972).
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a Title VII proceeding and makes it unlawful to cause to be pub-
lished a notice relating to employment which indicates a preference
or limitation based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."
Exceptions are made for classifications based on religion, sex or
national origin, but not upon race or color, which are justified as
"bona fide occupational qualification's] reasonably necessary to the
normal operation of that particular business or enterprise."" Thus,
Title VII permits discrimination on the basis of factors other than
race or color if justified as a bona fide occupational qualification.
Title VII also permits an employer "to give and act upon the results
of a professionally developed ability test," regardless of discrimina-
tory impact, provided that the test is not designed or administered
with discriminatory intent.' 5 An employee must file charges within
180 days of the occurrence of an alleged unlawful employment
practice, unless compliance with state or local proceedings is neces-
sary, in which case the statute of limitations is 300 days. 16
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (hereinafter
EEOC) has general authority to implement Title VII," with the
exception of cases involving federal government agencies and de-
partments under section 717. 18
 The EEOC has power to investigate
complaints, to seek voluntary compliance with Title VII and to
initiate civil actions on behalf of aggrieved persons under section
15 42 U.S.C. § 2000c-3 (Supp. II, /972).
14 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1970).
18
 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1970).
14
 42 U.S.C, § 2000e-5(e) (Supp. II, 1972).
17 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (Supp. II, 1972).
18
 The Equal Employment Opportunity At of 1972 adds a separate section extending
coverage of Title VII to the federal government to a limited extent. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16
(Supp. II, 1972). Title VII now provides that "all personnel actions affecting employees or
applicants for employment" in a federal government department or agency "shall be made free
from any discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-16(a) (Supp. II, 1972). However, enforcement authority of § 717 is vested in the Civil
Service Commission rather than in the EEOC and, unlike the EEOC, the Civil Service
Commission is given adjudicatory powers under the Act. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(b) (Supp. II,
1972). If the Civil Service Commission gives notice of adverse final action to an individual,
such person may file a private civil suit under § .706 of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 within thirty days, and if the agency fails to take final action within 180 days, the
individual may institute a civil action. 42 U.S.C. 2000e-16 (Supp. II, 1972).
Although there has been litigation under § 717, the issues which have arisen have been
primarily procedural. See, e.g., Thompson v. Department of Justice, 7 FEP Cases 347 (N.D.
Cal. 1974) (failure to request an administrative hearing following rejection of a claim of
racially motivated discharge was a waiver of the right to trial de novo under the circum-
stances and the adverse administrative record entitled the agency to summary judgment);
Jackson v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 7 FEP Cases 575, 576-78 (S.D. Tex. 1973)
(amendments apply retroactively where a claim was pending at the time of enactment and
plaintiff is entitled to trial de novo); Spencer v. Richardson, 7 FEP Cases 105 (D.D.C. 1973)
(administrative hearing not a prerequisite where notice of final agency action has been
received and the suit may be litigated in the same fashion as any other Title VII action).
Thus, the elements of a violation of § 717 have not yet been established by judicial decision.
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700 9 However, it is important to note that the EEOC does not
have actual, primary enforcement powers under Title VII. "The
Commission cannot adjudicate claims or impose administrative
sanctions. Rather, final responsibility for enforcement of Title VII is
vested in the federal courts." 2 ° Consequently, the EEOC must
enforce its interpretations of Title VII indirectly—through liti-
gation—when it cannot obtain voluntary compliance.
Section 713 21 gives the EEOC authority to issue "suitable pro-
cedural regulations to carry out the provisions" of Title VII. How-
ever, the Commission does not have power to issue substantive
regulations with the force and effect of law. 22 Nevertheless, the
EEOC has issued interpretative regulations under Title VII, de-
nominated "guidelines," which the Supreme Court has stated are
"entitled to great deference."23 These guidelines are significant for
two reasons. Section 713 makes good faith reliance on an EEOC
regulation a valid defense to an action under Title VII. 24 Moreover,
since the EEOC now has authority under Title VII to initiate a civil
suit, 25 its guidelines serve employers, unions, and employment
agencies with notice of when their employment practices may cause
the EEOC to bring suit.
In general, the EEOC guidelines contain expansive interpreta-
tions of the substantive provisions of Title VII which extend the
protections and prohibitions of the Act beyond the scope of coverage
which Title VII has been given by many courts. 26 Since the EEOC
Guidelines lack the force and effect of law, conflicting judicial
constructions of Title VII supersede the EEOC regulations.
Moreover, the EEOC, unlike many federal agencies, is not empow-
ered to adjudicate issues arising under its enabling legislation. Both
as a result of the not infrequent divergence of judicial interpreta-
tions of Title VII from those promulgated by the EEOC, and as a
result of the fact that federal courts alone can adjudicate Title VII
claims, the case law retains special significance in the domain of
employment discrimination.
14 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (Supp. II, 1972). The EEOC has additional powers under other
sections of Title VII. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-4 to 2000e-12 (1970).
20 Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., — U.S. —, 94 S. Ct. 1011, 1018, 7 FEP Cases 81,
84 (1974).
21
 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-12 (1970).
22 See Newspaper Publishers v. Alexander, 1 FEP Cases 703, 704 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
23 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433, 3 FEP Cases 175, 178 (1971). These
"guidelines" are-officially printed at 29 C.F.R. 1601-07 (1973).
24 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-12 (1970).
25 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (Supp. II, 1972).
26 See, e.g., Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 94, 6 FEP Cases 933, 936 (1973);
Newspaper Publishers v. Alexander, 1 FEP Cases 703, 704 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
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B. Procedural Developments
The, Supreme Court's decision in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver
Co. ' represents the most significant procedural development of the
Survey year relating to employment discrimination actions. The
Court held that an employee may institute a Title VII suit following
an adverse grievance-arbitration award, thus rejecting rules of pre-.
clusion and deferral. 2
 As a consequence of Alexander, employees
who receive inadequate union representation in grievance-
arbitration proceedings are guaranteed the opportunity to vindicate
their Title VII rights in court.
1. Union Adequacy as a Class Representative: Air Line Stewards
and Stewardesses
Since the decision of the Supreme Court in Steele v. Louis-
ville & Nashville R.R., 3
 it has been established that a union has a
duty to protect all those it represents in collective bargaining and in
contract administration, and may not advocate or agree to contrac-
tual provisions or tacitly acquiesce in employment practices which
discriminate against the minority element in the bargaining unit on
the basis of race. 4
 Indeed, unions have been required by the NLRB
to bargain for clauses explicitly prohibiting racially discriminatory
employment practices. 5
 Failure to take such affirmative action may
constitute a violation of Title VII. 6
 Such obligations are necessitated
by holdings prohibiting the minority membership of a union from
bargaining individually or choosing separate bargaining representa-
tives, and establishing that the union may take actions which are
unfavorable to some of its membership, subject only to the statutory
duty of fair representation. 7
In Air Line Stewards and Stewardesses Association, Local 550
v. American Airlines, Inc., 8 the Seventh Circuit confronted the issue
of whether the union's powers of exclusive representation, in the
— U.S. —, 94 S. Ct. 101, 7 FEP Cases 81 (1974). For a full discussion of Alexander,
see text supra at page 1187.
2
 Id. at 1020-22, 7 FEP Cases at 86-87.
3 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
Macklin v. Spector Freight Sys., Inc., 478 F.2d at 979, 989, 5 FEP Cases 995, 1001
(D.C. Cir. 1973).
5 Id. at 989, 5 FEP Cases at 1000-01; Local 2, United Rubber Workers v. NLRB, 368
F.2d 12, 24-25, 63 L.R,R.M. 2395, 2404, (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied. 389 U.S. 837, 66
L.R.R.M. 2306 (1967).
6
 478 F.2d at 989, 5 FEP Cases at 1001.
7
 See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 190-91 (1967); Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335,
349 (1964); Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 338 (1953); Steel v. Louisville &
N.R.R., 323 U.S, 192, 200 (1944).
490 F.2d 636, 6 FEP Cases 1197 (7th Cir. 1973) cert. denied, — U.S. —, 7 FEP Cases
1160 (1974). See Note, 15 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 1326 (1974).
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absence of a breach of the duty of fair representation, pertain to the
maintenance of Title VII class actions, as well as to contract negoti-
ations and contract administration. Prior to 1970, the defendant
airlines enforced a policy of permanently discharging stewardesses
who became pregnant. 9 Consequently, the certified bargaining agent
of the stewardesses, the Air Line Stewards and Stewardesses Asso-
ciation (ALSSA) and several individual former stewardesses, com-
menced an action against American, challenging the practice as an
unlawful sex discrimination in violation of Title VII.'° The com-
plaint sought certification of a class, under Rule 23(b)(2) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, composed of all present and
former American stewardesses employed at any time since the effec-
tive date of Title VII" "who had been, desired to be, or would in
the future desire to be, pregnant." 12
 In 1970, ALSSA and the
airlines entered collective bargaining agreements which prospec-
tively eliminated the challenged discharge practice.' 3 As a conse-
quence of this agreement, the attorney for ALSSA conceded that the
union could not fully represent the conflicting interests of both
present and former stewardesses.' 4
 The interests of the two groups
of stewardesses conflicted because the seniority of currently em-
ployed stewardesses would be adversely affected by reinstatement of
former stewardesses with full seniority; this would affect trip as-
signments, which are governed by seniority." Moreover, since the
company refused to negotiate concerning back pay, the interests of
present and former stewardesses clashed because litigation to obtain
back pay would be costly to the union and its present
membership.' 6
Subsequent to the employer's agreement to abandon the dis-
charge policy, the union, without consulting the individual
plaintiffs,' 7 agreed to a settlement of the Title VII action. The terms
of the settlement required discharged stewardesses, who desired
re-employment, to notify the airline. This would place them on a
preferential hiring list." Re-employed stewardesses would start with
at least full seniority as of the date of termination; however, no
9
 490 F.2d at 637, 6 FEP Cases at 1198.
11 ' Id.
July 2, 1965. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-15 (1970).
12 490 F.2d at 637, 6 FEP Cases at 1198.
13 Id.
14 Id. at 640, 6 FEP Cases at 1200.
15 Id.
1 " Id.
12 Id, at 638, 6 FEP Cases at 1198.
Id.
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provisions were made for back pay. 19 Failure to notify the airline
would relieve the airline of all liability. 20
After the proposed settlement, the trial court ordered that the
action be maintained as a class action pursuant to Rule 23(0( 0,21
but it did not expressly consider the requirements of Rule 23(a): 22
that the size of the class be such that joinder of all members would
be impracticable; that there exist questions of law or fact common to
the class; that "the claims or defenses of the representative parties
are typical" of the claims or defenses of the class; and that the
representative "will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the
class." Since the trial court did not order a notice required by Rule
23(c)(2) in class actions maintained under Rule 23(b)(3), it would
appear that the court applied Rule 23(b)(2). 23
 The use of 23(b)(2) had
the consequence of binding all members of the class to the judgment
approving the settlement, since only 23(c)(3) and the notice issued
pursuant to 23(c)(2) permit a member to opt out of the class.
Former stewardesses, who were understandably dissatisfied
with the settlement because it did not entitle them to back pay or
back seniority, appealed. In reversing the judgment of the trial
court, the Seventh Circuit held that the class action brought by the
discharged stewardesses must be maintained under Rule 23(b)(3),
which applies where the court finds that common questions of law
or fact predominate over questions affecting only individual mem-
bers and that a class action is superior to other procedural devices. 24
The court concluded that Rule 23(b)(2) should apply to the class
composed of currently employed stewardesses only. 25 Rule 23(b)(2)
applies where "the party opposing the class has acted or refused to
act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making
appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief
with respect to the class as a whole . ." The court reasoned that
23(b)(2) applied to the class of presently employed stewardesses
because they sought declaratory and injunctive relief from the dis-
charge policy. 26
 Addressing the issue of whether the union satisfied
the requirements of a class representative for the entire class of
present stewardesses, the Seventh Circuit held that the adequacy of
a union as a representative party in a class suit and its authority to
L  Id.
20 Id.
11 Id.
22 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(n).
23 490 F.2d at 638-39, 6 FEP Cases at 1198-99.
24 Id. at 643, 6 FEP Cases at 1202.
Id.
26 Id.
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compromise rights of its members which do not arise out of collec-
tive bargaining agreements, "are to be tested and judged in the
ordinary way."27 Under this test, the union was found to be an
unsatisfactory representative of the class of former stewardesses.
Significantly, the court reasoned that "except for the area of
collective bargaining and its necessary incidents, the union has no
unique authority to compromise the rights of its members." 28 Thus,
the Seventh Circuit rejected the contention that the union's role as
an.exclusive bargaining agent gave it the power, subject only to the
duty of fair representation, to accommodate and adjust the Title VII
rights of its members. Rather, Air Line Stewards requires that a
union fulfill the Rule 23(a) criteria before it may maintain suit as a
class representative in Title VII actions. Consequently, a union may
not represent its members and compromise their rights in Title VII
actions unless: (1) the claims or defenses of the union are typical of
those of the class; and (2) the union will fairly and adequately
protect the interests of the class.
It is submitted that Air Line Stewards correctly limited union
powers of exclusive representation to collective bargaining and con-
tractual administration. 29
 Title VII rights are individual, statutory
rights which exist independently of the collective bargaining agree-
ment. The union admittedly was not an adequate class representa-
tive under Rule 23(a) in Air Line Stewards. Moreover, in cases of
employment discrimination, it would appear that the union would
almost never be an adequate representative. The union itself, along
with the employer, might be charged with a violation of the
employee's Title VII rights. 30 Typically, in a Title VII action for
discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin, aggrieved union members would only constitute a minority
of the total union membership. As Air Line Stewards demonstrates,
the interests of the majority of union members often conflict with
those of the minority. Consequently, even if the union were not
charged with engaging in or approving of, discriminatory practices,
it is arguably unlikely that the union would "fairly and adequately
protect the interests of the class" of grievants as required by Rule
23(a)(4). 3 i Thus, if followed in other circuits, Air Line Stewards will
27 Id. at 642, 6 FEP Cases at 1201.
2g Id.
29 See Note, 15 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 1326 (1974).
3° See, e.g., Macklin v. Spector Freight, Inc. 478 F.2d 979, 5 FEP 994 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
31 Air Line Stewards was followed in Chrapliway v. Uniroyal, Inc., — F. Supp. —, 7
FEP Cases 343 (N.D. Ind. 1974), where the court held that the class action brought by female
employees for discrimination against past and present employees must be maintained under
Rule 23(b)(3) rather than under 23(b)(2). 7 FEP Cases at 345. Furthermore the court held that
Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291 (1973), does not require that all members of
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generally preclude union representation of a plaintiff-class in Title
VII actions.
2. Burden of Proof in Title VII Actions: McDonnell Douglas
Title VII does not allow an employer to justify racially dis-
criminatory employment practices under the "bona fide occupational
qualification" exception of section 703(e), 32 which is limited to ac-
tions based on religion, sex, or national origin. Consequently, an
employer charged with engaging in racial discrimination in violation
of Title VII, must rely on. the business necessity defense. 33
 In Griggs
v. Duke Power Co., 34
 the Supreme Court applied Title VII to
superficially neutral employment practices. The challenged practices
had a present discriminatory impact and also preserved the effects
of past racial discrimination.
The Act proscribes not only overt discrimination, but also
practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in opera-
tion. The touchstone is business necessity. If an employ-
ment practice which operates to exclude Negroes cannot be
shown to be related to job performance, the practice is
prohibited. 35
The Court concluded in Griggs that the defendant company had
failed to meet the test under the business necessity defense, since
neither the high school degree requirement, nor the general intelli-
gence test utilized by the company in making employment and pro-
motion decisions, was "shown to bear a demonstrable relationship to
successful performance of the jobs for which it was used."36 Thus,
while the Court stated that the test applicable to employment prac-
tices which are neutral on their faCe but discriminatory in operation,
the plaintiff class meet jurisdictional requirements of tiling a charge with the EEOC under
Title VII. The court distinguished Zahn, which held that multiple plaintiffs with separate and
distinct claims must each satisfy the jurisdictional amount requirement in a diversity case, on
the grounds that Title VII suits are necessarily class actions, that such a requirement would
abolish class suits under Title VII and consequently, would defeat the purpose of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, and that Title VII jurisdictional requirements are completely different. 7
PEP Cases at 346.
32
 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-2(e) (1970).
33 The business necessity defense was suggested by the Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431, 3 PEP Cases 175, 178 (1971). Subsequent cases developed the
defense. See, e.g., United States v. Jacksonville Terminal, 451 F.2d 418, 450-51, 3 FEP
Cases 862, 889 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 906 (1972); United States v. Bethlehem
Steel Corp., 446 F.2d 652, 662, 3 PEP Cases 589, 596 (2d Cir. 1971); Robinson v. Lorillard
Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 798, 3 FEP Cases 653, 657-58 (4th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006
(1971).
34 401 U.S. 424, 3 PEP Cases 175 (1971).
35
 Id. at 431, 3 PEP Cases at 178.
36
 Id.
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is that of "business necessity," Griggs apparently required the em-
ployer to show only a "demonstrable relationship" to successful job
performance. However, the lower federal courts have applied a
strict definition of the business necessity defense in cases involving
racially discriminatory employment practices. 37 To establish the
business necessity defense in a Title VII action, employers have been
required to show that the challenged practice is essential to the safe
and efficient operation of the business, 38
 and that no less dis-
criminatory, equally effective policy is reasonably available- 39
In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green," the Supreme Court
established rules governing "the order and allocation of proof in a
private, non-class action challenging employment discrimination." 4 I
Significantly this survey year decision may represent a limited,
implied modification of the business necessity defense in certain
types of cases involving racial discrimination. 42
 The respondent, a
long-time civil rights activist and a former long-term employee of
the company, was laid off in the course of a general reduction of
petitioner's work force. 43
 In a protest against the petitioner's al-
legedly discriminatory hiring practices, the respondent participated
in a "stall-in" wherein he and other members of the Congress on
Racial Equality "illegally stalled their cars on the main roads lead-
ing to the petitioner's plant for the purpose of blocking access to it at
the time of the morning shift change." 44 Subsequently, the company
advertised for qualified persons of the respondent's trade, and the
respondent promptly applied for the position, but was rejected. 45
Green then filed charges with the EEOC against the company for
violations of sections 703(a)(1)46 and 704(a)47
 of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964. The complaint alleged that the company had refused to hire
Green because of his race and his civil rights activism. 48
37 See, e.g., Head v. Timken Roller Bearing Co., 486 F.2d 870, 879, 6 FEP Cases 813,
819 (6th Cir. 1973); Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 798, 3 FEP Cases 653, 657-58
(4th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971).
See Note, 47 S. Cal. L. Rev. 585, 604 (1974).
39
 Sec Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 798, 3 FEP Cases 653, 657-58 (4th
Cir.), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971).
40 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
41
 Id. at 800.
42
 See Note, 15 B.C. Ind. Sr Corn. L. Rev. 654 (1974).
43 Respondent protested that his discharge and petitioner's hiring practices were racially
motivated, but he apparently did not file charges with the EEOC at that time. 411 U.S. at
794 n.2.
44 Id. at 794. A "lock in" also occurred, but the evidence did not establish that respon-
dent participated in chaining the door of one of the company buildings. Id.
4 ' Id.
44 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1970).
47
 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1970).
48
 411 U.S. at 796.
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The EEOC did not find reasonable cause to believe that a
violation of section 703(a)(1) had occurred; but it did find that the
company's refusal to rehire the respondent, because of his involve-
ment, constituted reasonable cause to believe that the company had
violated section 704(a). 49
 EEOC efforts at conciliation failed, and
Green brought suit for violations of both sections of Title VII.
Section 703 "generally prohibits racial discrimination in any em-
ployment decision" while section. 704(a) "forbids discrimination
against applicants or employees for attempting to protest or correct
allegedly discriminatory conditions of employment." 50
 The trial
court dismissed the section 703 claim because the EEOC had not
found reasonable cause to believe that a violation of that section had
occurred, 5 I but the Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded for con-
sideration of the section 703 claim. 52
 Both courts concluded that
section 704(a) did not protect illegal protest activities engaged in by
employees."
The Supreme Court agreed with the Eighth Circuit's decision
that an individual grievant's suit is not barred by the failure of the
EEOC to find reasonable cause to believe that a violation of Title
VII has occurred. 54
 The Court then proceeded to prescribe rules
governing "the order and allocation of proof in a private, non-class
action challenging employment discrimination." 55
The complainant in a Title VII trial must carry the
initial burden under the statute of establishing a prima
facie case of racial discrimination. This may be done by
showing (i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he
applied and was qualified for a job for which the employer
was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications,
he was rejected; and, (iv) that, after his rejection, the
position remained open and the employer continued to seek
applicants from persons of complainant's qualifications. 5 "
On the basis of these rules, the Court concluded that the respondent
had shown a prima facie case. 57
 "The burden then must shift to the
employer to articulate some legitimate, nondiscirminatory reason for
respondent's rejection."58
 Respondent's participation in the illegal
45
 Id. at 797.
5U Id.
53
 2 FEP Cases 997 (D.C. Mo. 1970).
52
 463 F.2d 337, 343, 4 FEP Cases 577, 582 (8th Cir. 1972).
53
 411 U.S. at 797.
34 Id.
55
 Id. at 800.
56 Id. at 802,
57 Id. at 802-03.
3 " Id.
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"stall-in" was found sufficient to satisfy this burden of proof; but the
Court expressly declined to establish guidelines defining what
"legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason[s] "justify an employer's rejec-
tion of an applicant's` Finally, the Court held that the employee
must be afforded a fair opportunity to show that the employer's
stated reason for its refusal to hire was in fact pretextual and
accordingly remanded the case to the trial court."
In attempting to distinguish Griggs, the Court in McDonnell
Douglas noted that Griggs involved employment practices which
resulted in discrimination on the basis of characteristics of the
grievants which were produced by forces beyond the grievants'
control. 6 ' On the other hand, in McDonnell Douglas, Green was
excluded because of his own voluntary acts, not on the basis of a
sweeping disqualification of all persons with criminal records, which
would operate without regard to an applicant's qualifications. 62
Thus the implication was raised that such a sweeping
disqualification would fall within the prohibitions of Griggs, though
the actions being challenged did not. "Petitioner assertedly rejected
respondent for unlawful conduct against it and in the absence of
proof of pretextual or discriminatory application of such a reason,
this cannot be thought the kind of 'artificial arbitrary, and unneces-
sary barrier to employment' which the Court lin Griggs] found to be
the intention of Congress to remove." 63
 Thus, the Court in McDon-
nell Douglas found Griggs factually distinguishable and applied new
requirements for an employer defense to a private, single plaintiff
action for violation of Title VII. However, the implications of
McDonnell Douglas are unclear. The Court failed to define the
requirements of the employer's burden of proof under the "legiti-
mate nondiscriminatory reason" defense, and did not establish a
standard to be used in judging when an employee has overcome his
employer's defense by a showing of pretextuality."
59 Id.
" Id. at 804.
Other evidence that may be relevant to any showing of pretextuality includes facts as to
the petitioner's treatment of respondent during his prior term of employment, petitioner's
reaction, if any, to respondent's legitimate civil rights activities, and petitioner's general policy
and practice with respect to minority employment.
Id.
61 Id. at 804-05.
62 Id.
"3 Id.
64
 Although the Supreme Court noted that the issue before it concerned the burden of
proof in a "private, non-class action" employment discrimination case, at least one court has
applied the McDonnell Douglas rules in a class suit to the individual plaintiffs' charges of
discrimination. Henderson v. First Nat'l Bank, 360 F. Stipp. 531, 6 FEP Cases 859 (M.D.
Ala. 1973). The plaintiffs in Henderson challenged the bank's hiring practices, but the court
held that they had failed to meet their burden under McDonnell Douglas since none of the
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Recent decisions have provided some clarification of the
McDonnell Douglas rules regarding the order and allocation of proof
in Title VII caseS. 65 In Taylor v. Safeway Stores, 66 the court, after
finding that a prima facie case of discriminatory discharge had been
established, applied the rules regarding both the employer's burden
in rebutting a prima facie case and the employee's burden in over-
coming that rebuttal. In McDonnell Douglas, the Supreme Court
held that, once a plaintiff has made a prima facie case of employ-
ment discrimination, the burden shifts to the employer "to articulate
some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason . . ." for the challenged
employment practice. 67 Then the employee must be given an oppor-
tunity to show that the "stated reason . . . was in fact pretextual." 68
In Taylor, which involved an allegedly discriminatory discharge, the
plaintiff established a prima facie case by showing: "(1) that the
plaintiff is a black man, (2) that he was discharged, and (3) that the
person who discharged him was predisposed to discriminate against
blacks."69 Because of the factual variation presented in Taylor, the
court could not apply the Supreme Court's four-part test of a
prima-facie showing in discriminatory hiring practice cases."
Nonetheless, the court in Taylor attempted to develop an equivalent
standard and proceeded to apply the additional McDonnell Douglas
rules: the employer's burden of rebuttal of a prima facie case by
advancing a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason and the
employee's burden of overcoming that rebuttal by a showing of
pretextuality.
Concluding that McDonnell Douglas placed upon the employer
the "burden of going forward, of advancing" a legitimate, nondis-
criminatory reason for its challenged employment action, the court
in Taylor held that the defendant; discharged this burden by intro-
ducing evidence that the company records showed, on their face,
that the plaintiff's productivity had been substandard. 71
 Taylor does
not require the defendant company to carry the burden of persua-
sion by proving the existence . of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
class members was shown to be both available and qualified for employment in the position
sought. Id. at 546-47, 6 FEP Cases at 871. It would appear that no court during the Survey
year applied McDonnell Douglas in a public ernployment case. Should the courts utilize the
McDonnell Douglas rules in class actions and Public employment cases, McDonnell Douglas
will have tremendous significance as a result of its apparent relaxation of the employer's
burden of proof in establishing a defense to a charge of employment discrimination.
65
 See Taylor v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 3b5 F. Supp. 468, 6 FE? Cases 556 (D. Colo.
1973); Henderson v. First Nat'l Bank, 360 F. Sapp. 536, 6 FEP Cases 859 (M.D. Ala. 1973).
'' 365 F. Supp. 468, 6 FEN Cases 556 (D. Colo. 1973).
67
 411 U.S, at 802.
FR Ed,
69
 365 F. Supp. at 472, 6 FEP Cases at 558.
741 See text at note 25 supra.
71 Id. at 472-73, 6 FEN Cases at .559.
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reason for its conduct. Rather, the court concluded that McDonnell
Douglas required the employer to meet the lesser burden of going
forward with the evidence in rebutting the plaintiff's prima facie
case. Although the defendant discharged this burden, the court in
Taylor held that the reason advanced by the defendant employer,
poor work performance, was "merely a pretext" for discriminatorily
firing the plaintiff; thus, a violation of Title VII was found. 72
 This
holding rested upon findings that the person in charge of keeping the
employment records was prejudiced against blacks; that the defen-
dant company knew this; that the records were unreliable; and that
the company readily acquiesced in the discharge decision. 73 It would
appear that the rationale of Taylor would support a rule, in Title
VII non-class actions, that a showing of pretextuality overcoming
the employer's rebuttal of the prima facie case of employment dis-
crimination is made, within the McDonnell Douglas rule, where the
employee shows that the challenged action was taken by a racially
prejudiced individual on the basis of criteria known or intended by
the employer to be "fraudulent, inaccurate or otherwise
unreliable. "74
While Griggs placed upon the employer the burden of showing
that an employment practice is demonstrably related to successful
job performance under the test of business necessity, McDonnell
Douglas, as interpreted in Taylor, would, in effect, place the burden
of showing that the employment practice was not job related, upon
the employee in private, Title VII non-class actions. The defendant
employer would only be required to "advance sufficient evidence of
a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason" for the challenged conduct
in order to satisfy the burden of going forward, while the plaintiff
employee would have the ultimate burden of proving that the
employer's stated reason was merely a pretext for prohibited dis-
crimination. Taylor indicates that application of McDonnell Douglas
in a broad range of Title VII cases would sharply limit Griggs by
relaxing the employer's burden of proof in establishing a defense,
and by shifting the ultimate burden of proof in employment dis-
crimination cases to the plaintiff employee. However, it is submitted
that the courts will limit the application of the McDonnell Douglas
burden of proof rules to factually analagous cases instituted by
individual plaintiffs seeking redress for individual discriminatory
employment actions.
Recent employment discrimination decisions indicate that the
courts are likely to determine the applicability of McDonnell Doug-
" Id.
73 Id.
74 Id, at 473-74, 6 FEP Cases at 559-60.
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las on the basis of the circumstances presented in each case. 75 The
Taylor court unquestioningly applied the McDonnell Douglas rules
to the issues presented by the plaintiff in his individual claim of
racial discrimination, without mention of the arguably limited na-
ture of the McDonnell Douglas holding. At least one court has
disregarded the new burden of proof rules and required the em-
ployer to meet the established criteria of the business necessity
defense in a clearly dissimilar factual situation. 76 However, the.
decision of the Eighth Circuit in Wallace v. Debron Corp.," where
the court avoided applying the new burden of proof rules by ex-
pressly finding McDonnell Douglas factually distinguishable, most
perceptibly manifests the probable judicial approach to the applica-
tion of the McDonnell Douglas rules.
In Wallace, the plaintiff, a black man, was garnished twice
within twelve months, in violation of a company rule, and was
consequently discharged.'" Noting that only one other employee, a
white man, had been discharged pursuant to this company rule, the
trial court concluded that McDonnell Douglas rather than Griggs
controlled because Wallace did not involve employment practices
having discriminatory impact as a result of forces beyond the control
of the aggrieved class. 79
 Plaintiff's cause of action was dismissed on
the grounds that the company rule was sufficiently job-related to
satisfy the employer's burden of advancing a legitimate nondis-
criminatory reason for its action. 8 °
Finding that Griggs controlled, the Eighth Circuit held that the
trial court erred in granting the defendant's motion for summary
judgment. 81 Noting that the defendant employer conceded "that its
racially neutral garnishment policy subjects a disproportionate
number of blacks to discharge from employment," 82 the circuit court
in Wallace reasoned that Griggs required the removal of all artificial,
arbitrary, and unnecessary racial barriers to employment, regardless
of the absence of a showing of historical discrimination. 83 McDon-
nell Douglas was distinguished on three grounds: (1) the employer in
75
 However, one court applied the McDonnell Douglas rules in a case presenting issues
similar to those before the Court in Griggs, in contrast to the apparent trend of decisions.
Henderson v. First Nat'l Bank, 360 F. Supp. 531, 6 FEP Cases 859 (M.D. Ala. 1973). See
note 33 supra,
76
 Head v. Timken Roller Bearing Co., 486 F.2d 870, 879, 6 FEP Cases 813, 817 (6th
Cir. 1973) (Class action for relief from discriminatory employment practices with a classwide
impact).
77
 — F.2d —, 7 FEP Cases 595 (8th Cir. 1974).
78
 363 F. Supp. 837, 6 FEN Cases 316 (E.D. Mo. 1973).
78
 Id. at 837-38, 6 FEP Cases at 318.
as Id. at 838, 6 FEP Cases at 318.
81
 7 FEP Cases at 598.
" 2
 Id. at 596.
8 ' Id. at 596-97.
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Wallace conceded that the challenged practice would have a dispro-
portionately . adverse effect on blacks; (2) the record contained no
evidence that the employee's conduct which prompted the discharge
in Wallace, was voluntary; and (3) McDonnell Douglas did not
involve an employment practice neutral on its face with a dis-
criminatory impact on blacks." Consequently, the court concluded
that the defendant had to prove the facts necessary to establish the
business necessity defense."
Wallace indicates that the courts will limit the application of
McDonnell Douglas to factually similar cases. Thus, it would ap-
pear that the McDonnell Douglas burden of proof rules will not be
applied in class suits or in Title VII actions involving allegedly
discriminatory employment practices which have a class-wide im-
pact. In such cases, courts will probably continue to require em-
ployers to satisfy the criteria of the strict business necessity test as it
has evolved from Griggs. The fact that the holding of the Supreme
Court in McDonnell Douglas was unanimous arguably lends support
to the hypothesis that the Court intended that case to have a limited
effect on Griggs. An implied overruling of a case as significant as
Griggs has proven to be in the advancement of the goals of Title
VII, would certainly have generated a strong dissent. Nonetheless,
McDonnell Douglas may have a substantial impact upon individual
plaintiff employment discrimination suits which involve allegations
of individual, discriminatory employment actions. In such suits the
employer's burden of proof in establishing a defense will be notice-
ably decreased, while the plaintiff employees will have the ultimate
burden of proof.
C. Sex Discrimination
1. Introduction
Considerable public attention has focused upon the general
problem of sex discrimination during recent years. The women's
liberation movement and the proposed 27th Amendment to the
United States Constitution' have generated a host of news reports
and scholarly analyses. After passage by the House in 1971, and by
the Senate in 1972, the drive for ratification- of the Equal Rights
Amendment by the necessary three fourths, 2
 or thirty-eight, of the
states, started promisingly but languished during the Survey year,
84
 Id. at 597.
85
 Id. at 598.
The proposed 27th Amendment states that "le]quality of rights under the law shall not
be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex."
2 U.S. Const. art. V.
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leaving its fate uncertain at the time of this writing. 3 Although the
movement for adoption of the Equal Rights Amendment appears to
have lost momentum, the courts are developing substantial protec-
tion against sex discrimination in employment under both Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Fourteenth Amendment. 4
Title VII explicitly prohibits employment discrimination on ac-
count of sex unless such discrimination can be justified as a bona
fide occupational qualification (hereinafter BFOQ). Section 703(a) of
the Act provides:
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an
employer—
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any indi-
vidual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual
with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any
way which would deprive or tend to deprive any indi-
vidual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely
affect his status as an employee, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 5
The courts have noted the lack of legislative history which would
provide guidance in the interpretation of the proscription against sex
discrimination in employment contained in this section." The statute
has been construed as demonstrating Congressional intent to "pro-
vide equal access to the job market for both 'men and women" 7 and
to preserve "equal occupational opportunities," such as "equal rights
to available employment, equal pay for equal work, and equal
working conditions."8
 The prohibition against employment dis-
3
 Thirty-three states had ratified the Equal Rights Amendment as of February 1974. 60
Women Lawyer's J. 16 (1974). Eleven states arc scheduled to consider or to reconsider the
proposed amendment in 1974. Id. at 30. Some stales are considering rescission of their
ratification, as Nebraska has done. Sec Nate, 49 N.D. Lawyer 657 (1974).
4
 See text at notes 30-66 infra.
5
 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1970).
• Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. 442 F.2d 385, 386, 3 FEP Cases 337 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971). See Baker v. California Land Title Co., 394 F. Supp. 235,
237-38, 5 FEP Cases 329, 330 (C.D. Cal. 1972). The amendment adding sex discrimination to
the list of unlawful employment practices in 703(a) was adopted in the House with little
pertinent debate only one day before passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 442 F.2d at 386,
3 FEP Cases at 338. As a result, the House report accompanying Title VII states that the
purpose of the Act is to eliminate "discrimination in employment based on race, color,
religion, or national origin." H. Rep. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1964), reprinted in 1964
U.S. Code. Cong. & Ad. News. 2401.
7
 442 F.2d at 386, 3 FEP Cases at 338.
• 349 F. Supp. at 238.
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crimination on account of sex now extends to state and 16cal gov-
ernments as a result of the amendment of section 701 contained in
the Equal Employment Opportunities Act of 1972, 9 and to federal
agencies under both Executive Order 11478,'" and new section
717." The EEOC takes the position that "Mlle principle of nondis-
crimination requires that individuals be considered on the basis of
individual capacities and not on the basis of any characteristics
generally attributed to the group." 12
While discrimination in employment on the basis of sex is
forbidden under Title VII, this proscription is qualified by the
BFOQ exception. Section 703(e) permits different treatment of an
applicant or an employee
on the basis of his religion, sex, or national origin in those
certain instances where religion, sex, or national origin is a
bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary
to the normal operation of that particular business or en-
terprise . . 13
In recognition of the general goal of Title VII—promotion of equal
opportunities in employment—courts have narrowly construed this
provision." The EEOC guidelines provide that the section 703
BFOQ exception should be interpreted narrowly, 15 and the restric-
tive language of the section 703(e) exception, in contrast to the broad
prohibitions against employment discrimination contained in the
whole of Title VII, seems to provide a sound basis for the EEOC
guidelines. 16
Among the EEOC regulations pertaining to sex discrimination
are guidelines which bear directly on two significant areas of con-
troversy which have come before the courts during the Survey year:
grooming codes and mandatory maternity leave regulations. The
Commission has adopted the view that "the refusal to hire an
individual based on stereotyped characterizations of the sexes" does
not fall within the bona fide occupational qualifications exception."
9
 Equal Employment Opportunities Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103,
amending 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. (1970).
1 ° 34 Fed. Reg. 12985 (1969).
11
 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16 (Supp. II, 1972). The federal government was not made an
employer within the meaning of § 701. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (Supp. II, 1972).
12
 29 C.F.R. § 1601 (1973).
13
 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1970).
' 4
 See Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, 442 F.2d 385, 5 FEP Cases 13 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971); Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 1 FEP
Cases 656, 70 L.R.R.M. 2843 (5th Cir. 1969).
15
 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2 (1973).
16
 See cases cited in note 14 supra.
17 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2 (1973).
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Additionally, the EEOC guidelines provide that a mandatory leave
or termination policy for pregnant women presumptively violates
Title VII." These regulations are entitled to great deference by the
courts, since they have been adopted by the agency charged with the
initial implementation of the Act.' 9 However, the guidelines have
generally not been dispositive of the cases which have arisen be-
cause the EEOC was only given authority to issue procedural regu-
lations by its enabling legislation. 2 ° Additionally, in many of the
significant cases the employers involved were state or local govern-
ments, which, prior to 1972, were specifically exempted from the
Act, and consequently from the EEOC guidelines.
The exemption of state and local governments from coverage
under Title VII before 1972 necessitated the development of con-
stitutional theories of relief in cases of employment discrimination
based upon sex. Aggrieved persons have contended that such dis-
crimination constitutes a denial of equal protection under the Four-
teenth Amendment. 21
 Consequently, the standard of review applied
by the courts in these cases has largely determined the results
reached. The traditional "rational basis" test utilized by the Su-
preme Court in controversies involving charges of sex discrimination
required only that the classification adopted by the state or local
government have some basis in reason. 22
The rational basis test was apparently modified by the Court in
Reed v. Reed, 23
 in which Chief Justice Burger, speaking for a
unanimous seven-man Court purported to apply the rule requiring
"a rational relationship to a state objective." 24
 However, he also
stated that "[a] classification must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and
must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substan-
tial relation to the object of the legislation." 25
 The Court held that
though the goal of administrative efficiency was a legitimate one in
Reed, the relationship between the classification and the objective
was insufficient, and the classification violated the Equal Protection
Clause of the 14th Amendment. 26
 The requirement that legislation
which discriminates on the basis of sex bear a "fair and substantial
relation" to its object amounted to a more stringent test of permissi-
bility than that imposed under the traditional standard.
" 29 C,F,R. § 1604.10 (1973).
19 Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 401 U.S. 424, 434 (1971).
2° 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-12 (1970).
2 ' Sec text at notes 30-66 infra.
22 Sec Goesart v. Cleary 335 U.S. 464, 467 (1948).
2 ' 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
24
 Id. at 76.
25
 Id.
26 Id.
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In Frontiero v. Richardson, 27 seven members of the Court, in
two separate opinions, determined that a sex classification imposed
by federal statutes amounted to discrimination in violation of the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Justice Brennan,
announcing the judgment of the Court in an opinion joined by
Justices Douglas, White and Marshall, concluded that classifications
based upon sex, like those based upon race, alienage, or national
origin, are inherently suspect, and must therefore be subject to strict
judicial scrutiny. 28
 However, since the four concurring justices de-
clined to adopt this approach, 29
 the test to be applied by the courts
in determining the constitutionality of classifications based upon sex
remains the rational basis test as modified by the Supreme Court in
Reed.
2. Mandatory Maternity Leave Regulations: La Fleur
Recent civil rights litigation has included a number of constitu-
tional challenges of mandatory maternity leave regulations for
teachers in public school systems. Several such cases reached the
United States courts of appeals, and a division on this issue among
the courts arose. 3 ° The regulations generally required teachers to
give the school system early notice of their pregnancy. The teachers
were required to terminate employment several months before the
expected date of birth and they could not return to work until at
least one semester after giving birth to a child. The rules often did
not guarantee re-employment and return to work was typically
conditioned upon submission of a physician's certificate of fitness.
The Second Circuit in Green v. Waterford Board of Education, 3 '
and the Tenth Circuit in Buckley v. Coyle Public School System 32
held that such regulations violate the Equal .Protection Clause, thus
joining with the Sixth Circuit in condemning such rules, while the
Fourth Circuit alone had adopted the contrary position. 33
In Green, the court reasoned that the Supreme Court had not
yet added sex to the category of inherently suspect classifications
27 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
28 Id.
29
 Id, at 691. Justices Powell, Burger and Blackmun felt that the Court should not
pre-empt a determination of the status of classifications based upon sex, but should defer to
the judgment of the people as expressed through their state legislatures in decisions on the
ratification of the 27th Amendment,
3o
	 v. Chesterfield County School Bd., 474 F.2d 395, 5 FEP Cases 341 (4th Cir.
1973), rev'd — U.S. —, 94 S. Ct. 791 (1974) (mandatory maternity leave rules for public
school teachers held not violative of teachers' constitutional rights); contra LaFleur v. Cleve-
land Bd. of Educ., 465 F.2d 1184, 4 FEP Cases 1070 (6th Cir. 1972), aff'd, — U.S. —, 94 S.
Ct. 791 (1974) (maternity leave regulations violate the 14th amendment).
3 ' 473 F.2d 629, 637, 5 FEP Cases 443, 449 (2d Cir. 1973).
32 476 F.2d 92, 96, 5 FEP Cases 773, 775-76 (10th Cir. 1973).
33 Sec note 30 supra.
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which includes race, nationality and alienage, but that the decision
in Reed modified the traditional rational basis test as it applied to
classifications based upon sex, imposing a somewhat stricter
standard. 34
 The maternity leave regulations did not pass scrutiny
under the Reed standard: the regulations lacked the requisite rela-
tion to the legislative objectives of protecting the safety and health
of the teacher and the unborn child, avoiding classroom distraction,
assuring continuity of instruction and promoting administrative
convenience. 35
Reasoning that the possibility that pregnancy may be a volun-
tary. status is irrelevant, the Tenth Circuit in Buckley condemned
the regulation in question because it penalized the female school
teacher for being a woman. 36
 The classification imposed by the
regulation would be susceptible to a charge that it discriminated
arbitrarily against womanhood and invaded the plaintiff's privacy. 37
Therefore, the Tenth Circuit held that "[t]he state must demonstrate
a compelling interest in order to justify its policy because the interest
involved is a fundamental one in that (1) it concerns the acknowl-
edged right of the plaintiff to bear children and (2) it demands that
a school teacher select either employment or pregnancy."" Implicit
in the decision in Buckley is the conclusion that the classification of
pregnant teachers impinged upon a fundamental right and hence
could only be sustained upon a showing of a compelling state
interest. Classifications based upon sex were not held to be inher-
ently suspect.
Although the Buckley rationale would appear to be supported
by prior case law under the Equal Protection Clause," the issue of
the constitutionality of mandatory maternity leave regulations was
ultimately determined under the Due Process Clause. Resolving the
conflict among the federal courts on the issue of whether mandatory
maternity leave regulations for public school teachers are constitu-
tionally permissible, the Supreme Court, in LaFleur v. Cleveland
Board of Education, 4 ° held that such regulations violate the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if they contain overly
restrictive, arbitrary cut-off dates.'" Mandatory maternity leave
3° 473 F.2d at 632-33, 5 FEP Cases at 444-45.
3s
 Id. at 634-36, 5 FEP Cases at 447-48.
16
 476 F.2d at 95, 5 FEP Cases at 774. Plaintiff brought suit under the Civil Rights Acts
of 1866, 1871, and 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, 1983, 2000e (1970). The court, while noting that
Title VII now applies to public schools, found that the Act did not apply because plaintiff had
failed to exhaust her administrative remedies. 476 F.2d at 95 n.1, 5 FEP Cases at 774 n. 1.
37
 Id. at 96, 5 FEP Cases at 775.
38
 id. at 96, 5 FEP Cases at 775-76.
" Cf. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
40
 LaFleur v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 94 S. Ct. 791, 6 FEP Cases 1253 (1974).
41
 Id. at 801, 6 FEP Cases at 1259-60.
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rules were found to be an unwarranted governmental infringement
upon the constitutionally protected right to freedom of choice in
matters of marriage and family life, and in the decision of whether
to bear or beget children. 42 In its decision, the Supreme Court
consolidated and determined the cases on writ of certiorari from the
Sixth Circuit in LaFleur43
 and the Fourth Circuit in Cohen v.
Chesterfield County School Board. 44
The plaintiff in Cohen had been employed by the school board
and was forced to take a maternity leave without pay pursuant to a
regulation which required teachers to leave work at least four
months before the expected birth of a child. The teacher would be
declared re-eligible for employment upon submitting a written
notice of fitness from a physician assuring the school system that
care of the child would cause minimal interferences with her job
responsibilities. However, the regulations guaranteed re-
employment to the teacher no later than the first day of the school
year following the date the board declared her re-eligible. Despite
this guarantee of re-employment, the plaintiff filed suit under 42
U.S.C. 1983 for interference with her constitutional rights.
The district court decided that the regulation was devoid of any
rational purpose and that it violated the Equal Protection Clause
because it treated pregnancy differently from other disabilities. 45
The circuit court reasoned that the mandatory maternity leave regu-
lation in Cohen was not an invidious discrimination based upon sex
since "[i]t does not apply to women in an area in which they may
compete with men."46 Because of the widespread use of contracep-
tives, pregnancy was found to be largely voluntary.'" Therefore,
pregnancy was distinguished from other disabilities, and
classifications based upon the status of pregnancy did not lack a
rational basis. Acknowledging the Supreme Court's decision in Reed
v. Reed, the Fourth Circuit nevertheless found that the regulation
did not amount to an invidious classification based upon sex and
that the regulation served a reasonable objective: assuring educa-
tional continuity. 48
The mandatory maternity leave regulation involved in LaFleur
42 Id. at 796, 6 FE? Cases at 1256-57.
43 465 F.2d 1184, 4 FEP Cases 1070 (6th Cir. 1972).
44 474 F.2d 395, 5 FEP Cases 341 (4th Cir. 1973).
45 Cohen v. Chesterfield County School ed., 326 F. Supp. 1159, 1161 (E.D. Va. 1971).
This case was decided in the trial court several months prior to the Supreme Court's Equal
Protection decision in Reed.
4" 474 F.2d at 397, 5 FEP Cases at 342. The opinion was written . by Haynsworth, Chief
Justice.
47 Id. at 398, 5 FE? Cases at 343.
48
 Id. at 397-99, 5 FEP Cases at 342-44.
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required the teacher to terminate employment without pay five
months before the expected birth of her child. The teachers were not
allowed to return to work until the beginning of the next regular
semester following the date the child attained the age of three
months, and until the teacher had obtained a physician's certificate
attesting to her fitness. However, the regulations challenged in
LaFleur, unlike those questioned in Cohen, did not guarantee re-
employment for the former teachers, but merely gave them priority
in reassignment to any available positions. 49
 The district court ren-
dered judgment prior to the Supreme Court decision in Reed, and
therefore applied the traditional rational basis test, which requires
the challenger of the statute or regulation to show that the rule or
law has no rational basis." Moreover, the rational basis test allows
the court to assume the existence of any state of facts at the time of
enactment which would sustain the classification imposed by the
statute or regulation." The trial court noted the indignities suffered
by pregnant teachers and the resulting disruption of the classrooms'
and concluded that there existed a rational basis for the rule distin-
guishing pregnant teachers from all other teachers.s 3
 The Sixth
Circuit reversed, holding that the regulation in LaFleur violated the
Equal Protection Clause under the Reed rationale. 54
Apparently disregarding the Equal Protection arguments ac-
cepted by the district court in Cohen and by the court of appeals in
LaFleur, the Supreme Court determined the cases under the Due
Process Clause of the 14th Amendment.ss The public school au-
thorities contended that the regulations were justified because they
promoted continuity of instruction. The Court recognized that the
objective of continuity was legitimate, but noted that the regulations
actually frustrated the asserted objective in the cases before it by
requiring the teachers to leave during the middle of the semester. 56
Early notice of the date chosen by the teacher as the commencement
of her maternity leave would better serve the interest of continu-
ity." Consequently, the Court concluded that the arbitrary cut-off
49 94 S. Ct. at 793, 6 FE? Cases at 1254-55.
5°
 326 F. Supp, 1208, 1212, .3 FEY Cases 503 (N.D. Ohio 1971). This rule is derived
from the holding of the Supreme Court in McGowan v. Maryland 366 U.S. 420 (1961) that
such classifications should be upheld unless wholly irrelevant to achievement of the state's
objective; such statute or regulations should be sustained if any state of facts could reasonably
be conceived to justify them.
51
 366 U.S. at 425.
52 326 F. Supp. Cl 1210, 3 FEP Cases at 505,
53 Id. at 1214, 3 FEP Cases at 508.
465 F.2d at 1188-89, 4 FEY Cases at 1073.
55
 In concurring opinion, Justice Powell contended that equal protection was the proper
frame of reference. 6 FE? Cases at 1261,
14
 94 S. Ct. at 797, 6 FEP Cases at 1257-58.
57
 Id., 6 FE? Cases at 1257.
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dates embodied in the regulations lacked a rational relationship to
the objective of continuity, thereby violating Due Process."
In LaFleur, the Supreme Court also rejected the other asserted
justifications of mandatory maternity leave regulations, though it
left open the question of the permissibility of maternity leave regula-
tions at some definite date close to the expected date of birth. The
school boards contended that the regulations served the interest of
protecting unfit teachers, but the rules swept too broadly and the
presumption of unfitness was invalidated: "'permanent irrebuttable
presumptions have long been disfavored under the Due Process
Clause of the 5th and 14th Amendments.' "59 Moreover, the Court
stated that "administrative efficiency alone is insufficient to make
valid what otherwise is a violation of due process of law." 6 ° Finally,
the Court held invalid the regulation which prevented a teacher
from returning to work until her child reached the age of three
months, since that provision also created an irrebuttable presump-
tion of unfitness which seriously burdened the exercise of protected
constitutional liberty. b I
While the LaFleur Court struck down the mandatory maternity
leave regulations in question, it did leave open the question of the
permissibility of mandatory maternity leave regulations requiring
termination of employment at some definite date close to the ex-
pected date of birth. 62
 The Court noted that the inclusion of state
and local governments within the coverage of Title VII in 1972,
combined with the EEOC guideline providing that a mandatory
maternity leave regulation or termination policy for pregnant
women presumptively violated the Civil Rights Act of 1964, might
have the effect of reducing the practical impact of LaFleur. 63 Thus,
the Court implied that, although mandatory maternity leave regula-
tions are presumptively invalid under the Constitution and may be
invalid under Title VII, the rules might nevertheless be justified if
sufficiently related to the promotion of a legitimate state interest.
In Schattman v. Texas Employment Commission, 64 a regulation
of the Employment Commission was sustained which required
mandatory maternity leave to commence two months before the
expected date of delivery. Acknowledging the decision in Reed, the
58 Id. at 798, 6 FEP Cases at 1258-60.
" Id., 6 FEP Cases at 1257-58.
6° Id. at 799, 6 FEP Cases at 1259.
61 Id. at 801, 6 FEP Cases at 1260-61.
Id, at 799 n.13, 6 FEP Cases at 1259 n.13.
63
 Id. at 795 n.8, 6 FEP Cases at 1256 n.8. The Court stated that it expressed no view as
to the validity of the regulations.
64 459 F.2d 32, 4 FEP Cases 353 (5th Cir. 1972) cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1107 {1972), reh.
denied, 410 U.S. 959 (1973).
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Fifth Circuit concluded that the rule was shown to be both reason-
able and rationally related to a legitimate state purpose. 65 In a
footnote to its decision in LaFleur the Supreme Court referred to
Schattman, suggesting that a comparison of that case with Green
and Buckley," would demonstrate the split among the circuits on
the same issue. This might imply that the cases are not factually
distinguishable even though the length of the forced leave involved
varied by several months between the cases. This means that a
two-month cut-off date would not make reasonable an otherwise
irrational mandatory maternity leave regulation under the Due Pro-
cess approach relied upon in LaFleur. The dicta of the Supreme
Court indicates that a strong showing of reasonableness must be
made to justify the imposition of any cut-off point for the end of
employment and the commencement of mandatory maternity leave
for public school teachers and, by virtue of Title VII and the EEOC
guidelines, for employees of private employers as well.
3. Grooming Codes: Willingham; Dodge
In contrast to the maternity leave cases, which have been
determined on constitutional grounds up to the present time, suits
challenging private employer grooming code regulations have gener-
ally been resolved under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
Some employers have relied upon the bona fide occupational
qualification exception in section 703(e) 67 in defending grooming
codes against charges of sex discrimination brought under section
703(a). 68 Two cases decided during the Survey year have high-
lighted a division among the federal courts on the issue of the
permissibility of the discharge of a male employee or refusal to hire
a male applicant whose hair length violates employer grooming
codes." Since this question pertains to a potentially numerous pool
of litigants, these cases would appear to present a significant issue
which the Supreme Court may decide in order to resolve the conflict
among the lower federal courts.
In Willingham v. Macon Telegraph Publishing Co.," the Fifth
Circuit rendered judgment for a male applicant who was refused
employment because his hair length violated company grooming
code standards. The court's opinion was representative of other
65
 459 F.2d at 41, 4 FEP Cases at 360.
" 94 S. Ct. at 795 n.8, 6 FEP cases at 1256 n.8.
67
 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1970).
66
 42 U.S.C, § 2000e-2(a) (1970).
69
 Fagan v, National Cash Register Ca., 481 F.2d 1115, 5 FEP Cases 1335 (D.C. Cir.
1973); Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publishing Co., 482 F.2d 535, 5 FEP Cases 1329 (5th Cir.),
petition for reh. granted, 6 FEP Cases 830 (1973).
7"
 482 F.2(1 535, 5 FEP Cases 1329.
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cases in which the refusal to hire an applicant for noncompliance
with a grooming code has been held to constitute discrimination on
the basis of sex in violation of Title VII. 71 The plaintiff, who had
passed the company's tests and had previous experience, alleged
that he was denied employment as a layout artist in the retail
advertising department of the company solely because of the length
of his hair. After exhausting his administrative remedies with the
EEOC, he filed suit, alleging that he had been the victim of sex
discrimination in violation of both section 703 of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 72
 and the Civil Rights Act of 1871. 73
 The defendant
company contended that it requires employees who have public
contact to comply with standards of appearance customarily ac-
cepted in the business community, and that the plaintiff's hair
length would injure the business and image of the defendant. The
district court granted summary judgment for the defendant, reason-
ing that Congress, in enacting the Civil Rights acts, had not in-
tended to deprive employers of the "fundamental right" to recognize
societal mores in the formulation and imposition of reasonable
grooming standards. 74
 Moreover, it was found that equal employ-
ment opportunities had been made available to both sexes by the
company, and that equal conditions of employment also existed,
since females also had to comply with a grooming code. 75
In reversing the district court decision, the Fifth Circuit recog-
nized the applicability of section 703 to cases of "sex plus" discrimi-
nation, that is, to classifications of employees based on sex plus one
other characteristic, 76
 such as hair length in the controversy before
it. The court reasoned that, in enacting section 703, Congress in-
tended to provide equal employment opportunities for both men and
women. 77
 "Section 703, therefore, is not limited to situations in
which the employer's discriminatory employment practice is based
solely on sex but extends to all differences in the treatment of men
and women resulting from sex stereotypes." 78
 Since the grooming
code prohibited only males from wearing their hair long, it treated
71 See Donohue v. Shoe Corp. of America, 337 F. Supp. 1357, 4 FEP Cases 393 (C.D.
Cal. 1972).
72
 42 U.S.C. 5 2000e-2 (1970).
" 42 U.S.C.
	 1983 (1970).
74
 Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publishing Co., 352 F. Supp. 1018, 1021, 5 FEP Cases
847, 849 (M.D. Ga. 1972).
" Id.
" 482 F.2d at 537, 5 FEP Cases at 1331. See Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d
1194, 3 FEP Cases 621 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 991, 4 FEP Cases 37 (1971);
Developments in the Law, Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, 84 nary. L. Rev. 1109, 1171-72 (1971).
77
 482 F.2d at 537, 5 FEP Cases at 1331.
" Id.
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applicants differently because of a sex stereotype. Applying the rule
that section 703 does not permit the use of one standard for men and
another for women where both are similarly situated, the Fifth
Circuit found that a grooming code which requires different hair
lengths for male and female job applicants discriminates on the
basis of sex in violation of section 703. 79 The plaintiff's contentions
in Willingham drew support from the EEOC regulation providing
that if sex is a factor in the application of a grooming code, sex
discrimination is involved." This construction of the Act by the
EEOC was afforded great deference by the Fifth Circuit." The
possibility that the employer might justify its grooming code as a
bona fide occupational qualification on remand was acknowledged,
since that issue had not been considered. 82
In contrast to the Fifth Circuit, the District of Columbia Circuit
in two Survey year cases upheld hair length requirements, similar to
that found violative of Title VII in Willingham, on the ground that
the grooming codes did not discriminate on the basis of sex, thus
dispensing with the necessity of showing that hair length was a bona
fide occupational qualification. 83 In Dodge v. Giant Food, Inc., 84
the court found that the hair-length regulations, which embodied a
distinction based upon sex by treating long-haired males differently
than long-haired females, did not discriminate or classify within the
meaning of the statutory proscription of sex discrimination. There-
fore, it was unnecessary to reach the question of whether the groom-
ing code could fall within the BFOQ exception to the section 703
prohibitions on the ground that hair length was a bona fide occupa-
tional qualification under the circumstances. 85 Adopting the
rationale of its previous decision in Fagan v. National Cash Register
Co., 86
 the District of Columbia Circuit asserted that "the sexual
79 Id. at 538, 5 FEP Cases at 1331-32.
89 Id.
81
 Id., citing Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
82
 Id. In Boyce v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 402, 5 FEP Cases 285 (D.D.C.
1972), which presented a factual situation similar to Willingham, but which involved a
discharge rather than a refusal to hire, the trial court held that a grooming code hair length
requirement for males only, constituted a BFOQ because it had "demonstrable relevance" to
job performance within the meaning of section 703(e). 351 F. Supp, at 403-04, 5 FEP Cases at
286.
83 Dodge v. Giant Food, Inc., 488 F.2d 1333, 6 FEP Cases 1066 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Fagan
v. National Cash Register Co., 481 F.2d 1115, 5 FEP Cases 1335 (D.C. Cir. 1973). In Baker
v, California Land Title Co., 349 F. Supp. 235, 5 FEP Cases 329 (C.D. Cal. 1972), the court
reached an identical conclusion based on similar reasoning. The District of Columbia Circuit
had previously reached an identical result in Fagan v. National Cash Register Co,, 481 F.2d
1175, 5 FEP Cases 1335 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
" 488 F.2d 1333, 6 FEP Cases 1066 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
" 488 F.2d at 1335, 6 FEP Cases at 1067.
" 6
 481 F.2d 1115, 5 FEP Cases 1335.
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classification embodied in the hair-length regulations does not
significantly affect employment opportunities and thus does not
violate the statute" since hair length is not an immutable
characteristic. 87 Dodge rested in part on the premise that Title VII
was not intended to invalidate private employer grooming regula-
tions which do not significantly affect the employment opportunities
afforded one sex over another."
The decision in Dodge suggested a two-part test of employer
regulations which distinguish or classify on the basis of sex
stereotypes. The Dodge inquiry would require an evaluation of both
the degree of immutability of the distinguishing characteristic and
the amount of impact that the grooming code has upon employment
opportunities afforded the two sexes. On the basis of this framework
of analysis, the District of Columbia Circuit found the hair length
regulation cases distinguishable from other cases in which the em-
ployer had been found to violate section 703 for discriminating on
the basis of sex plus another sexually related characteristic. In
Sprogis v. United Air Lines, 89 a rule which required that stewardes-
ses be unmarried, while stewards were allowed to be married, was
held to be unlawful employment discrimination. The Dodge court
reasoned, however, that marriage is a characteristic less easily al-
tered than length of hair, though neither is immutable. 9 °
The decision of the Supreme Court in Phillips v. Martin
Marietta Corp." supplied the foundation for the holding of the
Seventh Circuit in Sprogis. Phillips is the leading case on the issue
of the permissibility of employer policies or rules which classify on
the basis of sex. The employer refused to hire the plaintiff in
Phillips because of its policy against hiring women with pre-school
age children, while it had no such policy with respect to men. The
Supreme Court held that:
Section 703(a) requires that persons of like qualifications be
given employment opportunities irrespective of their sex.
The Court of Appeals therefore erred in reading this sec-
tion as permitting one hiring policy for women and another
for men—each having pre-school-age children. 92
The Phillips Court further indicated that such an employment
policy must qualify within the section 703(e) exception for bona fide
occupational qualifications in order to be upheld. 93
ss 488 F.2d at 1336, 6 FEP Cases at 1067-68.
68 Id. at 1337, 6 FEP Cases at 1069.
" 444 F.2d 1194, 3 FEP Cases 621 (7th Cir. 1971).
9° 488 F.2d at 1337, 6 FEP Cases at 1069.
sE 400 U.S. .542 (1971).
92 91 Id. at 543-44.
si 92 Id.
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It is submitted that the decisions in Sprogis and Phillips should
have been controlling in Dodge and Fagan. All four cases involved
discrimination or classifications based upon sex plus another charac-
teristic: marriage, young children, and hair length. Title VII pro-
hibits employment discrimination because of sex, and Phillips estab-
lished that discrimination against one sex on the basis of a charac-
teristic shared by both sexes also violates Title VII. The dis-
criminatory impact of the sex-plus classification is the controlling
factor, not the immutability of the characteristic. The requirement
established by the Supreme Court in Phillips that persons of like
qualifications be given equal opportunities regardless of sex would
appear applicable to the facts in Dodge, since the distinguishing
factor in both cases was a characteristic other than sex. It is there-
fore submitted that hair length regulations which treat men differ-
ently from women and which affect the employment opportunities
of men whose hair fails to comply with the standard constitute
impermissible sex discrimination under Title VII and can only be
upheld as bona fide occupational qualifications. The section 703(e)
exception has generally been construed narrowly" and requires a
showing that the employer regulation is "reasonably necessary to the
normal operation of that particular business or enterprise." 95 It is
improbable that hair length requirements for males could qualify as
"reasonably necessary to the normal operation" of most businesses
and enterprises.
4. State Female Protective Statutes: Eslinger; Wernet
The developing judicial doctrines which define employment
discrimination based upon sex under either Title VII or the Con-
stitution do not afford automatic relief to the person deprived of
equal employment opportunities. The Fourth and Sixth Circuits
have held that good faith reliance upon a state female protective
statute may preclude an award of damages. 96 State female protec-
tive statutes are those laws which regulate conditions and oppor-
tunities of employment for female workers only. The EEOC
guidelines provide that
. . such laws conflict with and are superseded by Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Accordingly, such laws
" See Sprogis v. United Air Lines, 444 F,2d 1194 (7th Cir. 1971); Diaz v, Pan American
World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 387-88 (5th Cir. 1971); Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. &
Tel, Co., 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969),
95 42 U,S,C.	 2000e-(2)(e) (1970).
vn Wernet v. Meat Cutters, Local 17, 484 F.2d 403, 404, 6 FEP Cases 602, 603 (6th Cir.
1973); Ash v. Hobart Mfg. Co., 483 F.2d 289, 293, 6 FEP Cases 245, 247 (6th Cir. 1973);
Eslinger v, Thomas 476 F.2d 225, 228, 5 FEP Cases 793, 797 (4th Cir. 1973).
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will not be considered a defense to an otherwise established
unlawful employment practice or as a basis for the applica-
tion of the bona fide occupational qualification exception. 97
However, upon a finding of sex discrimination in employment prac-
tices, the decisions of the Fourth and Sixth Circuits indicate that
courts will refuse to award discretionary damages where the defen-
dant has acted in good faith reliance upon a presumptively valid
state female protective law, or, in certain circumstances, upon a
long-standing custom.
The Senate of South Carolina generally employed as pages, in
positions of temporary employment, students from the University of
South Carolina Law School. After being recommended for appoint-
ment as a page by a state senator, the plaintiff in Eslinger v.
Thomas, 9s a female law student at the university, applied for the
position. However, defendant Thomas, Clerk of the Senate, in-
formed her that she could not be employed as a page because of her
sex. She brought suit under the 14th Amendment and under section
1983, 99
 but the district court denied relief. After plaintiff filed suit,
the Senate of South Carolina passed a resolution which provided
that females could be employed as "clerical assistants" and as
"committee attendants," but not as pages.'°° The resolution re-
quired females, but not males, to furnish a statement from their
parent or guardian assuming responsibility for the transportation,
safety and supervision of the prospective employee."' The plaintiff,
however, pressed her right to be a Senate page.
Applying the Reed'"2
 test of a fair and substantial relation
between the basis of the classification and the object of the
classification, which it termed an " 'intermediate approach' " be-
tween the rational basis and the compelling interest standards, the
Fourth Circuit concluded that the South Carolina Senate resolution
denied equal protection, 1 "3
 and reversed the trial court's denial of
injunctive and declaratory relief.'" However, damages were not
awarded against the Clerk of the Senate in light of the finding that
97 29 C.F.R.	 1604.2(b)(1) (1973).
98 476 F.2d at 226-27, 5 FEP Cases at 794-95.
" 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). Eslinger arose prior to the 1972 Amendments.
1 " 476 F.2d at 227, 5 FEP Cases at 796.
1 ° 1 Id.
1 ° 2 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
'" 476 F.2d at 231, 5 FEP Cases at 798.
We have only to look at our own female secretaries and female law clerks to
conclude that an intimate business relationship, including traveling on circuit, be-
tween persons of different sex presents no "appearance of impropriety" in the current
age, graduated as we are from Victorian attitudes.
Id.
'°4 Id. at 232, 5 FEP Cases at 799.
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he had acted in good faith reliance upon the long-standing custom
against hiring female pages. To hold him liable would, in effect,
charge him with the responsibility of predicting developments in
constitutional law. 105 The Fourth Circuit reasoned that the inchoate
state of the law in the area of sex discrimination justified recognition
of a defense against a claim for damages under section 1983, where
the defense is based upon good faith and reasonable grounds to
believe in the lawfulness of the action taken.'" Thus, despite a
violation of her constitutional right to equal protection of the law
under the Fourteenth Amendment, the plaintiff received no dam-
ages for resulting lost wages.
The controversy in Eslinger arose prior to the passage of the
Equal Employment Opportunities Act of 1972, which brought state
and local governments under coverage of Title VII.' 07
 Conse-
quently, Eslinger did not involve a determination of rights and
remedies under Title VII. However, in Wernet v. Meat Cutters,
Local 17, 1 " the Sixth Circuit reached a similar result under the
provisions of Title VII.
In Wernet, the plaintiffs' employer had maintained separate
seniority lists for men and women during the years in question in
order to comply with the female protective statute then in effect in
Ohio. The plaintiffs' grievance regarding the separate seniority lists
was ultimately arbitrated and resolved in favor of the employer.
The plaintiffs filed suit under Title VII against both the employer
and the union, but settled with the employer. 169
 Although finding
that the union had failed to adequately represent the plaintiffs and
failed to employ proper grievance procedures in their behalf, the
trial court dismissed the complaint against the union because that
organization's lack of zeal resulted from good faith reliance upon the
female protective statute.' 10
The Sixth Circuit held that good faith reliance by a union, as
well as an employer, upon a presumptively valid state female pro-
tective statute serves as a defense to a claim for damages for sex
discrimination in violation of Title VII."' In a dissenting opinion,
Judge McCree contended that, since a showing by the plaintiff that
the defendant acted in bad faith is not necessary to establish the
commission of an unlawful employment practice under the Act, the
plaintiff need only show "a prohibited discriminatory consequence
"5 Id. at 229, 5 FEP Cases at 796.
106 Id. at 230, 5 FEP Cases at 797.
"7
 See text at pages — to — supra for a discussion of the 1972 Act.
'OH 484 F.2d 403, 6 FEP Cases 602 (6th Cir. 1973).
I " Id,, 6 FEP Cases at 603.
'th Id.
'IL Id, at 404, 6 FEP Cases at 603.
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of an act intentionally undertaken."" 2 Such a showing would estab-
lish a violation of Title VII and would empower the court to "order
such affirmative action as may be appropriate" pursuant to section
706(g). 13 The statutory language supports the construction that bad
faith is not required under section 706(g). Judge McCree made the
additional point that unions are not bound by state protective laws
and are free to challenge them in grievance and arbitration
proceedings.' 14 Nonetheless, Wernet appears to have been correctly
decided. Section 706(g) does not require a finding of bad faith in
order to establish a violation of Title VII and to empower the court
to grant relief. However, the form of relief granted is
discretionary.' is
The Supreme Court has stated that Congress intended to
remedy the consequences of discriminatory employment practices by
enacting Title VII, " 6
 and reliance upon state protective statutes
often results in discriminatory employment practices, as the EEOC
has formally stated. 17 Therefore, it would appear proper for the
courts to exercise the discretionary power granted in section 706(g)
to award damages in the form of back pay to persons aggrieved by
employer or union reliance upon state female protective statutes.
However, that power is discretionary, and it is within the authority
of the courts to recognize a good faith reliance defense to a claim for
damages.
D. Discrimination Against Aliens: Sugarman; Espinoza
The Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment affords
protection against employment discrimination against aliens by state
and local governments; an aggrieved individual may seek to obtain
such protection by instituting suit under section 1983. To the extent
that the Fifth Amendment has been found to guarantee equal
protection,' it would appear that similar rights would accrue to
non-citizens against the employment practices of the federal gov-
ernment. However, where state action is not involved in allegedly
12 Id. at 405, 6 FFP Cases at 605.
13 42 U.S.C. * 2000e-5(g) (1970).
14 484 F.2d at 405, 6 FBI' Cases at 604.
115 There is some question as to whether Wernet is consistent with Vaca v. Sipes, 386
U.S. 171 (1967). See 484 F.2d at 405, 6 FE? Cases at 604. Vaca requires a showing of
arbitrary, discriminatory, or had faith conduct on the part of the union to establish a breach
of the duty of fair representation. 306 U.S. at 190. If these requirements are alternative, it is
possible that good faith union reliance on a female protective statute is discriminatory conduct
which may amount to a breach of the duty of fair representation. It would not seem, however,
that such reliance is bad faith or arbitrary conduct.
116 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 11971).
117 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(b)(1) (1973).
Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954):
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discriminatory employment practices, constitutional protection is
not available. Litigation during the Survey year raised the possibil-
ity that the Title VII prohibition of national origin discrimination
might extend to discriminatory practices by private employers
against aliens. 2
Title VII forbids employment discrimination against any person
"because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin . . . ."3 However, the Act does not explicitly prohibit dis-
crimination on the basis of alienage or citizenship. The Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Act of 1972 4 brought state and local gov-
ernments within the coverage of Title VII and separately extended
the Act to the federal government in section 717.
During the Survey year, the Supreme Court resolved the ques-
tion of the permissibility of discrimination in employment based on
citizenship as practiced by private employers 5 and by state
governments.° But only the issue of private employer discrimination
against aliens was determined under the provisions of Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 7 and the constitutionality of the re-
quirement of citizenship for employment in the federal civil service
remains undecided by the Supreme Court. The result of the Su-
preme Court's determinations would 'seem to allow private employ-
ment discrimination based upon citizenship, while prohibiting
across-the-board discrimination against aliens in state and local
government employment.
In Sugarman v. Dougall, 8 the Court held that a state law which
indiscriminately prohibits the state from employing aliens in com-
petitive positions violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment. Sugarman is a logical outgrowth of prior case
law. The inclusion of aliens under the shelter of the Equal Protec-
tion Clause is long-recognized and well-established. 9 In Truax v.
Raich, 10 the Court struck down an Arizona statute which mandated
that all employers of five or more workers must employ at least 80%
2 Espinoza v, Farah Mfg. Inc., 414 U.S. 86 (1973).
3 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1970).
4 86 Stat. 103 (1972).
Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Inc., 414 U.S. 86 (1973).
6 Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973).
7 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. (1970), Pub. L. No. 92-261 (1972).
s 413 U.S. 634 (1973).
s Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371 (1971); Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n,
334 U.S. 410, 420 (1948); Truax v. Raich 239 U.S. 33, 39 (1915); Yick Wo v. Hopkins 118
U.S. 356, 369 (1886).
I 0 239 U.S. 33, 42 (1915). However, as pointed out by Justice Rehnquist in his dissent in
Sugarman, the Court in Truax noted that the case did not involve discrimination against
aliens in the regulation or distribution of the public domain or resources of the people, which
would have been permissible. 413 U.S. at 654, 5 FEP Cases at 1160. This was a recognition
of the "special public interest doctrine." See text at note 12, supra.
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United States citizens. In Takahashi v. Fish & Game Commission
the Court stated that a state's power "to apply its laws exclusively to
its alien inhabitants as a class is confined within narrow limits.""
Nonetheless, prior to Sugarman, both state and federal laws and
regulations prohibited employment of non-citizens generally, as
sanctioned in the early decades of the twentieth century by decisions
which recognized a special public interest doctrine. 12 This doctrine
justified the state's restriction of its resources, including public em-
ployment, to citizens. The special public interest doctrine was ex-
plicitly laid to rest in Graham v. Richardson,' 3 where the Court held
that state laws conditioning the receipt of welfare benefits upon
either citizenship or residence of 15 years violated the Equal Protec-
tion Clause. Reasoning that "classifications based on alienage, like
those based on nationality or race, are inherently suspect and sub-
ject to close judicial scrutiny,"" Justice Blackmun, writing for the
Court, applied the test of strict judicial scrutiny and concluded that
the public interest doctrine did not justify the classification and
consequent unequal treatment of aliens.' 5 This decision laid the
foundation for the Court's holding in Sugarman, also written by
Justice Blackmun.'
Prior to the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972,
Title VII coverage did not extend to government discrimination in
employment. As a result, aggrieved persons were forced to develop
other theories of relief. In Sugarman v. Dougall, 17 arising prior to
the 1972 amendments and decided before Espinoza v. Farah Man-
ufacturing Co., 18
 the Supreme Court sustained a constitutional chal-
lenge to a New York statute which indiscriminately prohibited the
employment of aliens in competitive civil service positions, on the
ground that it violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment. In Sugarman, the plaintiffs, who had never
attempted to become United States citizens, were discharged from
their clerical and administrative positions of employment with the
government of New York City pursuant to the statutory require-
ment of citizenship. 19
 They instituted a class action challenging the
constitutionality of the law and seeking an injunction and damages
for lost earnings. A three-judge district court ruled that the statute
'' 334 U.S. at 420.
12 Crane v. New York, 239 U.S. 195, atrg 214 N.Y. 154, 161, 108 N.E. 427, 429 (1915);
Heim v. McCall, 239 U.S. 175 (1915).
13
 403 U.S. 365 (1971). •
14 Id. at 372.
1 $ Id. at 376.
lb 413 U.S. 634.
17 Id .
" 414 U.S. 86 (1973).
1 " 413 U.S. at 636.
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violated the Fourteenth Amendment and the Supremacy Clause and
granted injunctive relief. 20
Writing for the Court in affirming the judgment of the trial
court, 21 Justice Blackmun stated that the "precise and narrow issue"
presented by the case was "whether New York's flat statutory
prohibition against the employment of aliens in the competitive
classified civil service is constitutionally valid." 22 The jobs in the
"competitive class" to which the citizenship requirement applied
ranged from menial to policy-making positions, while citizenship
was not a prerequisite for employment in other positions which
would naturally seem to fall within the statutory purpose. There-
fore, Justice Blackmun concluded that the New York scheme was
indiscriminate and had little, if any, relationship to the state's prof-
fered justification of promoting the integrity and efficiency of the
civil service. 23 Relying on Graham v. Richardson, 24 the Court stated
that "classifications based on alienage are subject to close judicial
scrutiny" and examined both "the substantiality of the State's in-
terest in enforcing the statute" and "the narrowness of the limits
within which the discrimination is confined." 25 The Court rejected
the special public interest doctrine and therefore held that the stat-
ute did not survive the necessary close judicial scrutiny. 26 However,
the holding in Sugarman was explicitly limited to flat bans on
government employment of aliens in positions which are
insufficiently related to a State's legitimate interest, leaving open the
possibility of a citizenship requirement for public employment which
"rests on legitimate state interests" relating either to qualifications
for particular positions or to characteristics of the employee." How-
ever, Espinoza indicates that the 1972 inclusion of governmental
employers within Title VII might afford protection to aliens in cases
such as Sugarman, if the governmental employment practice has the
effect of national origin discrimination.
Section 703 of Title VII explicitly prohibits discrimination
against any individual because of such individual's national origin. 28
This proscription generated the question of whether citizenship dis-
crimination is forbidden by Title VII within the national origin
20
 339 F. Supp. 906, 3 FEP Cases 1202 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) aff'd 413 U.S. 634 (1973).
21
 Justice Rehnquist dissented. 413 U.S. at 649-64.
22
 413 U.S. at 638-39.
23 Id. at 642.
24
 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
25 413 U.S. at 642-43.
26 Id. at 643. See discussion of the special public interest doctrine in text, supra note 12.
27 Id. at 646-47, 5 FEP Cases at 1157. The decision in Sugarman. was followed in
Mendoza v. City of Miami, 483 F.2d 430, 6 FEP Cases 492 (5th Cir, 1973).
28
 42 U,S.C. § 2000e-2 (1970).
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discrimination prohibition. The Supreme Court, in Espinoza, held
that citizenship discrimination which is not shown to have the
impact of national origin discrimination, is not prohibited by Title
VII, despite an EEOC regulation to the contrary. 29 In Espinoza, a
lawfully admitted resident alien was denied employment on the
basis of a long-standing company policy against the employment of
aliens, although the vast majority of employees at the particular
plant in question were of Mexican ancestry. After exhausting her
administrative remedies with the EEOC, pursuant to section
706(e), 3 ° Espinoza brought suit, alleging national origin
discrimination—a violation of section 703(a)(1) of Title V11. 31
Reasoning that the phrase "national origin" is broad enough to
encompass both "citizenship" and "nationality," and that classifica-
tions based upon alienage are inherently suspect, the district court
granted summary judgment to the plaintiff, holding that a refusal to
hire because of lack of United States citizenship alone is prohibited
as discrimination on the basis of national origin within Title VII. 32
The district court found that the legislative history of Title VII
supported the EEOC guideline prohibiting citizenship discrimina-
tion, as the original purpose clause of Title VII declared that "all
persons within the jurisdiction of the United States have a right to
the opportunity for employment without discrimination on account
of . . national origin." 33
 The Fifth Circuit reversed, concluding
that the statutory phrase "national origin" did not embrace citizen-
ship. 34
 The Fifth Circuit refused to follow the EEOC guideline and
responded to the district court's reliance upon the purpose clause by
noting that the fact that all persons are protected under the Act does
not of itself indicate what forms of discrimination are proscribed. 35
The Supreme Court, with Justice Douglas dissenting, affirmed
the decision of the Fifth Circuit, reasoning that the plain language
of the statute supported that holding, since "national origin" refers
to a person's, or to a person's ancestors' country of birth, not to
citizenship. 36
 The Court noted that a long-standing Civil Service
Commission regulation requires federal employees to be citizens, 37
35 414 U.S. at 86.
3° 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1970).
31
 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1970).
33
 343 F. Supp. 1205, 1207, 4 FEP Cases 929, 930 (W.D. Tex. 1971), rev'd 462 F.2d
1331, 4 FEP Cases 931 (5th Cir. 1972); 414 U.S. 86; 6 FE? Cases 933 (1973).
33
 343 F. Supp. at 1206, 4 FE? Cases at 929.
34
 462 F.2d 1331, 4 FEP Cases 931 (5th Cir. 1972), aff'd 414 U.S. 86, 6 FEP Cases 933
(1973).
35
 462 F.2d at 1335, 4 FEP Cases at 933-34.
36 414 U.S. at 88-89. The Court also found that the meager legislative history on the
question, supported this construction. Id.
" Id.
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and that, at the same time, section 701(b) 38 makes it the "policy of
the United States to insure equal employment opportunities for
Federal employees without discrimination because of .. . national
origin . . ." Furthermore, since 1964, Congress has passed legisla-
tion barring aliens from federal employment. 39 The Court conse-
quently refused to interpret the term "national origin" to embrace
citizenship requirements where to do so would necessitate a conclu-
sion "that Congress itself has repeatedly flouted its own declaration
of policy.m40
In adopting a literal interpretation of the section 703 prohibi-
tion of national origin discrimination, the Court declined to follow
the interpretative guideline of the EE0C, 41 reasoning that, although
entitled to great deference, such administrative interpretations are
not controlling where they conflict with obvious congressional
intent. 42 However, the Court agreed that aliens are protected from
discrimination under the Act: 43 "[clertainly Title VII prohibits dis-
crimination on the basis of citizenship whenever it has the purpose
or effect of discriminating on the basis of national origin."44 In his
dissenting opinion, Justice Douglas stated that the EEOC position
was the correct one: that discrimination on the basis of citizenship
always has the effect of national origin discrimination. Citing lan-
guage in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 45 to the effect that Title VII
prohibits practices neutral on their face which create "artificial,
arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment" resulting in
discrimination "on the basis of racial or other impermissible
classification," Justice Douglas contended that citizenship discrimi-
nation was proscribed by Title VII as it necessarily has the effect of
national origin discrimination." The majority rejected this ap-
proach, holding that discrimination on the basis of citizenship alone
is not prohibited by Title VII and implying that employment dis-
crimination on the basis of citizenship will not be presumed to have
the effect of national origin discrimination. The decision in Espinoza
will probably have the consequence of requiring evidence that dis-
crimination on the basis of alienage has the effect of discrimination
33
 42 U.S.C. § 2000c(b) (1970).
39
 414 U.S. at 90,
40 Id .
41
 The regulation provides: "Because discrimination on the basis of citizenship has the
effect of discrimination on the basis of national origin, a lawfully immigrated alien who is
domiciled or residing in this country may not be discriminated against on the basis of his
citizenship . . ." 29 C.F.R. § 1606.1(d) (1973).
42
 414 U.S, at 94-95.
43 Id. at 95.
44
 Id. at 92,
43
 401 U.S. 424, 430-31 (1971).
43
 414 U.S. at 96.
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on the basis of national origin, or possibly race, in order to bring the
discriminatory practices within the prohibitions of Title VII.
Neither Sugarman nor Espinoza involved the issue of whether
federal statutes and regulations which discriminate against non-
citizens in employment by the federal government are susceptible to
challenge on constitutional grounds.'" The courts of appeals for the
District of Columbia and the Ninth Circuit took different ap-
proaches when presented with this question. Both Jalil v.
Hampton" and Wong v. Hampton" involved challenges of the same
statutes and regulations. The authorizing statute of the Civil Service
CommisSion provides in part:
The President may—
(1) prescribe such regulations for the admission of indi-
viduals into the civil service in the executive branch as will
best promote the efficiency of that service. 5 °
Pursuant to this statutory grant of power, the President promul-
gated Executive Order 10577, 5 ' authorizing the Civil Service Com-
mission to establish qualifications for admission or rating in civil
service examinations including, among others, standards based
upon citizenship. The Civil Service Commission consequently issued
a regulation conditioning appointments and admission to examina-
tions on United States citizenship. 52 The cases also involved a
statute prohibiting the use of appropriated funds for the payment of
salaries to aliens. 53 Though the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia failed to reach the constitutional issue, the Ninth Circuit
in Wong held that the Civil Service Commission regulation indis-
criminately banning aliens from employment in the federal service
violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 54
The court in Jalil remanded the case to the district court for
insufficient findings of fact without discussing the constitutional
questions raised by appellant. However, the circuit court intimated
that the validity of the Civil Service regulation was questionable
under the statutory authorization. 55 The court noted that
classifications based on alienage are suspect and justifiable only
47
 413 U.S. at 646 n.12; 414 U.S. at 95.
43
 460 F.2d 923, 5 FEP Cases 1351 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 887 (1972).
49 — F.2d —, 7 FEP Cases 58 (9th Cir. 1974).
5° 5 U.S.C. § 3301 (1970).
51
 19 Fed. Reg. 7521 (1954).
52 5 C.F.R. § 338.101 (1973).
53
 Public Works Appropriation Act of 1970, Pub. L. 91-144, § 502, 83 Stat. 323, 336-7.
54
	F.2d —, 7 FEP Cases at 65.
55
 460 F.2d at 928-29 nn.11, 15, 5 FEP Cases at 1354-55 nn.11, 15.
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upon a showing of a compelling governmental interest. 56 The deci-
sion in Jalil suggested that the indiscriminate exclusion of aliens
from federal civil service employment might be unauthorized in that
the regulation would not "best support the efficiency of that
service."57
 In his dissenting opinion, Chief Judge Bazelon
foreshadowed the Wong decision in urging that the constitutional
issue should have been determined. He stated that "a compelling
state interest, apart from the now discredited 'special public interest'
in dispensing financial benefits to citizens over aliens," must be
shown if the inherently suspect classification based on alienage was
to be sustained under the Equal Protection Clause."
In holding that the Civil Service Commission regulations dis-
criminate unreasonably against aliens, based only on their status as
aliens, the Ninth Circuit relied on the opinion in Sugarman and on
the dissenting opinion in Jain." In contrast to the result suggested
by the majority in Jalil, the Ninth Circuit in Wong did not find that
the regulations were unauthorized by statute or invalid because
conflicting with other statutes and regulations. Without considering
the issue of whether the citizenship requirement best promoted the
efficiency of the civil service, within the meaning of the authorizing
statute, the court reasoned that the regulation complemented the
statutory prohibition of the payment of salaries to aliens from ap-
propriated funds in the Public Woiks Appropriation Act." Appel-
lants contended that the citizenship requirement was invalid by
reason of inconsistency with ExeCutive Order 11478 prohibiting
discrimination in federal employment because of race, color, reli-
gion, sex or national origin. 61 Noting the Supreme Court's holding
in Espinoza that the prohibition of national origin discrimination did
not encompass discrimination against non-citizens as such, the
Ninth Circuit distinguished the issue before it: the right to federal
government employment. However, the court stated that, even if
the citizenship requirement contravenes Executive Order 11478, the
conflict would not be judicially reviewable as the Executive Order
merely declares, a general policy. 62 . Being unable to dispose of the
case on non-constitutional grounds,: the court proceeded to consider
the constitutional challenge to the Civil Service regulation.
In determining the constitutionality of a classification based on
56
 Id. at 928-29, 5 FEP Cases at 1354.
57
 Id. at 927, 5 FEP Cases at 1353.
58
 Id. at 930, .5 FEP Cases at 1355.
SR F.2d —, 7 FEP Cases at 64.
" Id. at —, 7 FEP Cases at 59-60.
65 34 Fed. keg. 12985 (1969).
62 - F.2d —, 7 FEP Cases at 61-62.
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alienage, the Ninth Circuit properly applied the compelling gov-
ernmental interest test. The court found authority for the imposition
of an equal protection guarantee against alien discrimination by the
federal government in the Due process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment. 63 Neither the special public interest doctrine nor the
arguments based on loyalty and security advanced by the appellees
justified the indiscriminate exclusion of aliens from the civil service.
The Ninth Circuit in Wong concluded that the Civil Service regula-
tion imposed "such an impermissible discrimination as to be a denial
of due process" and consequently violates the Fifth Amendment."
It would appear that Wong significantly increases the constitu-
tional rights of aliens to employment by the federal government.
The decision extends greater protection under the Constitution than
the Supreme Court found under Title VII against private employ-
ment discrimination in Espinoza—which required a showing of
practices having the purpose or effect of national origin discrimina-
tion-. However, Wong would appear to be a consistent and logical
outgrowth of the Supreme Court's holding in Sugarman. A denial of
equal protection by the federal government can amount to a Fifth
Amendment denial of due process on the authority of Bolling v.
Sharpe.€ 5 Therefore, Wong should establish the constitutional in-
validity of the Civil Service Commission regulation requiring citi-
zenship for federal employment. The Supreme Court rejected the
special public interest doctrine and stated that aliens were a suspect
class in Sugarman. There is little likelihood that a compelling gov-
ernmental interest can be shown, on national security or other
grounds, which would justify the continuation of the indiscriminate
prohibition of employment of noncitizens in the federal civil service.
E. Remedies–Affirmative Relief
1. Back Pay: N.L. Industries; Rosen; Head
During the Survey year, the federal courts, with varying de-
grees of harmony, have recognized new forms of discriminatory
employment practices 1
 under both Title VII and the Constitution in
the areas of national origin discrimination and sex discrimination.
Identification of these additional forms of discrimination accents the
significance of issues related to the appropriateness or necessity of
certain forms of affirmative relief.
63
 Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
"	 F.2d at —, 7 FEP Cases at 63.
65
 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
' See discussion in text supra at pages 1203 -42,
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Title VII explicitly authorizes an award of affirmative relief "[Of
the court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in or is
intentionally engaging in an unlawful employment practice . . ." 2
Section 706(g), in defining affirmative relief, provides that:
the court may enjoin the respondent from engaging in such
unlawful employment practice, and order such affirmative
action as may be appropriate, which may include, but is
not limited to reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or
without back pay (payable by the employer, employment
agency, or labor organization, as the case may be, respon-
sible for the unlawful employment practice), or any other
equitable relief as the court deems appropriate. Back pay
liability shall not accrue from a date more than two years
prior to the filing of a charge with the Commission. In-
terim earnings or amounts earnable with reasonable dili-
gence . .. shall operate to reduce the back pay otherwise
allowable. 3
A showing of either bad faith or discriminatory intent is not neces-
sary to permit a finding that an employer, employment agency, or
union has intentionally engaged in an unlawful employment
practice4—an intentional act or practice satisfies the statutory lan-
guage. In Griggs v. Duke Power Co., the Supreme Court stated that
"Congress directed the thrust of the Act to the consequences of
employment practices, not simply the motivation." 5 Thus, the court
may award injunctive and affirmative relief under section 706(g) if it
finds that an intentional employment practice has discriminatory
impact. "Under the Act, practices, procedures or tests neutral on
their face, and even neutral in terms of intent, cannot be maintained
if they operate to 'freeze' the status quo or prior discriminatory
employment practices." 6
 In Griggs, the court stated that the "touch-
stone" or test, is business necessity and found that the employer's
testing and educational requirements violated Title VII since they
did not "bear a demonstrable relationship" to successful job
performance.? According to Griggs, employment practices which
have discriminatory impact are prohibited by Title VII unless the
employer justifies them by a showing of business necessity.
2
 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1970).
3
 42 U.S.C, § 2000e-5(g) (Supp. II, 1972), amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1970)
(emphasis added). The phrase "but is not limited to" was added in 1972. Equal Employment
Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (1972).
4
 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971).
3 Id.
6
 Id, at 430.
7
 Id. at 431.
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The business necessity defense operates to foreclose the availa-
bility of relief to persons aggrieved by discriminatory employment
practices. Decisions of the lower federal courts have clarified the
business necessity test. 8 A "business purpose" will not suffice to
justify the discriminatory impact of an employment policy. 9 How-
ever, an employer may avoid liability under Title VII if it can show
that its discriminatory employment practice was essential or neces-
sary to promote safety and efficiency in the employer's business, and
that there was no reasonably available alternative with less dis-
criminatory impact.'° A showing of such a business necessity is an
adequate justification of the discriminatory effects of the employ-
ment practice and consequently a recognized defense to an award of
back pay under Title VII." In the absence of a showing of business
necessity, the federal courts have generally awarded back pay to
persons aggrieved by employment practices which violate Title
VII. 12 However, the Eighth Circuit alone, in United States v. N.L.
Industries," a Survey year case, continued to refuse to make the
remedy of back pay available under Title VII.
In N.L. Industries, the Attorney General of the United States,
pursuant to his powers under section 707, 14 instituted an action
against N.L. Industries, charging discrimination against blacks in
the maintenance of the company's seniority system, in job assign-
ment policies, in the selection of foremen, and in hiring white collar,
personnel.' 5
 The collective bargaining agreement created a dual
seniority system in which departmental seniority, based upon length
of service within a department, governed awards of vacant jobs in
the department, the order of layoff, and the order of recall within
that department; plant-wide seniority, based upon length of service
with the company, determined length of vacations and the outcome
of interdepartmental job bidding. Job vacancies within a depart-
ment were initially open only to intradepartmental bids. Prior to
8
 See Comment, 1971-1972 Annual Survey of Labor Relations Law, 13 B.C. Ind. &
Com. L. Rev. 1348, 1362 (1972).
9
 Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 798, 3 FEP Cases 653, 657-58 (4th Cir.),
cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971),
1 ° United States v. Jacksonville Terminal, 451 F.2d 418, 451, 3 FEP Cases 862, 889 (5th
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 906 (1972); United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446
F.2d 652, 662 3 FEP Cases 589, 596 (2d Cir. 1971); Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d at
798, 3 FEP Cases at 57-58. The EEOC has issued "Guidelines on Employee Selection
Procedures" which contain detailed definitions of discriminatory hiring tests and specific
validation requirements for employment tests 29 C.F.R. § 1607 (1973).
11 Head v. Timken Roller Bearing Co., 486 F.2d at 870, 877, 6 FEP Cases 813, 817 (6th
Cir. 1973).
2 See discussion of cases in text at note 31 infra.
13 479 F.2d 354, 379, 5 FEP Cases 823, 843 (8th Cir. 1973).
14 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6 (1970).
13
 479 F.2d at 358, 5 FEP Cases at 826.
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1962, the Company discriminated against blacks by assigning them
exclusively to the Labor Department seniority group, and by pro-
hibiting transfers from the Labor Department prior to 1963. 16 The
facts established that the detrimental effects of an interdepartmental
transfer under the dual seniority system inhibited blacks from trans-
ferring out of the Labor Department after 1963) 7 Finding that the
present seniority system perpetuated the effects of past discrimina-
tion, the Eighth Circuit reversed the decision of the trial court and
relied upon Griggs's in holding that implementation of that system
constituted an unlawful employment practice proscribed by Title
VII, regardless of the employer's good faith or absence of dis-
criminatory intent. 19 Reasoning that "[blusiness purpose alone is not
enough to justify an employment practice which preserves the ef-
fects of past discrimination,"24
 the circuit court held that the district
court applied the improper business purpose test and that the senior-
ity program was not justified by business necessity. 2 '
The company had engaged in other racially discriminatory
practices in selecting foremen 22 and in testing and hiring certain
white collar employees. 23 The Eighth Circuit directed the district
court on remand to award most of the injunctive relief sought by the
government. 24 The relief included the carry-over of Labor Depart-
ment seniority by employees who transferred into other departments
as well as pay rate retention. The court directed both the institution
of changes in hiring and recruiting practices and the selection of
foremen from a list of eligibles on the basis of merit. 25 Though it is
not clear whether the government sought an award of back pay to
aggrieved employees, the Eighth Circuit discussed that issue at
length and refused to make such an award. 26
The determination of the N.L. Industries court not to award
back pay abruptly and incongruously followed a thorough and con-
vincing analysis in the court's opinion of the appropriateness of an
award of back pay. 27 The court reasoned that back pay awards
have two roles in employment discrimination cases: they provide
compensation to those discriminated against for actual loss of pay,
16
 479 F.2d at 359, 5 FEY Cases at 826-27.
'/ Id.
11
 401 U.S. 424, 3 FE? Cases 175 (1971),
16
 479 F.2d at 360-63, 5 FEP Cases at 827-29,
2 ')
 Id. at 365-66, 5 FEP Cases at 832.
21
 Id. at 366, 5 FEY Cases at 832-33.
22
 Id. at 367-68, 5 FEY Cases at 834.
23
 Id. at 369-70, 5 FEP Cases at 835-36.
24
 Id. at 373-80, 5 FEY Cases at 838-44.
25 Id.
26
 Id. at 378-80, 5 FEP Cases at 842-43.
27 Id.
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and they act as a deterrent to employers and unions, thereby per-
forming a crucial function in the remedial process. 28 The company
could have unilaterally eliminated the discriminatory practices and
the parties responsible appeared before the court; thus, backpay
awards would have been appropriate under the circumstances of the
case. But the court in N.L. Industries nonetheless declined to make
such an award, giving only the following explanation of its decision:
[lin this Circuit the law in regard to back pay has not been
adequately defined to provide employers and unions with
notice that they will be liable for a discriminatee's
economic losses due to continuation of past or present
discriminatory policies. 29
It can arguably be inferred that the Eighth Circuit, having defined
the law in this case, and thereby having given employers and unions
notice, will in the future grant back pay awards. Although back pay
awards are not expressly made mandatory by Title VII, the decision
in N.L. Industries conflicts with results reached by other circuits on
similar facts and it clearly frustrates the purpose of Title VII. 3 °
Prior case law in the courts of appeals recognized the appro-
priateness of back pay awards under Title VII. In the leading case,
Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 31 the Seventh Circuit stated that
"[t]he clear purpose of Title VII is to bring an end to the proscribed
discriminatory practices and to make whole, in a pecuniary fashion,
those who have suffered . . ."32 In Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 33 a
case factually similar to N.L. Industries, the Fourth Circuit
reasoned that "[t]he back pay award is not punitive in nature, but
equitable—intended to restore the recipients to their rightful
economic status absent the effects of the unlawful discrimination." 34
Congress apparently intended to encourage awards of back pay
under Title VII, since section 706(g) expressly authorizes such
relief. 35 During the Survey year, the Sixth Circuit, following the
Fourth and Seventh Circuits in Lorillard and Bowe respectively,
specifically acknowledged the propriety of back pay awards under
'a Id.
29
 Id. at 380, 5 FEP Cases at 843.
3D
 However, good faith reliance on an apparently valid female protective statute has
been recognized as a sufficient justification for the denial of a back pay award. Kober v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 480 F.2d 240, 5 FEP Cases at 1166 (3d Cir. 1973).
31
 416 F.2d 711, 2 FEP Cases 121 (7th Cir. 1969).
32
 Id. at 720, 2 FEP Cases at 126.
33
 444 F.2d 791, 3 FEP Cases 653 (4th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971).
34
 Id. at 802, 3 FEP Cases at 661.
35
 42 U.S.C. .§ 2000e-5(g) (1972).
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Title VII, 36 while the Fifth Circuit in Peters v. Missouri Pacific
R.R. Co.," affirmed a back pay award to retired employees without
discussion, and the Third Circuit cited Bowe in ordering the pay-
ment of back retirement compensation. 38
In Head v. Timken Roller Bearing Co., 39 the plaintiff em-
ployees brought a class action against the employer, Timken, and
against their labor union for the creation and enforcement of an
alleged racially discriminatory seniority and transfer system, which
was very similar to the plan involved in N.L. Industries." Prior to
the effective date of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Timken employed
racially discriminatory hiring procedures which, coupled with a
departmental seniority system in operation until 1968, denied equal
opportunity to black employees. 41
 The Sixth Circuit agreed with the
trial court's holding that the seniority system was not justified by
business necessity. 42 However, the circuit court held that the district
court erred in refusing to award back pay to the plaintiffs. 43
Relying on Bowe and Lorillard, the Sixth Circuit in Head
reasoned that back pay is an appropriate remedy under Title VII
and that the legislative history of section 706(g) revealed the Con-
gressional intent to give the courts wide discretion in exercising their
equitable powers to eliminate discrimination and to restore ag-
grieved persons to their rightful economic position." Significantly,
Head would support a rule that back pay is required under Title VII
in the absence of unusual circumstances justifying a denial of such
relief:
The finding of discrimination by the district court, in
addition to the nature of the relief (compensatory rather
36 Head v. Timken Roller Bearing Co., 486 F.2d 870, 876, 6 FE? Cases 813, 816-17 (6th
Cir. 1973).
" Peters v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 483 F.2d 490, 5 FEP Cases 853, 854 (5th Cir, 1973).
The court affirmed the award of back wages to the plaintiffs, six retired black employees of
the railroad and the reinstatement of those under age 70. The district court correctly con-
cluded that the employer had violated section 703(a) of Title VII in entering and enforcing a
collective bargaining agreement with the all-black union which provided for mandatory
retirement at age 65, while also contracting with the counterpart white union for mandatory
retirement at age 70. Id. at 492-93, 5 FE? Cases at 854. Even though the agreements resulted
from a statutory duty to bargain collectively and even though the black union apparently
fulfilled its duty of fair representation in entering the contract, the court held that the
employer violated Title VII since, in enforcing the agreement, the employer preserved the
effects of past discrimination. Id. at 496-97, 5 FEP Cases at 857-58.
38 Rosen v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 477 F.2d 90, 5 FEP Cases 709 (3d Cir. 1973).
29 486 F.2d 870, 6 FEP Cases 813.
4° 479 F.2d 354, 5 FEP Cases 823 (8th Cir. 1973).
41 486 F.2d at 875-76, 6 FEP Cases at 816.
42 Id.
4 ' Id. at 878, 6 FEP Cases at 818.
44 Id. at 875-76, 6 FEP Cases at 816.
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than punitive), and the clear intent of Congress that the
grant of authority under Title VII should be broadly read
and applied mandate an award of back pay unless excep-
tional circumstances are present. 45
Finding neither a valid defense to an award of back pay on the basis
of business necessity, nor any reasonable cause for denial of such an
award, the Sixth Circuit reversed the trial court's denial of back pay
and remanded. 46
 The circuit court acknowledged that Congress
apparently intended that the award of back pay under Title VII
should rest within the sound discretion of the trial court, but stated
that such decisions are not free from appellate scrutiny. 47
 Reliance
-was placed on prior case law which established that trial courts
must exercise such discretion with a view toward effectuating the
purposes of the enabling legislation."
Head thus implies that a failure to award back pay to those
suffering economic loss as a result of discrimination prohibited by
Title VII amounts to an abuse of discretion by the trial court in the
absence of justifying business necessity or other undefined excep-
tional circumstances. In so implying, the Sixth Circuit seems to be
willing to go significantly further than the other circuits in compen-
sating victims of Title VII violations.
Prior to the Sixth Circuit's decision in Head, the Third Circuit
in Rosen v. Public Service Electric Co. 49
 adopted the Bowe and
Lorillard rationale and granted affirmative relief in the form of back
retirement compensation and increased future retirement benefits.
In Rosen, the trial court held that both the original and the revised
versions of the company's pension plans discriminated on the basis
of sex in violation of section 703(a) but the court did not award
compensatory damages. 5° The original plan discriminated against
men insofar as they received a lower pension than women upon
retirement at age sixty, and against women because their.mandatory
retirement age was lower than that of male employees." The re-
vised plan, instituted in 1967, made retirement mandatory at age 70
for all employees, and it provided for early retirement at 60 with
reduced pensions, but it continued to favor women through early
45
 Id. at 876, 6 FEP Cases at 817.
4
 Id. at 880, 5 FE? Cases at 819. In response to Timken's claim of good faith, the court
stated that good faith is not a valid defense to an award of back pay. Id. at 877, 5 FEP Cases
at 817.
47 Id .
45 Id.
49
 477 F.2d 90, 95-96, 5 FEP Cases 709, 712 (3d Cir. 1973).
5° Id. at 92, 5 FEP Cases at 710.
s' Id. at 93-94, 5 FEP Cases at 710.
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retirement pension for service prior to the effective date of the
plan. 52
On appeal, the Third Circuit held that the pension plans dis-
criminated on the basis of sex with respect to "terms, conditions or
privileges of employment" within the meaning of section 703(a)(1). 53
Equality could properly be achieved by raising the level of men's
pensions." Citing Bowe, the Rosen court reasoned both that the
grant of authority to award appropriate affirmative relief in section
706(g) should be read broadly and applied so as to effectively termi-
nate the practice and make the victims whole, 55 and that a duty
exists to render such affirmative relief as is needed to remedy the
effects of past discrimination by restoring plaintiffs to their proper
economic status. The plaintiffs in Rosen contended that compensa-
tory damages should have been awarded by the trial court. Accept-
ing this contention, the Third Circuit held that retirement benefits of
males must be increased accordingly. 56
The Head, Peters and Rosen decisions, following Bowe and
Lorillard, represent a clear majority view among the circuits which
have expressly considered the issue of the appropriateness of back
pay awards under Title VII, with the Eighth Circuit alone reaching
the opposite result. The dominant and, it is submitted, more
reasonable view, is that back pay awards are generally required
under Title VII to fulfill the purposes of that Act: elimination of
present employment discrimination, restoration of aggrieved persons
to their rightful economic status, and deterrence of future unlawful
employment practices. It seems probable that the Supreme Court, if
confronted with this conflict, will reject the Eighth Circuit's refusal
to grant back pay, and will adopt the current majority view. How-
ever, the Eighth Circuit may obviate the conflict by granting back
pay in a future case, pursuant to the implications of N.L. Indus-
tries.
2. Hiring Ratios in Public Employment Cases: Morrow; Harper
Issues concerning minority hiring and promotion preference
orders in public employment cases have recently given rise to con-
52 Id.
" Id. at 95, 5 FE? Cases at 711. The defendant contended that the revised plan was
valid because it resulted from collective bargaining, but the court correctly rejected this
argument on the grounds that Title VII rights cannot be bargained away. Id., 5 FE? Cases at
712. Decisions in other circuits conform to this result. See note 37 supra; Robinson v.
Lorillard, 444 F.2d at 799, 3 FEP Cases at 658.
" 477 F.2d at 95, 5 FE? Cases at 712.
55
 Id. at 95-96, 5 FEP Cases at 712.
56 Id.
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siderable litigation." Minority preference orders are designed to
remedy the effects of past discriminatory hiring or promotion prac-
tices and generally require accelerated favorable employment action
with respect to minority group members on the basis of a mathemat-
ical ratio. To date, most of these cases have arisen prior to the
enactment of the Equal Employment Opportunities Act of 1972.
The majority of employers upon whom courts have imposed minor-
ity hiring and promotion preference orders have been local govern-
ment agencies, which were not "employers" subject to Title VII
prohibitions prior to the 1972 Act. As a result, the preference order
cases generally arose under the Constitution and section 1981. 58
However, the courts have drawn analogies from cases decided
under Title VII. Thus, it would seem that these cases can be used as
a basis for predicting or even determining the outcome of cases
arising under Title VII after the 1972 Amendments.
Minority preference orders raise constitutional issues of "reverse
discrimination" against members of the previously privileged major-
ity groups. 59 These issues were first resolved by the Eighth Circuit
in Carter v. Gallagher. 60
In Carter, the fire department in the city of Minneapolis had
535 employees in 1970, but none of them were black, Indian, or
Chicano. 61 Claiming that the civil service commission discriminated
against minority group applicants in.its hiring procedures for the fire
department, the plaintiffs brought a class action against the respon-
sible individuals, in their personal and official capacities, seeking
declaratory and injunctive relief. 62 The trial court found that the
discriminatory practices of the Minneapolis Civil Service Commis-
57 See cases cited in note 83 infra.
59 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970). There would appear to be no question of the propriety of an
assertion of jurisdiction by a court under § 1981 in these public employment cases since relief
was not available under Title VII. However, in the future, courts will be faced with the
necessity of reconciling Title VII actions and § 1981 suits in public as well as private
employment discrimination cases. See, Comment, 1971-1972 Annual Survey of Labor Rela-
tions Law, 13 B.C..Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 1347, 1350 (1972).
59 See Harper v. Mayor & City Council, 359 F. Supp. 1187, 5 FEP Cases 1050 (D. Md.
1972), affd and modified in part sub. nom., Harper v. Kloster, 486 F.2d 1134, 6 FE? Cases
880 (4th Cir. 1973), refusing to grant a request for a minority hiring quota or preference order,
suggesting but not holding that, as racial classifications, such orders would be constitutionally
impermissible, distinguishing the school segregation issue, and finding no "sufficiently compel-
ling need" to impose such "quotas" in the case before it. 359 F. Supp. at 1214, 5 FEP Cases at
1069-70.
60 452 F.2d 315, 3 FEP Cases 900 (8th Cir.), affd and modified on rehearing, 452 F.2d
327, 4 FEP Cases 121 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972). For a thorough
discussion of Carter, see Comment, 14 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 293 (1972).
61 3 FEP Cases 692, 695 (D. Minn. 1971).
62 Id.
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sion violated section 1981 63 and the equal protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, and that relief could be given under sec-
tion 1983. 64 On the basis of these conclusions, the district court
directed the commission to give "absolute preference" to twenty
minority group applicants for employment with the fire department,
that is, to hire only members of minority groups to fill the next
twenty positions open in the fire department. 65 Reasoning that
statistical evidence can suffice to establish a prima facie case of
discrimination and that the defendants had introduced no substan-
tial evidence to rebut the inference of racial discrimination based on
the statistics, 66 the Eighth Circuit panel affirmed the trial court's
finding of racially discriminatory hiring testing procedures. 67 Griggs
established that good intent does not constitute a defense to an
action for discrimination brought under Title VII. 68 Similarly, the
panel of the Eighth Circuit in Carter reasoned that neither section
1981 nor 1983 required wilful discrimination or bad faith as a
prerequisite to relief. 69 However, the circuit court panel vacated the
absolute preference order, holding that it violated the rights of white
applicants under section 1981 and the equal protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 7 °
Carter established that absolgte minority hiring preference or-
ders violate section 1981 and the Constitution, and no circuit since
Carter has approved such an order in a class action for discrimina-
tion in public employment. The Eighth Circuit panel concluded that
section 1981 and the Fourteenth Amendment prohibit employment
discrimination against any race and that the absolute preference
order would result in the denial of employment to qualified whites
solely on the basis of race. 71 It would appear that absolute prefer-
ence orders would also violate Title VII. Section 703(j) prohibits an
interpretation that Title VII requires an employer to grant preferen-
tial treatment to any individual or group to correct imbalances in
the representation of any race, color, religion, sex, or national origin
among employees. 72 The Eighth Circuit in Carter stated that Griggs
63 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970).
64
	U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
65 3 FEP Cases at 709.
66 452 F.2d at 323, 3 FEP Cases at 905.
67 Id.
66 401 U.S. at 4.32, 3 FEP Cases at 178.
69 452 F.2d at 323, 3 FEP Cases at 906.
7° Id. at 325, 327, 3 FEP Cases at 907,'909.
7 ' Id. at 325, 3 FEP Cases at 907. The court did not, however, discuss the question of
whether this racial classification, though suspect under current equal protection analysis,
could be justified by a compelling state interest.
72 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (1970),
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supported the decision not to uphold the absolute preference order,
though Griggs was not decided under section 1981 and the Four-
teenth Amendment. 73 In Griggs, the Supreme Court reasoned that
Congress, in enacting Title VII, proscribed only discriminatory pre-
ference for any group, majority or minority, and did not command
that persons be hired simply because of their status as minority
group members. 74
Although absolute hiring preference orders appear to be pro-
hibited by the Constitution and section 1981, as well as by Title
VII, on rehearing en banc in Carter, 75 the Eighth Circuit directed
the trial court to enter a limited hiring preference order, or hiring
ratio, stating that such orders are within authority possessed by trial
courts, and thereby implying that minority preference orders are
permissible under section 1981 and the Fourteenth Amendment. 76
On rehearing en banc, the circuit court recognized the need for a
remedy which would erase the effects of past discrimination without
infringing upon constitutional rights of majority applicants." The
Eighth Circuit directed the trial court to order implementation of a
hiring ratio of one minority applicant out of every three persons
hired until twenty minority group persons had been accepted by the
fire department. 78 "Such a procedure does not constitute a 'quota'
system because as soon as the trial court's order is fully im-
plemented, all hirings will be on a racially nondiscriminatory basis
"79 The hiring ratio order would remedy the effects of past
discrimination, without depriving qualified whites of employment
opportunity. The court noted that analogous relief would be avail-
able under section 706(g) 8° of Title VII, which authorizes "such
affirmative relief as may be appropriate, which may include . .
hiring of employees . . . ." Moreover, the Eighth Circuit stated that
the anti-preference section of Title VII, section 703(j), 8 ' does not
limit the power of a court to order affirmative relief to correct the
effects of past discrimination. 82 Following Carter, several circuits
have ordered or affirmed such remedies in public employment cases
under the Fourteenth Amendment and sections 1981 and 1983, 83
73
 452 F.2d at 325, 3 FEP Cases at 907.
74
 401 U.S. at 430-31.
7S
 452 F.2d 327, 4 FEP Cases 121 (8th Cir. 1 97 2) .
7
 Id. at 330-31, 4 FE? Cases at 124.
7 7 Id.
78 Id.
ig Id. at 330, 4 FEE' Cases at 124.
g° 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1970).
61
 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (1970).
e2 452 F.2d at 329, 4 FE? Cases at 123.
83
 See Vulcan Soc'y v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 490 F.2d 387, 6 FEP Cases 1045 (2d Cir.
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while the Fourth Circuit, in a panel decision 84 during the Survey
year, has affirmed a denial of a "hiring quota" and expressed agree-
ment with the trial court's disapproval of "hiring quotas." 85
The cases involving minority preference orders have arisen on
very similar factual situations." Generally, the plaintiffs have been
minority group members whose applications for employment with
fire departments or with state or local police forces were rejected
because of inadequate performance on various forms of hiring ex-
aminations. The plaintiffs have introduced statistics which reveal
that the examinations have discriminatory impact, and the plaintiffs
contend that the tests are not substantially job related. The statistics
also demonstrate: the wide discrepancy between the passing perfor-
mance rate of whites, and that of minority group members on the
examinations; and the discrepancy between the percentage of minor-
ity group persons employed as policemen or firemen, and the per-
centage of the population in the relevant geographical area com-
prised of such minority group members.
Since the cases reported to date are not governed by Title VII,
that Act and the EEOC Guidelines issued thereunder which pertain
to employment examinations 87 are not controlling. However, in
requiring justification of discriminatory examinations, various fed-
eral courts have applied the job-relatedness standard developed by
the EEOC88
 pursuant to section 703(h) of the Civil Rights Act of
196489 and adopted by the Supreme Court in Griggs." Section
703(h) permits an employer to base employment decisions upon the
results of a "professionally developed ability test" so long as the test
is neither designed nor used to discriminate." The Supreme Court
in Griggs adopted the EEOC interpretation of "professionally de-
veloped ability test" as permitting only the use of job-related tests:
1973); Commonwealth v. O'Neill, 473 F.2d 1029, 5 FEP Casa 713 (3d Cir. 1973) (equally
divided).
94
 Harper v. Kloster, 486 F,2d 1134, 6 FEP Cases 880 (4th Cir. 1973).
85
 Id. at 1136, 6 FEP Cases at 882.
as See Vulcan Soc'y v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 490 F.2d 387, 6 FEP Cases 1045 (2d Cir.
1973); Bridgeport Guardians v. Comm'n, 482 F.2d 1333, 5 FEP Cases 1344 (2d Cir. 1973);
Morrow v. Crider 479 F.2d 960, 5 FE? Cases 934 (5th Cir. 1973), aff'd and remanded on
rehearing, 491 F.2d 1053, 7 FEP Cases 586 (1974); Commonwealth v. O'Neill, 473 F.2d 1029,
5 FEP Cases 713 (3d Cir. 1973); Castro v. Beecher, 459 F.2d 725, 4 FEP Cases 700 (1st Cir.
1972); Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F,2d 323, 4 FEP Cases 121 (8th Cir. 1972),
" 29 C.F.R. * 1607 (1973).
" Id.
99
 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1970).
9° 401 U.S. at 433-34. This standard was applied in Bridgeport Guardians v. Civil Serv.
Comm'n, 482 F.2d at 1337, 5 FEP Cases at 1347; Castro v. Beecher, 459 F.2d at 732, 4 FEP
Cases at 706; Commonwealth v. O'Neill, 348 F. Supp. 1084, 1102-03, 4 FE? Cases 970, 984
(E.D. Pa. 1972).
9/
 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1970).
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those which fairly measure "the knowledge or skills required by the
particular job or class of jobs." 92 The Griggs standard, adopted
from the EEOC guidelines, bears a significant relationship to minor-
ity preference order issues. The cases which have resulted in the
entrance of such orders, have often involved charges of discrimina-
tory employment tests and employment qualifications. Further, the
courts have scrutinized discriminatory hiring examinations under
the Griggs standard, which is that the tests must be substantially
job-related, rather than under the compelling state interest test. 93
The First Circuit, in Castro v. Beecher," was the first circuit
court to adopt the Griggs standard in a case not controlled by Title
VII. In holding that a hiring ratio or limited preference order would
be appropriate to remedy the effects of past discrimination in the
hiring of Boston policemen, 95 the court affirmed the finding of the
trial court that the hiring test had a racially discriminatory impact
and was not substantially job-related. 96 Castro is significant because
the court, in holding that use of the hiring examination violated the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, applied
neither the rational basis test nor the compelling state interest .
standard. 97 Instead, the First Circuit adopted the arguably less
demanding job-relatedness standard of Griggs.
Upon a determination that an examination has a discriminatory
impact and is not substantially related to job performance, the trend
of federal court decisions, in public employment cases since Carter
was decided in 1972, has been toward willingness to order minority
hiring preferences to remedy the effects of past discrimination. De-
velopments during the Survey year have highlighted this trend and
it now appears that approval of minority hiring preference orders
represents the majority view among the federal courts, although the
Fourth Circuit appears to have adopted the opposite position.
During the Survey year, the Second and Third Circuits
affirmed limited preference orders, or hiring ratios, entered by the
respective trial courts in public employment cases under section
1981 and the Fourteenth Amendment." In contrast, the Fourth
Circuit in Harper v. Kloster99 held that the trial court properly
refused to order a minority hiring preference or to retain jurisdiction
91
 401 U.S. at 433-34, 3 FEP Cases at 178-79.
93 See cases cited in note 90 supra.
" 459 F.241 725, 4 FEP Cases 700 (1st Cir. 1972).
95
 Id. at 736-37, 4 FEP Cases at 709.
99
 Id. at 735, 4 FEP Cases at 708.
97
 Id. at 733, 4 FEP Cases at 706.
98
 Vulcan Soc'y v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 490 F.2d 387, 6 FEP Cases 1045 (2d Cir. 1973);
Commonwealth v. O'Neill, 473 F.2d 1029, 5 FEP Cases 713 (3d Cir. 1973).
99
 486 F.2d 1134, 1136-37, 6 FEP Cases 880, 882 (4th Cir. 1973). 	 .
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in order to remedy the effects of discrimination. The Fifth Circuit,
in Morrow v. Crisler,Itm held initially in a panel decision, that the
district court did not abuse its discretion in failing to enter a limited
hiring preference order to remedy the effects of discrimination, but
the circuit court retained jurisdiction."' Upon rehearing by the
Fifth Circuit en bane in Morrow, the case was remanded to the trial
court with directions to order some form of affirmative hiring
relief. 1 ° 2
In Morrow, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the finding of the trial
court that the Mississippi State Highway Patrol had engaged in a
pattern and practice of racial discrimination in its hiring procedures
which violated the Fourteenth Amendment:° 3 Statistics in the trial
record showed that the state's population was over thirty-six percent
black, but that there had never been a black state highway patrol
officer in Mississippi. 104 In a panel decision, the Fifth Circuit
affirmed the decree of the district court which "delcared the right of
the plaintiffs and the members of the plaintiff class to be treated
equally without racial discrimination." 105 The defendants were re-
quired to conduct an affirmative recruiting program directed toward
attracting black applicants and to comply with regulations prohibit-
ing the use of any racial terms and epithets: 06 The Fifth Circuit
panel affirmed the injunction prohibiting racial discrimination in the
processing of applications and prohibiting the use of intelligence
tests which had not been validated or proven to be significantly
related to job performance.'"
The pivotal issue determined in the panel opinion was whether
the trial court abused its discretion by failing to grant equitable
relief which would be sufficient to bar future discrimination as well
as to remove the discriminatory effects of past unlawful employment
practices.'" Without reaching the question of whether the Constitu-
tion permits "quota based relief, a point that deserves serious
consideration,"t 09 the Fifth Circuit panel reasoned that there was no
showing that the relief which was granted would not remedy the
wrong. Therefore, the court held that denial of relief in the form of
'°° 479 F.2d 960, 5 FEP Cases 934 (5th Cir. 1973), afrd and remanded on rehearing, 491
F.2d 1053, 7 FEP Cases 586 (1974).
1 ° 1
 479 F.2d at 964, 5 FEP Cases at 937.
102 491 F.2d at 1055, 7 FEP Cases at 587.
1 ° 3
 479 F.2d at 962, 5 FEP Cases at 935.
'" Id.
105 Ed .
'° Id.
1 ° 7 Id.
479 F.2d at 963, 5 FEP Cases at 936.
1 °9
 Id. at 964, 5 FEP Cases at 937. In Carter, the Eighth Circuit clearly stated that the
hiring ratio order did not amount to a quota system. 452 F.2d at 330-31, 4 FEP Cases at 124.
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a limited hiring preference order did not constitute an abuse of
discretion; nonetheless, the court retained jurisdiction "to make the
decree work."tt°
Significantly, the panel decision in Morrow suggests a method
of accommodating: the broad discretion traditionally afforded trial
courts in fashioning equitable decrees and the need to order
sufficient affirmative class-wide relief to eradicate the effects of past
discriminatory hiring practices. However, if the panel decision is
followed in similar cases where the trial court has declined to order
a minority hiring preference ratio, Morrow could result in delaying
and hindering the vindication of constitutional and Title VII rights.
Judge Goldberg entered a dissent to the panel opinion." He
noted that the district court had offered no explanation for withhold-
ing the requested limited hiring preference order and concluded that
the relief afforded, amounting to little more than an order to " 'stop
discriminating,' " was inadequate to remedy the constitutional
deprivations." 2 He cited Carter and Castro as support for the
proposition that affirmative relief in the form of hiring ratios is both
appropriate and necessary"' where an historical pattern of dis-
crimination is shown in public employment cases. In Carter, the
Eighth Circuit vacated the absolute preference order and directed
the imposition of a hiring preference ratio.'" The First Circuit in
Castro did state that "some form of compensatory relief is man-
dated" and implied that a limited hiring preference order is neces-
sary in such cases)" However, the First Circuit in Castro also
predicated its decision upon the district court's error in denying the
plaintiffs' request to maintain a class action, since that denial ren-
dered a hiring ratio inappropriatei" and, consequently, the court
did not hold that the failure to impose a hiring ratio constituted an
abuse of discretion.
On rehearing en bane in Morrow, the Fifth Circuit decided
that:
. . . the case should have been and must now be remanded
for the District Court, in the first instance, to fashion an
appropriate decree which will have the certain result of
increasing the number of blacks on the Highway Patrol." 7
II° 452 F.2d at 330-31, 4 FEP Cases at 124.
"' 479 F.2d at 968, 5 FEP Cases at 937.
II2 Id. at 970, 5 FEP Cases at 938.
"3 Id. at 971-72, 5 FEP Cases at 939-40.
II' See text at notes 60-85 supra.
I" 459 F.2d at 736-37, 4 FEP Cases at 709.
16 Id. at 735-36, 4 FEP Cases at 705.
"3 491 F.2d at 1055, 7 FEP Cases at 587.
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While ninety-one patrolmen were added to the force of five hundred
after the district court decision, only six of those hired were
blacks.' 18 This experience convinced the circuit court on rehearing
that the trial court was "wrong" and that the relief ordered was
"insufficient." 19 Consequently, the case was remanded to the dis-
trict court with guidelines to aid in shaping a decree.' 2 °
Beyond insuring that objective hiring criteria are
utilized, it will be incumbent on the District Court to order
some affirmative hiring relief. It may, within the bounds of
discretion, order temporary one-to-one or one-to-two hir-
ing, the creation of hiring pools, or a freeze on white
hiring, or any other form of affirmative hiring relief until
the Patrol is effectively integrated. We emphasize, how-
ever, that the imposition of some affirmative hiring relief
need not inexorably lead to the dilution of valid employ-
ment requirements. 121
The en bane decision in Morrow would appear to indicate that, in
similar factual situations in the future, the Fifth Circuit will require
the trial court to grant affirmative relief in the form of minority
hiring preference orders.
The Survey year panel decision of the Fourth Circuit in Harper
v. Kloster' 22 presents a sharp contrast to the decisions of the First,
Second, Third, Fifth and Eighth Circuits 123 approving limited hir-
ing preference orders. The trial court in Harper concluded that the
hiring examinations utilized in hiring firemen had a discriminatory
impact 124
 and were not substantially related to job performance. 125
Moreover, the court concluded that the plaintiff class had been
subject to a pattern of historical discrimination. 126 Nonetheless, the
plaintiffs' request for a minority hiring preference order was re-
jected. 127 Reasoning that the constitutional status of "hiring quotas"
is an unsettled question, the trial court suggested that "racial em-
ployment quotas may not be valid ingredients in relief," 128
 denied
IN Id .
119
 Id.
120 Id .
Id. at 1056, 7 FE? Cases at 588.
122
 486 F.2d 1134, 6 FE? Cases 880 (4th Cir. 1973).
123
 See cases cited in note 86 supra.
124
 359 F. Supp. at 1199, 5 FEP Cases at 1057.
' 25
 Id, at 1203, 5 FEP Cases at 1060.
125
 Id. at 1195, 5 FEP Cases at 1054.
127
 Id. at 1213, 5 FEP Cases at 1069.
128
 Id. at 1214, 5 FEP Cases at 1069. The court referred to minority hiring preference
orders as "hiring quotas." Id. at 1215, 5 FEP Cases at 1070.
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the requested remedy, and ordered instead that hiring be confined to
residents of the City of Baltimore. 129
The trial court's refusal to order a "hiring quota" in Harper was
based upon the premise that minority hiring preference orders create
suspect classifications and must be subject to rigid scrutiny."°
Moreover, the use of racial quotas in education cases was distin-
guished.
Racial quotas in education impose no burden on anyone,
since no one has a right to attend a segregated school. On
the contrary, all prospective employees have the right to
consideration for public employment without regard to
race. 131
Purporting not to choose between applying the standard of business
necessity or that of a compelling state interest to justify the imposi-
tion of a hiring preference order, 132 the court found no need to enter
such an order.
The Court simply concludes that the law's rigid scrutiny of
racial classifications must be an element of the Court's
exercise of its remedial powers. And in this case, no
sufficiently compelling need exists for the imposition of
racial quotas. 133
In effect, the trial court in Harper did apply the compelling state
interest test in determining whether to grant a minority hiring
preference order. On appeal, a panel of the Fourth Circuit modified
the district court's decision as to parties and expressly affirmed the
denial of the requested "hiring quota" as well as the determination
of the trial court not to retain jurisdiction. 134
The en banc decision of the Fifth Circuit in Morrow suggests
that failure to grant minority hiring preference orders in cases of
historical discrimination against a minority group may be an abuse '
of discretion. Harper, in contrast, suggests that minority hiring
preference orders may not be constitutionally permissible. Harper
casts a shadow of uncertainty over the constitutional status of
minority hiring preference orders, raising the possibility that they
may be impermissible racial classifications. 135 As the trial court
129 Id. at 1215, 5 FEP Cases at 1070.
130
 Id. at 1213-14, 5 FEP Cases at 1069-70.
131
 Id. at 1214, 5 FEP Cases at 1069.
132
 Id., 5 FEP Cases at 1070.
133 Id,
134 486 F.2d at 1136-37, 6 FEP Cases at 882-83.
1 .33
 Harper derives some support from the dissenting opinion of Justice Douglas in
DeFunis v. Odegaard, — U.S. —, 94 S. Ct. 1704, 1708 (1974). Because the University of
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stated in Harper, this is by no means a settled question." 6 It awaits
final resolution by the Supreme Court. Meanwhile, however,
Harper is likely to remain a minority view, and the majority of
federal courts will continue to approve limited minority hiring pref-
erences orders in public employment cases to remedy the effects of
discriminatory hiring practices. It should also be noted that the
question of whether a compelling state interest exists in eliminating
racial barriers to public employment, as well as the effects of past
discrimination, underlies the controversy over the constitutionality
of minority hiring preference orders. Thus, racial classifications in
the form of hiring preference orders might be justified under even
the most rigid scrutiny.
There is considerable support for the view that limited minority
hiring preference orders are permissible to remedy the effects of an
historical pattern of discrimination in a public employment case.
The First Circuit in Castro reversed a denial of such relief and
recognized the necessity of ordering some form of hiring
preference. 137
 In a recent school desegregation case, Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education., 138
 the Supreme Court
upheld the use of mathematical ratios "as a starting point" in fash-
Washington Law School utilized different criteria in judging minority group applicants and
white applicants, Justice Douglas reasoned that this racial classification was subject "to the
strictest scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause," 94 S. Ct. at 1714. However, he
concluded that, in light of the cultural bias inherent in the standardized admission test, the
law school was justified in applying different standards to minority group applicants. Id. at
1715. Nonetheless, justice Douglas used the opportunity presented by DeFunis to express
general disapproval of racial preferences on constitutional grounds.
Justice Douglas emphasized that each application should be considered "in a racially
neutral way." Id. at 1717. Moreover, he rejected the argument that a compelling state interest
justified "the racial discrimination that is practiced here." Id. at 1718.
The Equal Protection Clause commands the elimination of racial barriers not their
creation in order to satisfy our theory as to how society ought to be organized. . . .
All races can compete fairly at all professional levels. So far as race is concerned, any
state sponsored preference to one race over another in that competition is in my view
"invidious" and violative of the Equal Protection Clause.
Id. at 1718-19. Thus, it might be inferred from this dissenting opinion that all that is required,
indeed all that is permitted, in employment discrimination cases is the elimination of dis-
criminatory requirements. Like the Fourth Circuit in Harper, Justice Douglas distinguished
the school desegregation issue. He reasoned that the policy of prescribing racial ratios
proportional to representation in the population suggested in Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971), would not exclude anyone from a public school
and would not impinge upon constitutional rights since "no one has a right to attend a
segregated school." 94 S. Ct. at 1715 n.18. However, Justice Douglas also noted that
DeFunis, unlike Griggs, did not involve racial barriers and that there was no showing that the
policy of the law school was designed to eliminate "arbitrary and unnecessary barriers to entry
by certain racial groups. . . ." Id. This suggests that the use of minority hiring preference
orders to eliminate such barriers and to remedy the effects of past discrimination would be
permissible.
136 486 F.2d at 1213, 5 FE? Cases at 1069.
137
 459 F.2d at 737, 4 FEP Cases at 709.
138
 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
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ioning a remedy for a condition which offends the Constitution. 139
Moreover, the Supreme Court reasoned that school desegregation
cases are fundamentally similar to "other cases involving the fram-
ing of equitable remedies to repair the denial of a constitutional
right."'" The language of the Supreme Court's opinion in Louisiana
v. United States, 14 I lends strong support to the proposition that
minority hiring preference orders are constitutionally permissible
and arguably suggests that a denial of a limited hiring preference
order may constitute an abuse of discretion by the trial court in
certain circumstances. In Louisiana, which involved the denial of
black citizens' right to vote, the Supreme Court stated that "the
court has not merely the power but the duty to render a decree
which will so far as possible eliminate the discriminatory effects of
the past as well as bar like discrimination in the future." 142 Swann's
approval, in constitutional cases, of remedial orders which embody
mathematical ratios, coupled with the recognition in Louisiana that
courts have a duty to fashion such affirmative relief as will suffice to
remedy the effects of past discrimination, suggests that limited
minority hiring preference orders are constitutionally permissible.'"
In the future, Title VII will apply to public employment dis-
crimination cases because the Equal Employment Opportunity Act
of 1972 brought state and local governments under the section 701
definition of "employer." The question of the permissibility of lim-
ited minority preference orders in class actions under Title VII to
remedy the effects of prior discrimination is also unsettled. A final
determination that minority hiring preference orders do not violate
the Constitution would not necessarily resolve the issue of the per-
missibility of such orders under Title VII because the pertinent
statutory provisions are ambiguous, if not inconsistent. Section
703(j) of Title VII provides that the Act shall not be "interpreted to
require any employer . . . to grant preferential treatment to any
individual or to any group because of the race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin of such individual on account of an imbalance
which may exist . . ." between the percentage of such persons
employed and the percentage in the pertinent population of the
base.'" In Griggs, the Supreme Court stated that the Act does not
command that individuals be hired simply because they are mem-
139 Id. at 25.
14° Id. at 15-16.
141 380 U.S. 145 (1965).
142 Id. at 154 (emphasis added).
I" The Supreme Court denied certiorari in Carter. 406 U.S. 950 (1972). Cf. Watson v.
Memphis, 373 U.S 526, 539 (1963).
144
 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (1970).
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bers of under-represented minority groups. 145 However, it would
appear that limited hiring preference orders would be permissible
under Title VII. 146 In Carter, the Eighth Circuit, in referring by
analogy to Title VII, stated that section 703(j) "does not limit the
power of a court to order affirmative relief to correct the effects of
past unlawful practices." 147 This statement has support in the sta-
tute itself. Section 703(g) provides that the court may "order such
affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may include rein-
statement or hiring of employees .. . ." 148 Thus it is submitted that
section 703 permits but does not require limited minority hiring
preference orders, and the majority of federal circuit courts are
likely to uphold such orders on appeal under Title VII, as they have
under the Fourteenth Amendment and sections 1981 and 1983. 149
"5 401 U.S. at 430-31.
146
 See Comment, 14 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev., 297, 306 (1972). Although several
circuits have affirmed federal district court decisions ordering the implementation of hiring
ratios, no federal court of appeals has upheld a promotion preference order in a public
employment case. During the Survey year, the Second Circuit, in Bridgeport Guardians, Inc.
v. Comm'n, 482 F.2d 1333, 5 FEP Cases 1344 (2d Cir. 1973), and the Third Circuit, in
Commonwealth v. O'Neill, 473 F.2d 1029, 5 FEP Cases 713 (3d Cir. 1973), reversed limited
minority promotion preference orders entered by district courts in public employment cases.
In both of these cases, the police departments administered written hiring examinations which
were shown to have discriminatory impact. Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v. Comm'n, 482 F.2d
at 1336, 5 FEP Cases at 1346; Commonwealth v. O'Neill, 348 F. Supp. 1084, 1090-91, 4 FEP
Cases 970, 974-75 (E.D. Pa. 1972). The circuit courts refused to uphold the promotion quotas,
but affirmed the hiring preference orders. Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v. Comm'n, 482 F.2d at
1341, 5 FE? Cases at 1351; Commonwealth v. O'Neill, 473 F.2d at 1031, 5 FEP Cases at
714.
The reliance by the Courts, in determining public employment cases upon private
employer discrimination decisions under Title VII, suggests the appropriateness of limited
promotion preference orders. In United States v. N.L. Indus., 479 F.2d 354, 5 FEP Cases,
823 (8th Cir. 1973) the court found the foreman selection process discriminatory and conse-
quently ordered the employer to institute a minority promotion ratio. 479 F.2d at 378-80, 5
FEP Cases at 841-43. Promotions were to be made from a list of qualified employees. Id.
Where a plaintiff had introduced statistics showing the discriminatory impact of a promotion
test as well as the under-representation of minorities in the positions for which the test is
utilized, the courts should require the defendant to justify the examination under the job-
relatedness standard. If the defendant fails to do so, limited minority promotion preference
orders entered by district courts should be upheld. Such orders are designed to remedy the
effects of past discrimination and should be treated similarly to hiring ratios, which the courts
have consistently upheld on appeal.
147
 452 F.2d at 329, 4 FEP Cases at 123.
148
 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (1970).
146
 The significance of the present applicability of Title VII to public employment
discrimination cases should not be overestimated. Several circuits have allowed plaintiffs to
bring suit under § 1981 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and intentionally to bypass the delays
and obstacles under Title VII where both are available theories of relief. In those circuits,
limited minority preference orders would be available as remedies for past discrimination.
Caldwell v. National Brewing Co., 443 F.2d 1044, 1046, 3 FE? Cases 600, 602 (510 Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 916 (1972); Young v. International Tel. & Tel. Co., 438 F.2d
757, 764, 3 FEP Cases 146, 151 (3d Cir. 1971); Waters v. Wisconsin Works of Int'l Harvester
Co., 427 F.2d 476, 484, 2 FEP Cases 524, 530 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 911 (1970).
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Moreover, in Swann the Supreme Court upheld a lower court
school desegregation order imposing mathematical ratios's° under a
statute's' similar to section 703(j) in that it limited possible interpre-
tations of the powers granted under the legislation, and expressly
withheld authority to order busing to achieve racial balance. Writ-
ing the opinion for the unanimous Court in Swann, Chief Justice
Burger reasoned that the statute foreclosed an interpretation of Title
IV of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as expanding the existing powers
of federal courts.'" However, he concluded that the trial court's
busing order was permissible since the section did not restrict or
withdraw the "historic equitable remedial powers" of the courts.'"
Section 703(j) of Title VII should be construed similarly: as with-
holding a grant of additional powers, but not as reducing the exist-
ing powers of the federal courts to order affirmative relief to remedy
the effects of past discrimination.
VI. FEDERAL COURT INJUNCTIONS: Granny Goose Foods
In a decision during the Survey year, Granny Goose Foods,
Inc. v. Teamsters Local 70,' the Supreme Court resolved an impor-
tant procedural question regarding the effect of the removal of a
case to the federal court 2 after an ex parte, temporary injunction has
been issued by the state court. A federal statute provides that the
state court injunction "shall remain in full force and effect until
dissolved or modified" . by the federal district court exercising its
federal question removal jurisdiction. In Granny Goose Foods, the
Court unanimously held that this statute did not indefinitely extend
See, Comment, 1971-1972 Annual Survey of Labor Relations Law, 13 B.C. Ind. & Com. L.
Rev. 1347, 1350 (1972).
''° 402 U.S. at 32.
131 42 U.S.C.	 2000c-6 (1970).
152 402 U.S. at 17.	 •
153 Id.
I — U.S. —, 94 S. Ct. 1113, 85 L.R.R.M. 2481 (1974).
2 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1970) provides for removal of a case from a state court to the federal
district court where a question of federal law exists. This statute has been held to include
removal of suits for breach of a collective bargaining agreement. Avco Corp. v. Machinists
Lodge 735, 390 U.S. 557 (1968).
3 28 U.S.C. § 1450 (1970) provides in pertinent part:
Whenever any action is removed from a State court to a district court of the
United States, any attachment or sequestration of the goods or estate of the defen-
dant in such action in the State court shall hold the goods or estate to answer the
final judgment or decree in the same manner as they would have been held to
answer final judgment or decree had it been rendered by the State court. . .
All injunctions, orders, and other proceedings had in such action prior to its
removal shall remain in full force and effect until dissolved or modified by the
district court.
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the duration of the state court injunction beyond that period man-
dated by the state court. 4
The issue arose upon an employer's motion in the federal dis-
trict court to hold a union in contempt for allegedly violating a
temporary restraining order issued by a California state court
against strike activity. The federal district court granted the motion,
although the injunction had been limited by the state court to a
fifteen day period, which had expired more than six months before
the date of the alleged union contempt of that temporary
injunction.' The federal district court had held that when the case
was removed, shortly after the issuance of the state court restraining
order, under the federal removal statute that order was converted
into an injunction of indefinite duration because the statute required
that state court injunctions "remain in full force and effect until
dissolved or modified" by the federal district court. 6 Since no such
dissolution or modification had ever been made by it, the federal
district court found the union in contempt on the grounds that the
state court's temporary restraining order did not expire after the
passage of the fifteen-day period, but instead had remained in effect
indefinitely,' and was thus in effect at the time the alleged contempt
by the union occurred.
The Supreme Court disagreed ,
 with this interpretation of the
"full force and effect" removal statute, and sought to resolve a
conflict among the circuits over the effect of that statute. 8
 The Court
stated that the statute was not intended to turn state court tempo-
rary restraining orders confined to a limited time period into federal
court injunctions of unlimited duration merely due to the change
of jurisdiction. 9
 The majority opinion, with which the concurring
opinion agreed in this respect, '° reasoned that the "full force and
effect" removal statute was intended merely to protect the rights and
remedies delineated by the state court from lapse due to a change of
a jurisdiction of the case, and was not intended to give a party a
greater remedy after removal than that which was fashioned by the
state court.' I An interpretation of the statute as automatically re-
moving expiration dates from the state court injunction and sub-
4
 94 S. Ct. at 1124, 85 L.R.R.M. at 2486. A concurring opinion written by Justice
Rehnquist, with whom the Chief Justice and Justices Stewart and Powell concurred, agreed
with this holding, but differed with the majority on other issues. 94 S. Ct. at 1127, 85
L.R.R.M. at 2489.
5
 Id. at 1119.20, 85 L.R.R.M. at 2482-83.
Id. at 1121, 85 L.R.R.M. at 2483.
' Id.
Id. at 1118 n.2 (citing cases), 85 L, R. R.M. at 2481-82 n.2 (citing cases).
9
 Id. at 1122, 85 L.R.R.M. at 2485.
t" Id. at 1127, 85 L.R.12,114. at 2489.
" Id. at 1122-23, 85 L.R.R.M. at 2485.
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stituting an injunction of indefinite duration appeared to the Court
to give the party that sought the state injunction a greater remedy
after the removal than before, a result clearly not intended by
Congress. 12
This interpretation of the removal statute would have been
sufficient to permit the majority to conclude that the temporary
restraining order expired by its own terms after the fifteen-day
period, that is, almost six months before the alleged union contempt
of that order. Nevertheless, the majority opinion embarked upon a
second line of reasoning, disagreement with which provoked a con-
curring opinion. 13
 The majority stated that under Rule 65(b) 14 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the life of the state court injunc-
tion was in any case limited to a ten-day maximum duration, since
upon removal, the proceedings are governed by the procedural rules
of the federal court." Thus, the majority indicated that although
the federal removal statute provided for continued effect of the state
injunction according to its terms until dissolved or modified by the
federal district court, nevertheless the life of that state order would
be terminated sooner than defined by its terms if the ten-day Rule
65(b) period, as measured from the date of removal, expired
sooner. 16
An ex parte temporary restraining order issued by a state
court prior to removal remains in force after removal no
longer than it would have under state law, but in no event
does the order remain in force longer than the time limita-
tions imposed by Rule 65(b) measured from the date of
removal. 17
Although agreeing that the federal removal statute could not,
without action by the federal court, extend the state court order
beyond the duration for which it was issued, in his concurring
opinion, Justice Rehnquist's concurring opinion argued that Rule
65(b) could not be applied to restrict the duration for which the state
order was issued." Noting that the entire Court agreed that any
conflict between a procedural rule and a statute should be resolved
12 Id.
11
 Id. at 1127, 85 L.R.R.M. at 2489.
14
 Fed, R. Civ, P. 65(b) states in pertinent part:
Every temporary restraining order . . . shall expire by its terms within such time
after entry, not to exceed 10 days, as the court fixes, unless within the time so fixed
the order for good cause shown, is extended for a like period. . . .
15 94 S. Ct. at 1123, 85 L.R.R.M. at 2485-86.
16 Id. at 1123, 85 L.R.R.M. at 2486.
15
 Id. at 1124, 85 L.R.R.M. at 2486.
" Id. at 1127, 85 L.R.R.M. at 2487.
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in favor of the latter, Justice Rehnquist reasoned that the applica-
tion of Rule 65(b) to restrict the duration of the state order, without
federal court modification of the order, emasculated the statute. He
argued that the application of Rule 65(b) would allow a mere change
of jurisdiction to alter the effect of the state court order, without
compliance with the statutory requirement that such orders "remain
in full force and effect" until dissolution or modification by the
federal district court."
It is submitted that the concurring opinion is correct in argu-
ing that the time limitation of Rule 65(b) should not be utilized to
limit the duration of the state court temporary restraining order
issued prior to removal. To allow such restriction upon the life
of the state order would permit a mere change of jurisdiction to
shorten the prescribed life of the state contrary to the purpose
of the federal "full force and effect" removal statute. This dicta in
the majority opinion appears to have sanctioned this result.
However, the unanimous holding of the Court that the federal
removal statute does not in itself extend the life of the state order
beyond its original duration is logical. But, the majority's applica-
tion of Rule 65(b) to allow mere removal to abbreviate the life of
that order appears to contradict the rationale of that holding by
permitting a mere change of juriScliction, without action by the
federal court, to alter the rights of the parties as previously defined
by the state court. Thus, Granny Goose Foods, as applied to suits
between unions and employers, would appear to bestow a pro-
cedural advantage upon the party whose conduct has been enjoined
by the state court, since the life of the state court order may be
attenuated but not extended solely because of the change of jurisdic-
tion.
THOMAS J. FLAHERTY
MICHAEL J. VARTAIN
19 Id. at 1128, 85 L.R.R.M. at 2489-90.
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